Spelling suggestions: "subject:"leakage resilience"" "subject:"eakage resilience""
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Leakage Resilience and Black-box Impossibility Results in CryptographyJuma, Ali 31 August 2011 (has links)
In this thesis, we present constructions of leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives, and we give black-box impossibility results for certain classes of constructions of pseudo-random number generators.
The traditional approach for preventing side-channel attacks has been primarily hardware-based. Recently, there has been significant progress in developing algorithmic approaches for preventing such attacks. These algorithmic approaches involve modeling side-channel attacks as {\em leakage} on the internal state of a device; constructions secure against such leakage are {\em leakage-resilient}.
We first consider the problem of storing a key and computing on it repeatedly in a leakage-resilient manner. For this purpose, we define a new primitive called a {\em key proxy}. Using a fully-homomorphic
public-key encryption scheme, we construct a leakage-resilient key proxy. We work in the ``only computation leaks'' leakage model, tolerating a logarithmic number of bits of polynomial-time computable leakage per computation and an unbounded total amount of leakage.
We next consider the problem of verifying that a message sent over a public channel has not been modified, in a setting where the sender and the receiver have previously shared a key, and where the adversary controls the public channel and is simultaneously mounting side-channel attacks on both parties. Using only the assumption that pseudo-random generators exist, we construct a leakage-resilient shared-private-key authenticated session protocol. This construction tolerates a logarithmic number of bits of polynomial-time computable leakage per computation, and an unbounded total amount of leakage. This leakage occurs on the entire state, input, and randomness of the party performing the computation.
Finally, we consider the problem of constructing a large-stretch pseudo-random generator given a one-way permutation or given a smaller-stretch pseudo-random generator. The standard approach for doing this involves repeatedly composing the given object with itself. We provide evidence that this approach is necessary. Specifically,
we consider three classes of constructions of pseudo-random generators from pseudo-random generators of smaller stretch or from one-way permutations, and for each class, we give a black-box impossibility result that demonstrates a contrast between the stretch that can be achieved by adaptive and non-adaptive black-box constructions.
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Leakage Resilience and Black-box Impossibility Results in CryptographyJuma, Ali 31 August 2011 (has links)
In this thesis, we present constructions of leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives, and we give black-box impossibility results for certain classes of constructions of pseudo-random number generators.
The traditional approach for preventing side-channel attacks has been primarily hardware-based. Recently, there has been significant progress in developing algorithmic approaches for preventing such attacks. These algorithmic approaches involve modeling side-channel attacks as {\em leakage} on the internal state of a device; constructions secure against such leakage are {\em leakage-resilient}.
We first consider the problem of storing a key and computing on it repeatedly in a leakage-resilient manner. For this purpose, we define a new primitive called a {\em key proxy}. Using a fully-homomorphic
public-key encryption scheme, we construct a leakage-resilient key proxy. We work in the ``only computation leaks'' leakage model, tolerating a logarithmic number of bits of polynomial-time computable leakage per computation and an unbounded total amount of leakage.
We next consider the problem of verifying that a message sent over a public channel has not been modified, in a setting where the sender and the receiver have previously shared a key, and where the adversary controls the public channel and is simultaneously mounting side-channel attacks on both parties. Using only the assumption that pseudo-random generators exist, we construct a leakage-resilient shared-private-key authenticated session protocol. This construction tolerates a logarithmic number of bits of polynomial-time computable leakage per computation, and an unbounded total amount of leakage. This leakage occurs on the entire state, input, and randomness of the party performing the computation.
Finally, we consider the problem of constructing a large-stretch pseudo-random generator given a one-way permutation or given a smaller-stretch pseudo-random generator. The standard approach for doing this involves repeatedly composing the given object with itself. We provide evidence that this approach is necessary. Specifically,
we consider three classes of constructions of pseudo-random generators from pseudo-random generators of smaller stretch or from one-way permutations, and for each class, we give a black-box impossibility result that demonstrates a contrast between the stretch that can be achieved by adaptive and non-adaptive black-box constructions.
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Cryptographic techniques for hardware securityTselekounis, Ioannis January 2018 (has links)
Traditionally, cryptographic algorithms are designed under the so-called black-box model, which considers adversaries that receive black-box access to the hardware implementation. Although a "black-box" treatment covers a wide range of attacks, it fails to capture reality adequately, as real-world adversaries can exploit physical properties of the implementation, mounting attacks that enable unexpected, non-black-box access, to the components of the cryptographic system. This type of attacks is widely known as physical attacks, and has proven to be a significant threat to the real-world security of cryptographic systems. The present dissertation is (partially) dealing with the problem of protecting cryptographic memory against physical attacks, via the use of non-malleable codes, which is a notion introduced in a preceding work, aiming to provide privacy of the encoded data, in the presence of adversarial faults. In the present thesis we improve the current state-of-the-art on non-malleable codes and we provide practical solutions for protecting real-world cryptographic implementations against physical attacks. Our study is primarily focusing on the following adversarial models: (i) the extensively studied split-state model, which assumes that private memory splits into two parts, and the adversary tampers with each part, independently, and (ii) the model of partial functions, which is introduced by the current thesis, and models adversaries that access arbitrary subsets of codeword locations, with bounded cardinality. Our study is comprehensive, covering one-time and continuous, attacks, while for the case of partial functions, we manage to achieve a stronger notion of security, that we call non-malleability with manipulation detection, that in addition to privacy, it also guarantees integrity of the private data. It should be noted that, our techniques are also useful for the problem of establishing, private, keyless communication, over adversarial communication channels. Besides physical attacks, another important concern related to cryptographic hardware security, is that the hardware fabrication process is assumed to be trusted. In reality though, when aiming to minimize the production costs, or whenever access to leading-edge manufacturing facilities is required, the fabrication process requires the involvement of several, potentially malicious, facilities. Consequently, cryptographic hardware is susceptible to the so-called hardware Trojans, which are hardware components that are maliciously implanted to the original circuitry, having as a purpose to alter the device's functionality, while remaining undetected. Part of the present dissertation, deals with the problem of protecting cryptographic hardware against Trojan injection attacks, by (i) proposing a formal model for assessing the security of cryptographic hardware, whose production has been partially outsourced to a set of untrusted, and possibly malicious, manufacturers, and (ii) by proposing a compiler that transforms any cryptographic circuit, into another, that can be securely outsourced.
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A Study on Cryptographic Protocols: Achieving Strong Security for Zero-knowledge Proofs and Secure Computation / 暗号プロトコルに関する研究 : ゼロ知識証明と秘密計算における高度な安全性の実現についてKiyoshima, Susumu 26 March 2018 (has links)
京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・論文博士 / 博士(情報学) / 乙第13184号 / 論情博第94号 / 新制||情||116(附属図書館) / (主査)教授 石田 亨, 教授 中村 佳正, 教授 岡部 寿男, 教授 岡本 龍明 / 学位規則第4条第2項該当 / Doctor of Informatics / Kyoto University / DGAM
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Attribute-based encryption : robust and efficient constructionsRouselakis, Ioannis 26 September 2013 (has links)
Attribute-based encryption is a promising cryptographic primitive that allows users to encrypt data according to specific policies on the credentials of the recipients. For example, a user might want to store data in a public server such that only subscribers with credentials of specific forms are allowed to access them. Encrypting the data once for each party is not only impractical but also raises important privacy issues. Therefore, it would be beneficial to be able to encrypt only once for all desired parties. This is achievable by attribute-based encryption schemes, which come into several types and are applicable to a wide range of settings. Several attribute-based encryption schemes have been proposed and studied with a wide range of characteristics. For example, initial constructions proved to be significantly more challenging than constructing traditional public-key encryption systems and they imposed restrictions on the expressiveness of the Boolean formulas used during encryption. For several proposed schemes the total number of attributes was fixed during setup, while others allowed any string to be used as attribute ("large universe" constructions), but with considerable weaker security guarantees. Furthermore, these first constructions, although polynomial time, were impractical for wide deployment. This thesis is motivated by two main goals for ABE schemes: robustness and efficiency. For robustness, we propose a novel construction that achieves strong security guarantees and at the same time augments the capabilities of previous schemes. More specifically, we adapt existing techniques to achieve leakage-resilient ABE schemes with augmented robustness features making no compromises on security. For the second direction, our goal is to create practical schemes with as many features as possible, such as "large universe" and multi-authority settings. We showcase these claims with working implementations, benchmarks, and comparisons to previous constructions. Finally, these constructions lead us to new directions that we propose and intend to investigate further. / text
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Feasibility, Efficiency, and Robustness of Secure ComputationHai H Nguyen (14206922) 02 December 2022 (has links)
<p>Secure computation allows mutually distrusting parties to compute over private data. Such collaborations have widespread applications in social, scientific, commercial, and security domains. However, the overhead of achieving security is a major bottleneck to the adoption of such technologies. In this context, this thesis aims to design the most secure protocol within budgeted computational or network resources by mathematically formulating it as an optimization problem. </p>
<p>With the rise in CPU power and cheap RAM, the offline-online model for secure computation has become the prominent model for real-world security systems. This thesis investigates the above-mentioned optimization problem in the information-theoretic offline-online model. In particular, this thesis presents the following selected sample of our research in greater detail. </p>
<p>Round and Communication Complexity: Chor-Kushilevitz-Beaver characterized the round and communication complexity of secure two-party computation. Since then, the case of functions with randomized output remained unexplored. We proved the decidability of determining these complexities. Next, if such a protocol exists, we construct the optimal protocol; otherwise, we present an obstruction to achieving security. </p>
<p>Rate and Capacity of secure computation: The efficiency of converting the offline samples into secure computation during the online phase is essential. However, investigating this ``production rate'' for general secure computations seems analytically intractable. Towards this objective, we introduce a new model of secure computation -- one without any communication -- that has several practical applications. We lay the mathematical foundations of formulating rate and capacity questions in this framework. Our research identifies the first tight rate and capacity results (a la Shannon) in secure computation. </p>
<p>Reverse multiplication embedding: We identify a new problem in algebraic complexity theory that unifies several efficiency objectives in cryptography. Reverse multiplication embedding seeks to implement as many (base field) multiplications as possible using one extension field multiplication. We present optimal construction using algebraic function fields. This embedding has subsequently led to efficient improvement of secure computation, homomorphic encryption, proof systems, and leakage-resilient cryptography. </p>
<p>Characterizing the robustness to side-channel attacks: Side-channel attacks present a significant threat to the offline phase. We introduce the cryptographic analog of common information to characterize the offline phase's robustness quantitatively. We build a framework for security and attack analysis. In the context of robust threshold cryptography, we present a state-of-the-art attack, threat assessment, and security fix for Shamir's secret-sharing. </p>
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