The question this contribution sets out to address is whether law can be regarded as a science. This notion is readily accepted by many, yet it is submitted that a proper theoretical justification for such an assumption is usually missing. The traditional primary sources of law, South African case law and legislation, distinguish between legal practice and legal science, but the basis of the distinction is not clear. However, an entire body of literature in the philosophy of science has developed around the question of when a discipline will amount to science. Various demarcation criteria proposed in philosophy of science are considered. These include that science uses the scientific method, is susceptible to falsification, is puzzle-solving within a paradigm or renders beneficial results. None of these criteria offer a satisfactory solution to the problem. The proposition by a group of philosophers including Herman Dooyeweerd, Marinus Stafleu and DFM Strauss, that the answer to the demarcation question is to be found in modal abstraction, is then considered. Modal abstraction amounts to a consideration of reality (persons, things, theories and rules) from one or more defined point(s) of entry. It is an artificial and learnt manner of thinking as it approaches reality from the perspective of one of the modalities of being. For example, juridical abstraction would mean that a cow is considered as the object of someone‟s proprietary rights. An abstract idea of the cow‟s characteristics, from a juridical point of view, is formed and the rules of property law are applied. A number of South African legal philosophers, amongst others Van Zyl, Van der Vyver and LM du Plessis, have followed this approach. The South African legislature also attempted to define the terms “science” and “research”, mainly for funding purposes. These definitions are considered and the conclusion is that they do not provide the clear-cut answers one would expect. It will be argued that the nature of activities will determine whether an endeavour is scientific or not. The conclusion is that an alignment of the demarcation criterion developed by Strauss and others and the statutory definitions can provide a workable demarcation criterion. This “test” is then applied to activities of law students, academics, practitioners and judicial officers to determine when they will be practicing “science”. / MPhil, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

The question this contribution sets out to address is whether law can be regarded as a science. This notion is readily accepted by many, yet it is submitted that a proper theoretical justification for such an assumption is usually missing. The traditional primary sources of law, South African case law and legislation, distinguish between legal practice and legal science, but the basis of the distinction is not clear. However, an entire body of literature in the philosophy of science has developed around the question of when a discipline will amount to science. Various demarcation criteria proposed in philosophy of science are considered. These include that science uses the scientific method, is susceptible to falsification, is puzzle-solving within a paradigm or renders beneficial results. None of these criteria offer a satisfactory solution to the problem. The proposition by a group of philosophers including Herman Dooyeweerd, Marinus Stafleu and DFM Strauss, that the answer to the demarcation question is to be found in modal abstraction, is then considered. Modal abstraction amounts to a consideration of reality (persons, things, theories and rules) from one or more defined point(s) of entry. It is an artificial and learnt manner of thinking as it approaches reality from the perspective of one of the modalities of being. For example, juridical abstraction would mean that a cow is considered as the object of someone‟s proprietary rights. An abstract idea of the cow‟s characteristics, from a juridical point of view, is formed and the rules of property law are applied. A number of South African legal philosophers, amongst others Van Zyl, Van der Vyver and LM du Plessis, have followed this approach. The South African legislature also attempted to define the terms “science” and “research”, mainly for funding purposes. These definitions are considered and the conclusion is that they do not provide the clear-cut answers one would expect. It will be argued that the nature of activities will determine whether an endeavour is scientific or not. The conclusion is that an alignment of the demarcation criterion developed by Strauss and others and the statutory definitions can provide a workable demarcation criterion. This “test” is then applied to activities of law students, academics, practitioners and judicial officers to determine when they will be practicing “science”. / MPhil, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

Die bisherigen Heranziehungsmodelle der Rechtsökonomik bei der Rechtsanwendung geht vor allem davon aus, dass die Effizienz als Rechtsprinzip in bestimmten Rechtsordnungen inbegriffen ist. Dies schränkt aber die Rolle der Rechtsökonomik für die Rechtsanwendung ein. Da der Rechtsanwender in Deutschland sowohl am geltenden Recht als auch an wissenschaftlichen Gesetzen binden soll, kann die Rechtsökonomik als die im Sinne vom kritischen Rationalismus genannte Wissenschaft zur Erklärung menschlichen Verhaltens unter Berücksichtigung der gegebenen Rechtszuordnungen bezeichnet werden. Daraus ergibt sich, dass die aus der wissenschaftlichen Rechtsökonomik abgeleitete Gesetzmäßigkeit dem Rechtsanwender nachkommen soll, sodass die Rechtsökonomik als Rechtsanwendungsmethode unbeschränkt bei der Rechtsanwendung verwertet werden kann. Bei der Auswahl rechtsdogmatischer Lehrsätze bei der Rechtsanwendung ist das Werturteil unvermeidlich, mithilfe des vom kritischen Rationalismus vertretenen Brückenprinzips und Komparativismus kann die Werturteilproblematik bei der Rechtsanwendung durch die positive Wissenschaft und Rechtsökonomik gelöst werden. Die konkrete Methode zur Auswahl rechtsdogmatischer Lehrsätze ist es, dass durch die positive Rechtsökonomik diese rechtsdogmatische Lehre auszuwählen ist, die im Vergleich mit anderen konkurrierenden Lehren das restriktive Minimum der Transaktionskosten darstellt und somit die faktische Geltung der entsprechenden rechtlichen Regelung unter dem gegebenen Umstand am höchsten verwirklicht. / The previous application models of economics of law in the judicial application assume that efficiency as a legal principle is included in the jurisdiction. However, this limits the role of economics of law in the judicial application. As the legal practitioner in Germany shall obey applicable laws and scientific laws, economics of law can be recognized as a real science in the sense of critical rationalism, explaining the human behavior under the condition of the given legal order. It follows that the regularity derived from the scientific economics of law shall be complied with by the legal practitioner, so that the economics of law can be indefinitely used in the judicial application. By selecting the concrete legal dogmatic doctrines in the judicial application, the value judgement is inevitable. With the help of bridge principle and comparativism of the critical rationalism, the value judgement problem can be resolved through the positive science and the positive economics of law. The concrete method of selecting legal dogmatic doctrines is that the legal dogmatic doctrine, which represents the restrictive minimum of the transaction costs and thus realizes the de facto validity of the relevant legal provisions under the given circumstance in highest grade, shall be selected through the positive economics of law.