This study of the law relating to drug offending, now covered by the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 as amended, begins with a historical survey of corresponding legislation. The combined pressures of endemic social needs and international demands for tighter drug control measures inevitably raise questions as to whether certain criminogenic effects were produced by this legislative activity. They include: Did premature restrictions cause amplification of the range of substances that became the subjects of abuse? Do the restraints that are now imposed have a scope and severity disproportionate to the social harm threatened by the proscribed conduct? These questions cannot be conclusively answered in a study of this nature, but the historical approach illustrates the complex relationship, both on a domestic and an international scale, between legislative action and conduct which is deemed criminal. An attempt is made to evaluate the assistance available to New Zealand courts from overseas judicial interpretations of legislation enacted within the same context of international obligation. As is then demonstrated, the major drug offences provide fertile ground for nurturing the technical requirements of proof of guilt. Already in New Zealand, in response to the demands and resources of accused persons faced with high penalties upon conviction, the concept of possession has been judicially analysed in great depth and detail. A comparative study is made of the requirements of the corresponding possessory offences in some other jurisdictions; each of the major offences against the Act is then analysed by analogy with the elements of possession. The statutory defences are also examined in relation to this analysis. Although an appraisal of the morality of current legislative policy is not seen as being within the scope of this study, an attempt is made to gauge the effect of Parliament's extension of police powers of search and seizure, and of the power to use listening devices, on the ways by which the courts have weighed socially important contending interests in the most delicate of balances. The courts' evident acceptance of the need for 'undercover' police detective operations in relation to drug offences is documented, as are the judicial restraints applied to the use of evidence so obtained. Sentencing policy in this context is a subject of increasing public interest and concern. An analysis is made of the principles of sentencing as they emerge from New Zealand Court of Appeal judgments over the period 1970-1979. It will be shown that aspects of that policy received recognition in the 1975 Act. However, because of the apparent emphasis on deterrence, many problems continue to tax the sentencing tribunal. This study does not purport to be exhaustive. It excludes detailed consideration of the administrative provisions in the Act and eschews analysis of offences against sections 11, 15 and 16 (concerning theft, etc., of controlled drugs, false statements, and obstruction of officers). The discussions of liability for secondary participation, and the inchoate offences, are confined to such points as are seen to be directly related to the context of drug offences. With some exceptions where subsequent information has come to hand, the law is stated on the basis of the materials available to the writer on 1 May 1980. / Whole document restricted, but available by request, use the feedback form to request access.

The Constitution of Fiji though similar to many others adopted within the Commonwealth since the end of the Second World War departs in many respects from the Constitution of the United Kingdom and that of New Zealand. The Constitution of the United Kingdom is wholly unwritten and that of New Zealand is only partly written as contained in the Constitution Act of 1852. Fiji not only has a written Constitution; the Constitution also incorporates the rules or principles which are accepted as constitutional conventions in the United Kingdom and New Zealand. In this thesis attention has been given to the position of the Governor-General as the representative of the Queen and the powers conferred upon him. The fact that he is a local appointee makes his position even more delicate. The problem is accentuated in that the exercise of some of his powers are made nonjusticiable by the Constitution. It is also suggested in this work that the fact that the Constitution of Fiji has an entirely different basis from that of the United Kingdom or New Zealand renders many of the principles adopted in those countries inapplicable. The notion of parliamentary sovereignty propounded by Dicey and others does not apply. The Constitution, not Parliament, is supreme. Judicial review of legislation is inevitable and the courts are intended as guardians of the Constitution. There are other important differences many of which are the result of the political decisions made on behalf of the three main races in Fiji before the Constitution was drafted. The separate Fijian administration and the powers of the Council of Chiefs are illustrations of these provisions. The fact the indigenous Fijians enjoy a privileged position through the separate Fijian Administration and the Council of Chiefs is discussed. The system of representation in the House of Representatives with a combination of the communal and multiracial electorates provides an unusual, perhaps questionable, experiment towards a solution of the tensions and problems associated with a heterogeneous society. Likewise the fundamental rights provisions have special significance in a multi-racial society like that of Fiji. As a background to the above matters a comprehensive survey of the constitutional history of the country is attempted. The role of the judiciary has been given significant emphasis throughout the thesis as it is felt that the judiciary is linchpin of the Constitution of Fiji. Concluding observations have been offered on ways of making the spirit of the Constitution, as enshrined in the preamble to the Constitution, a reality; and to engender a national outlook amongst the people of all ethnic groups.

Equality is a prominent value in modern moral, legal and political philosophy. There is, however, much controversy over the meaning of the concept and its moral implications. In this thesis I argue that the recent scepticism expressed by some writers about the prospects of reaching any agreement about what equality means is not well founded. The idea is not an empty one. The difficulty in pinning down its exact meaning and implications for our social ethics is caused by its abstractness, not its vacuity. The moral significance of equality can be expressed in the idea of basic equality – the requirement that persons are to be treated as equals and accorded equal concern and respect. That idea is morally justifiable and plays an important role in modern moral theory. If we accept that human beings are equal in important respects and that a commitment to basic equality as a moral ideal makes sense because of our shared human condition, then it follows that respect for that value is implicit in each instance of our moral decision making. The abstractness of basic equality means that it cannot serve as a straightforward rule which can be easily applied to disputes about who should or should not receive equal treatment. There is no list of prohibited grounds of differentiation that applies in all circumstances. Thoughtful moral judgments about the denial of basic equality typically demand sophisticated assessments of whether the interests of all affected parties have been taken into account and different sorts of denial of basic equality will require consideration of different factors. Attempts have been made in recent equality law jurisprudence to find a less abstract concept of equality that can inform the interpretation of the law. These are unsuccessful because basic equality cannot be reduced to some simpler, rule like, standard. These understandable attempts to make this area of law more manageable are not good explanations of what is morally important about the idea of equality. Clarity about the meaning and purpose of contemporary discrimination law is not likely to be achieved by further attempts to say what this law is really about. The law is difficult to apply because it is in the same broad terms as the idea of basic equality. The central moral quandaries of recent jurisprudential thought about basic equality concern the appropriateness of different treatment on grounds which can be used to discriminate against people. The difficulties that courts have with these issues are not remarkable because the moral issues are intractable. Issues such as indirect discrimination or the fairness of affirmative action policies require in depth consideration of the interests and concerns of all affected parties and will not be resolved by the application of any simple algorithm based on a less abstract definition of equality. These issues are difficult to resolve, not because we do not know what equality is but because weighing the competing concerns of affected parties while paying attention to other important values is a complex and often difficult task.

This thesis examines four aspects of the contempt power in New Zealand. It does not, therefore, purport to be an exhaustive study of the law of contempt in all its protean forms. Rather, its aims are to assess what the law is, and why, and to consider whether it aptly describes the values of the society it purports to protect. The law of contempt has suffered from an excess of dichotomies and classifications which nowhere guarantee its clarity. The most enduring classification is that which distinguishes between criminal and civil contempts, largely on the basis of whether the sanctions which follow are punitive or coercive. Three types of criminal contempt are discussed. Contempt in the face of the court concerns the jurisdiction to punish summarily contumelious behaviour in court. It is argued that, since the summary procedure permits the imposition of sanctions without the usual trial safeguards, the contempt power ought to be limited to the removal of the contemnor from the court. Any more extensive contempt power arguably infringes the freedoms protected by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The law of sub judice contempt seeks to strike a balance between the competing values of freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial. Judicial insistence on the existence of a real risk as a matter of practical reality before the actus reus of this form of contempt is met has effectively restrained criticisms of the rule. Nevertheless, since it can penalise non-negligent practices, it is suggested that sub judice contempt should be treated as a crime of strict liability. The third form of criminal contempt, scandalising a court or judge, is said to be necessary to ensure confidence in the administration of justice. However, there is little evidence that the public perception of the judiciary would suffer through debate over the abilities of its judges. This arm of contempt ought not to be perceived as a form of judicial protectionism. For that reason, and because it arguably infringes the Bill of Rights Act 1990, it is urged that contempt through scandalising a court or judge should be abolished. The law of civil contempt is dealt with through a discussion of breaches of injunctions and undertakings. Since the sanctions which follow may serve both punitive and coercive ends the distinction between this category and the other three is regarded as incomplete. It is contended, however, that there are many similarities between criminal and civil contempts which merit their treatment as a genus. Whenever punitive sanctions are imposed (whether for a criminal or civil contempt) normal trial safeguards ought to exist. On the other hand, if enforcement of a court order is sought, such protection is inappropriate. A procedural approach to the different types of sanctions ought to rid contempt law of perplexing categorisations which fail to address the essential characteristics of the contempt power.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2008. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Lehigh University, 1997. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 239-250).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 254-261). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on March 1, 2010). The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file. Dissertation advisor: Dr. Martha Markward. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (LLB Honours) -- Australian National University, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p.44-55) ALSO available in ELECTRONIC FORMAT via SSRN.

Teilw. zugl.: Zürich, University, Diss., 2006 u.d.T.: Melzer, Nils: Targeted killing under the international normative paradigms of law enforcement and hostilities. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [445]-458) and index.