No description available.

No description available.

This thesis is a cross-disciplinary study of legal history and customary law. Respect for, and accommodation of local customary law has been a constant and integral feature of law in Britain since Anglo-Saxon times. It guided the emergence of the common law, and continues as a rule of law to the present day. Such respect and accommodation was an essential principle that permitted the peaceful consolidation of the British realms from its constituent parts. Continuity of law is a legal presumption whether territories have been added by conquest, cession or annexation. The principle respect for local legal custom was one of two schools of thought carried to Britain's overseas colonies; the other was a theory that local customary law could be extinguished by non-recognition on the part of the British sovereign or his/her delegates. Nevertheless, customary laws and institutions were explicitly and implicitly recognized in the colonial period. The doctrine has modern application with respect to the customary law ways of indigenous peoples wherever the common law has been extended overseas. Rights under customary law are distinguished from Aboriginal rights, though there is some overlap between the two. Customary law can only be extinguished by an express statute, or by clearly unavoidable implication. Legal customs are not invalid merely for being contrary to the common law. Common law defers to valid customary law as a matter of constitutional common law. But the common law provides tests by which courts can identify valid legal custom. Where a valid, unextinguished legal custom is found, courts are bound by the common law to apply it. Where customary law can be identified, it binds the servants and agents of the Crown, except when it is inconsistent with Crown sovereignty itself.

This study examines two interconnected and as yet wholly neglected aspects of Max Weber's 'Sociology of Law,' namely, its substantive underpinnings and focal concern with the status of the judge. At the heart of the 'Sociology of Law' is a comparative analysis of the Continental and the English administrations of justice, which can best be understood when read against his substantive sociology and which requires an assiduous reading of the 'Sociology of Law.' Thus the first part of this examination elucidates Weber's overarching concern with the effects of bureaucratization on the development of personality. The second part provides a detailed explication of the 'Sociology of Law' which privileges his treatment of the Common Law and distinguishes the juristic and sociological strands of his analysis, re-examines his notion of formal and substantive rationality, pays close attention to his assessment of the Free Law Movement, and accords due place to his discussion of the anti-formalistic tendencies in modern law. Taken together, these expose the contradictions and assumptions which frame his tendentious analysis and bring to light the vital role he ascribes to the judge.

This thesis concerns the legal rules of contractual remoteness: these rules govern the extent of liability that is imposed on a breaching party to compensate for the adverse consequences that the breach causes. It is argued that the allocation of responsibility for such consequences is contained implicitly in the contract: every contract extends beyond its express terms, and the allocation of responsibility for the consequences of breach is one of the matters to which it extends. This latter assertion is supported by the argument that an assumption of responsibility for the consequences of breach is a fundamental part of what it means to make a promise. Hence the rules of remoteness are merely a specialised application of the general legal principles that are used to discover the unexpressed part of an agreement. These legal principles can be seen in operation in the implication of terms and the interpretation of expressed terms.

I address the problem of the lack of academic attention to evidentiary issues in Honduras in comparison to Common Law Countries. I feel that Honduran law students need to be taught a working scheme to deal with issues of admissibility and weight of evidence in order to achieve the rational determination of facts. / Moreover, I draw such a scheme from the conceptual basis for admission of evidence and the probative processes identified by Wigmore. I think that if this scheme were applied to trial records, academicians would identify problems in the admission and weight of evidence and would develop approaches to make reason and justice prevail. / The scheme is presented in the form of a chart and because it is adapted to the Honduran context I consider that it will have a positive effect on academic research, theorization and teaching of issues of admission and weight of evidence in Honduras.

The question asked by this thesis is when and why, as a matter of principle, should there be judicial scrutiny on the merits of administrative decisions on migration status ('migration status decisions') in the United Kingdom? It argues that this is a moral question, engaging concerns of fair treatment. The first two chapters examine the question theoretically. It is argued that access to justice is not a gift of citizenship and that migration status decision-making should be reviewable on the merits to avoid the appearance and/or occurrence of injustice in the light of the effects of migration control on individual migrants and the nature of migration status decision-making as 'very imperfect procedural justice' (save where a decision is not based on the judgment discretion of an administrator). The latter five chapters apply the normative claims to the United Kingdom constitutional context, including the relevant European regimes (European Convention on Fundamental Rights and European Union). First, as background to the argument, a history of recourse from migration status decision-making in the UK from the initial establishment of a review system in 1905 is sketched out. The history demonstrates the absence of a coherent or principled account of migration status appeals. The history is followed by a three-part critique of the current system of recourse in the UK. First rights of appeal in three case studies (deportation, offshore visitors and students) are examined. Secondly, the three standards of review available under judicial review (rationality, anxious scrutiny and proportionality) are critiqued, and thirdly, the contribution of European and international norms is considered. In general terms the thesis concludes that the current UK system of recourse is deficient in certain respects and suggests reform to the current appeals system.

This thesis is a cross-disciplinary study of legal history and customary law. Respect for, and accommodation of local customary law has been a constant and integral feature of law in Britain since Anglo-Saxon times. It guided the emergence of the common law, and continues as a rule of law to the present day. Such respect and accommodation was an essential principle that permitted the peaceful consolidation of the British realms from its constituent parts. Continuity of law is a legal presumption whether territories have been added by conquest, cession or annexation. The principle respect for local legal custom was one of two schools of thought carried to Britain's overseas colonies; the other was a theory that local customary law could be extinguished by non-recognition on the part of the British sovereign or his/her delegates. Nevertheless, customary laws and institutions were explicitly and implicitly recognized in the colonial period. The doctrine has modern application with respect to the customary law ways of indigenous peoples wherever the common law has been extended overseas. Rights under customary law are distinguished from Aboriginal rights, though there is some overlap between the two. Customary law can only be extinguished by an express statute, or by clearly unavoidable implication. Legal customs are not invalid merely for being contrary to the common law. Common law defers to valid customary law as a matter of constitutional common law. But the common law provides tests by which courts can identify valid legal custom. Where a valid, unextinguished legal custom is found, courts are bound by the common law to apply it. Where customary law can be identified, it binds the servants and agents of the Crown, except when it is inconsistent with Crown sovereignty itself. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

No description available.

No description available.