This thesis draws on the theory and method of social ontology to explore why labour law struggles to provide for wage security and clarity of employment status today. It starts by exploring at a conceptual level the relationship between law and capitalism, before moving on to engage more specifically with the concept of the wage, situating the analysis in a theory of the wage's socio-economic function. The thesis understands the 'wage' as, initially, the market price of the commodity, 'labour power', which is exchanged in the labour market. As with any other 'price', the wage functions to coordinate decision making in the market. At the same time, however, the wage is also the cost of reproducing that commodity, a process which is not confined to the market but takes place in society more generally: this is the function of social reproduction. These two functions are not only conceptually and materially distinct; they are frequently in conflict. The price the market assigns to the labour commodity is not always, and not necessarily, that which is required to cover its costs of (re)production. The thesis shows that these functions of the wage find their expression in the various concepts the legal system uses to describe the payment made by employers to their workers. For example, the legal concept of the 'wage' corresponds closely to the economic idea of the wage as price, and the concept of 'remuneration' to the wage as the cost of social reproduction, shifting some of the social costs of employment onto the employer. How these conceptual tools are deployed, however, and thus how effectively these functions are performed in practice, depends on law's own view of its ontological status: that is, the implicit position that the legal system takes on what constitutes 'social reality' beyond the text of a particular case or statute, and thus its view of whether, and to what extent, legal concepts can shape, as well as respond, to it. The thesis shows that whether the legal system sees its concepts playing an active role in constituting social and economic relations, or whether it sees them as passively reacting to the 'demands' of a 'pre-constituted' economic system makes a difference to the effectiveness of law in practice. Understanding law's implicit ontology in this sense helps us to see why labour law struggles to provide for wage security and clarity of status. Thinking about law's relationship with social reality can thus make an important contribution to our understanding of the problems of low pay and unclear employment status today.

This study examines the ways Parisians viewed marriage contracts and marital relationships in the late fourteenth century. It focuses on the Archidiaconal court of Paris and the ways men and women used the court to modify their marriages. My argument in this project is two-fold: First, I argue that the Parisian laity had at least a basic understanding of marriage law, especially the importance of consent for the creation of marriages, and that women, in particular, used that knowledge to control their choice of marriage partner. Second, I argue that after the formation of the marriage, society had certain expectations for both husbands and wives. The evidence from narrative sources—such as conduct manuals and saints lives—presents a picture of obedient wives loving their husbands, who not only financially supported the household, but also loved their wives in return. Similarly, within Parisian separation cases, these same expectations allowed the majority of plaintiffs—usually female—to legally separate from their husband who did not live up to this ideal. The majority of this study uses documents from the Archidiaconal court of Paris from 1384-1387, but my arguments speak to a wider view of medieval marriage and the ways society viewed marriage more generally. Overall, these court cases indicate a wider cultural acceptance of affective marriages in the Middle Ages, and fit into the larger argument of female agency within the medieval legal system. Despite women’s marginalized legal status—in many cases not being allowed even to testify in court—women in the late fourteenth-century Archidiaconal court of Paris were regularly plaintiffs, defendants, and witnesses before the officials. Women pled their cases sometimes with the support of legal counsel or their parents, but often alone, and they successfully negotiated the legal system to achieve their preferred outcome.

This dissertation argues that the idea of constitutional rights transformed Canadian constitutional law well before the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Specifically, it locates the origins of Canada’s twentieth-century rights revolution in the constitutional thinking of scholars, lawyers, judges, and politicians at mid-century (1930-1960). Drawing on archival documents, personal papers, government reports, parliamentary debates, case law, and legal scholarship, this work traces the constitutional thought and culture that first propelled human rights and fundamental freedoms to the forefront of the Canadian legal imagination. As a work of legal history, it also seeks to revive the dormant spirit of constitutional history that once pervaded the discipline of Canadian constitutional law. The Introduction situates the chapters that follow within the emerging Canadian historiography of rights. Chapter Two traces the origins of Frank Scott’s advocacy for constitutional rights to the newer constitutional law, an approach to constitutional scholarship sparked by the social and political upheavals of the Depression, and the influence of Roscoe Pound’s sociological jurisprudence. Chapter Three explores the varied dimensions of the Second World War’s influence on the nascent idea of Canadian constitutional rights. In particular, the rapid rise of the wartime administrative state produced a rights discourse that tended to reflect the interests of property while ignoring the civil liberties of unpopular minorities. Chapter Four examines the rise of a politics and scholarship of rights in the years immediately following the war. In response to international rights ideals and continuing domestic rights controversies, scholars and lawyers sought to produce a theory of Canadian constitutional law that could accommodate the addition of judicially-enforced individual rights. If not entirely successful, their efforts nonetheless further reoriented the fundamental tenets of Canadian constitutional law. Chapter Five reveals the influence of Canada’s emerging constitutional culture of rights on the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada, particularly Justice Ivan Rand and his conception of an implied bill of rights. Together, these chapters demonstrate the confluence of ideology, circumstance, and personality – the constitutional history – that altered the future of Canadian constitutional law.

This thesis explores the role played by law in the current breakdown of the employment pension system, focusing on the legal status of pension plans within the employment relationship, and on the way lawmakers have defined, shaped and enforced employee pension rights. It traces the legal status of employment pensions from their 19th Century characterization as gifts to reward employees for long and faithful service, to their current 21st Century construction as terms of the contract of employment. The thesis argues that Canadian lawmakers within all three legal regimes structuring rights and obligations within the employment relationship – the common law, collective bargaining law and statute law – have contributed significantly to the overall dysfunction of the system by cultivating both substantive and procedural legal rules that locate critical issues concerning the scope, design, durability and distribution of employee pension rights within the control of employers. Predictably, Canadian employers have used that control to shape pension plans to meet their distinct business needs, needs that frequently collide with worker needs and expectations for good pensions. Even in the heyday of the ‘Fordist’ work structures that fostered employment pension plans, the system delivered benefits very unequally, privileging the interest of elite workers who fit the ‘male breadwinner’ mould, and failing to provide adequate and secure pensions for the majority of Canadian workers. Changes in the organization of work in Canada, including trends towards more precarious work, will continue to exacerbate the problems inherent in the system, escalating its distributional inequalities. In the current round of pension law reform, Canada’s policy makers should abandon the effort to repair a system which is flawed at its core, and should instead seek a new foundation for pensions outside the employment relationship, a foundation which will not subordinate the pension interests of workers to the business interests of employers.

This dissertation argues that the idea of constitutional rights transformed Canadian constitutional law well before the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Specifically, it locates the origins of Canada’s twentieth-century rights revolution in the constitutional thinking of scholars, lawyers, judges, and politicians at mid-century (1930-1960). Drawing on archival documents, personal papers, government reports, parliamentary debates, case law, and legal scholarship, this work traces the constitutional thought and culture that first propelled human rights and fundamental freedoms to the forefront of the Canadian legal imagination. As a work of legal history, it also seeks to revive the dormant spirit of constitutional history that once pervaded the discipline of Canadian constitutional law. The Introduction situates the chapters that follow within the emerging Canadian historiography of rights. Chapter Two traces the origins of Frank Scott’s advocacy for constitutional rights to the newer constitutional law, an approach to constitutional scholarship sparked by the social and political upheavals of the Depression, and the influence of Roscoe Pound’s sociological jurisprudence. Chapter Three explores the varied dimensions of the Second World War’s influence on the nascent idea of Canadian constitutional rights. In particular, the rapid rise of the wartime administrative state produced a rights discourse that tended to reflect the interests of property while ignoring the civil liberties of unpopular minorities. Chapter Four examines the rise of a politics and scholarship of rights in the years immediately following the war. In response to international rights ideals and continuing domestic rights controversies, scholars and lawyers sought to produce a theory of Canadian constitutional law that could accommodate the addition of judicially-enforced individual rights. If not entirely successful, their efforts nonetheless further reoriented the fundamental tenets of Canadian constitutional law. Chapter Five reveals the influence of Canada’s emerging constitutional culture of rights on the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada, particularly Justice Ivan Rand and his conception of an implied bill of rights. Together, these chapters demonstrate the confluence of ideology, circumstance, and personality – the constitutional history – that altered the future of Canadian constitutional law.

This thesis explores the role played by law in the current breakdown of the employment pension system, focusing on the legal status of pension plans within the employment relationship, and on the way lawmakers have defined, shaped and enforced employee pension rights. It traces the legal status of employment pensions from their 19th Century characterization as gifts to reward employees for long and faithful service, to their current 21st Century construction as terms of the contract of employment. The thesis argues that Canadian lawmakers within all three legal regimes structuring rights and obligations within the employment relationship – the common law, collective bargaining law and statute law – have contributed significantly to the overall dysfunction of the system by cultivating both substantive and procedural legal rules that locate critical issues concerning the scope, design, durability and distribution of employee pension rights within the control of employers. Predictably, Canadian employers have used that control to shape pension plans to meet their distinct business needs, needs that frequently collide with worker needs and expectations for good pensions. Even in the heyday of the ‘Fordist’ work structures that fostered employment pension plans, the system delivered benefits very unequally, privileging the interest of elite workers who fit the ‘male breadwinner’ mould, and failing to provide adequate and secure pensions for the majority of Canadian workers. Changes in the organization of work in Canada, including trends towards more precarious work, will continue to exacerbate the problems inherent in the system, escalating its distributional inequalities. In the current round of pension law reform, Canada’s policy makers should abandon the effort to repair a system which is flawed at its core, and should instead seek a new foundation for pensions outside the employment relationship, a foundation which will not subordinate the pension interests of workers to the business interests of employers.

Historians have often discussed the process of Zionist settlement in Ottoman and mandate Palestine as if it occurred in isolation from, and without impact on, the indigenous Palestinian Arab population. Revisionist scholars, including Gershon Shafir and Gabriel Piterberg, have challenged this portrayal. They argue that the presence of the Palestinian Arabs on the land, as well as their participation in the labour market, had a fundamental influence on the development of divergent Zionist settlement strategies. This thesis complements and supports this argument through analysis of the participation of two influential Zionists, Alexander Aaronsohn and Norman Bentwich, in a series of legal actions known as the “Zeita Lands Case”. The case itself, which took place under the British mandate between 1923 and 1931, is discussed in detail. The lives and background of Bentwich and Aaronsohn are examined in order to contextualize their participation in the case. / Graduate

This study in constitutional history argues that the American framers created the Constitution of 1787 to address the problem of coercion in American society. It demonstrates that the framers’ antecedent commitment to a conception of the law that made coercion its sine qua non best explains why they sought fundamental reconstitution rather than amendment in 1787, and why they made certain choices and not others in establishing and administering the first federal government in the decade after ratification. The research revolves around two central questions. First, why did coercion concern the framers? Certainly a number of concrete policy-related failures coming to a head in 1787 starkly illuminated both the Continental Congress’s want of enforcement powers and the foundering magistracies in the states. Part I, however, situates the coercion problem in a deeper historico-intellectual context. The American Revolution produced a constitutional discourse that made the consent of the governed its essential ingredient and government by coercion ipso facto illegitimate and unrepublican. At the same time, the Revolution unleashed egalitarian social thinking predicated on the belief in an absolute equality of mind, ability, and opportunity among individuals. Part I shows that the principles of popular consent and individual equality had real legal consequences in the decade after Independence that scholars have overlooked. Specifically, the principle of consent produced a revolution against independent judicial power and the principle of equality produced a revolution against professional lawyers and the common law. Both insurgencies posed special threats to legal professionalism as such and both advanced upon a single shared legal ideal: law without force. Fearing anarchy and seeking to secure their own place within the constitutional order, American lawyers calling themselves Federalists waged a counterrevolution against this conception of law in 1787. But how? Those few historians who have acknowledged the Federalists’ stated commitment to the principle of coercion in 1787 have downplayed its practical significance in the early republic. They have suggested that Federalist legislators and administrators ultimately bowed to the strong anti-statist currents in American society and avoided coercive enforcement measures in the 1790s. Part II shows otherwise. The analysis recovers an originally understood constitutional structure of coercion that included military, magisterial, and judicial sanctions, to operate in accordance with a priority scheme that partially accommodated the inherited republican aversion to the deployment of military force in domestic affairs. It further demonstrates that in the decade after ratification the Federalists brought the constitutional structure of coercion to bear on individuals and states within the union in every area that concerned the framers and nothing in either the Jeffersonian ascendancy or the Revolution of 1800 immediately compromised the Federalists’ achievements in this regard. The constitutional structure of coercion’s effective implementation in the 1790s best explains why the first federal government succeeded where the Continental Congress had failed.

While scholars have focused on the importance of the landmark decisions of the United States Supreme Court and its Chief Justice, John Marshall, in the rising influence of the federal justice system in the early Republic, the crucial role of the circuit courts in establishing uniformity of federal law and procedure across the nation has largely been ignored. This thesis seeks to remedy this lack of research on circuit courts by revealing the central role of their presiding Supreme Court justices in the successful development of a national court system drawn up from the ‘inferior’ courts rather than down from the Supreme Court to the lower jurisdictions. This thesis argues that, at a time when the Supreme Court had few cases to consider, all of the nation’s law was formulated by the lower courts; with very few decisions appealed, the circuit court opinions were invariably accepted as final, settling the law for each circuit and for the nation if followed by other justices. Therefore, in the early years, it was the circuit experience and not Supreme Court authority which shaped the course of United States law. This thesis contributes to an understanding of this early justice system because of its focus on and the depth of its research into the work of the circuit courts. Through detailed analysis, it reveals the sources used by the justices to influence the direction of the law and, by its reading of almost 2000 cases tried by four prominent Marshall associate justices, presents insights into momentous issues facing the Union. The thesis examines the generality of the circuit work of each justice but pays particular attention to the different ways in which each contributed to the shaping of United States law. Understanding the importance of the role of the circuit courts leads to a more informed reading of early American legal history.

From the late-thirteenth through late-fifteenth centuries, among the most frequently produced and widely disseminated books in England were unofficial, common law statute-based miscellanies known as Statuta Angliæ or ‘statute books’. In ca. 1470, a large format, de luxe, yet highly standardized, version of this codicological genre emerged; likely produced on a speculative basis, it survives in approximately two dozen exemplars. This thesis takes as its focus a member of this latter group: Cambridge, MA, Harvard University, Houghton Library, MS Richardson 40 (ca. 1460– 70). After reviewing current scholarship on these codices—examining several key issues and clarifying previous descriptions to enhance our understanding—it endeavours to establish a likely provenance for MS Richardson 40, exploring the ways in which both the manuscript and the broader genre resonate with the life of the proposed patron, Philip Mede (d. 1476), merchant, twice MP, and thrice Mayor of Bristol.