Texte remanié de : Ph. D. : Anthropology : Yale University : 1975. / Bibliogr. p. 167-174.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, School of History and Politics, Discipline of Politics, 2005. / "December 2003" Includes bibliographical references (leaves 349-387).

This thesis addresses the question of the shift in the sectarian framing of political conflict and violence in Lebanon by focusing on the period between 2000 and 2010. Lebanon represents an interesting case where the saliencies of sectarian dichotomies have been drastically remodelled in only a few years following the Hariri assassination in 2005. Whereas most studies focus on long-term ethnic and sectarian conflicts, few have addressed the issue of fast remodelling of sectarian divisions in times of political turmoil. How do sectarian schisms shift in a short period of time? Why do some political changes affect sectarian dichotomies and not others? What factors can push some people to take part in clashes framed as sectarian violence? In short, how does political closure happen along sectarian lines? In order to answer these questions, this thesis uses a triangulation of qualitative and quantitative methods to disentangle the relationship between political change and sectarianism. Building on the social movement literature, it argues that street mobilisations, understood as peaceful or violent collective action, are important mechanisms through which political conflict can assume sectarian overtones. It relies on a compiled dataset of protest events that occurred in Beirut between 2000 and 2010, and applies network analysis techniques in order to study coalition formations and shifts in alliances. This analysis is combined with semi-structured interviews with a sample of 29 residents of Beirut neighbourhoods that witnessed violent clashes in 2007/8. The analysis of my data suggests that the Hariri assassination marked a turning point in the dynamics of contentious politics in Lebanon, and acted as a catalyst for the emergence and consolidation of new coalitions and sectarian dichotomies. The study argues that sectarian political parties are the main channels through which political and sectarian depictions become interchangeable. It suggests that in order for a political shift to be understood in sectarian terms, two main factors need to be taken into account: (i) the competing political parties should represent sectarian communities that are able to compete demographically (in terms of size), and (ii) the competing parties should be able to represent the majority of their sectarian communities (intra-sectarian homogeneity). The analysis of my qualitative data explores the mechanisms at work during periods of collective violence, and shows that drivers such as peer pressure, neighbourhood-level networks, material grievances, pleasure in agency, ideology and previous fighting experience seem to explain individual decisions to participate in collective violence more than sectarian hatred. In fact, rather than being the primary cause of the violence, sectarian cleavages seem to have been crystallised by the 2007/8 episodes of violence. Consequently, this thesis concludes that whereas the conflict in Lebanon today is often understood and framed in sectarian terms, a closer analysis suggests that the conflict at a macro level is essentially political and its implications at the micro level can best be understood beyond the notion of sectarianism.

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This thesis is a study of international relations theory and the case of the Lebanese state's relations with Syria between 1975 and 2002. It aims to answer the following questions: (1) Why has Lebanon generally "bandwagoned" with Syria, a country which has managed to intervene in and subdue it at the expense of Lebanese sovereignty. (2) How have Lebanese state officials, along with other political actors, tried to manipulate Syria for their own interests, whether to defend Lebanese sovereignty, to maintain and increase their status, or to contain and appease their rivals and opponents. (3) Parallel to the discussions generated by these two questions, which kinds of theory are relevant to or best explain Lebanese relations with Syria. Specifically this study demonstrates that the behavior of a penetrated weak state, Lebanon, toward a regional middle power, Syria, cannot usefully be explained by simple realism's state-to-state power balancing model. Rather, it is necessary to differentiate the multitude of state (office-holders) and sub-state actors. In addition, their behavior can only be explained by a combination of factors identified in a variety of theories: reaction to an external threat (simple realism) which explain a very few cases; "omni-alignments" against interrelated threats (complex realism) which result from the weaknesses of the Lebanese state and which explain much more; still powerful transstate ties (constructivism) which themselves needed to be understood in terms of the contradiction between sovereignty and identity and which have some impact; and complex interdependence and shared interests (pluralism) which generally exist between Lebanese and Syrian elites.

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This study investigates Hizb'allah's successful but competing dual development as an extra-institutional Shi'a social movement and an institutional political party. Hizb'allah has traditionally been studied from the perspective of one of its many natures, such as a social movement, Islamic movement, resistance, or political party, each perspective bringing with it limitations and differing interpretations of its identity, motivations, and success. The motivation behind this research was to seek an interpretation of the movement's development and success that would encompass these multiple natures. Through an interpretation of social movement ‘life-cycles', a social movement ‘development model' is proposed that accounts for contradicting theories on the ‘success' of social movements, interpreting success instead as an ability to exhibit simultaneous institutional and extra-institutional natures. The hypothesis provided in this work is that it is an ability to simultaneously exhibit institutional and extra-institutional natures that can be a source of strength and success for a movement, drawing capital from both while avoiding accountability that typically accompanies institutional politics. This challenges traditional theoretical approaches in terms of linear life-cycles with few paths for the social movement to choose from. In turn, questions arise regarding notions of social movement life-cycles being uni-directional, continuously progressing towards ‘institutionalization' or demise. Ideas of an ‘end-date' or ‘inevitable outcome' of social movements are also confronted. This interdisciplinary study is conducted by means of media, archival, and empirical research (participant observation, interviews, and surveys), focusing on changing constituent perceptions of the movement between 1985 and 2013. It is also argued that Hizb'allah's strength is its ability to draw from both extra-institutional and institutional resources while simultaneously avoiding accountability. However, it was also found that, by forming the 2011 governing coalition, the movement upset this balance by subjecting itself to accountability inherent in governance, in turn leading to ‘schizophrenic behaviour' as Hizb'allah sought to serve conflicting constituent and state interests. The significance of this research is that it not only provides an explanation for Hizb'allah's success, but also provides an interpretation of social movement development that accounts for multi-natured movements.