I investigate the association between independent directors' monitoring roles as distinguished by whether they reside on the audit committee (ACs) or not (NACs) and their respective ownership and whether Section 301 or a proxy for alternative independent monitoring (the percentage of institutional ownership) affects this relation. Specifically, I examine whether the objectivity required of serving as an AC (consistent with their audit function role) or alignment with investors (consistent with agency theory) dominates in determining independent directors' level of share ownership. Using generalized estimations of equations I provide evidence that ACs hold less ownership than NACs that suggests differences with respect to independence in appearance/ alignment with shareholder interests not previously documented amongst independent directors. I also find evidence that Section 301 may contribute to this differential ownership while the presence of institutional ownership moderates this relationship. / by John Incardona. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2010. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2010. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

No description available.

Relying on interviews of Indian rights lawyers as well as archival research, this collective history excavates a missing page in the history of the modern tribal sovereignty movement. At a time when vocal Native American political protests were raging from Washington State, to Alcatraz Island, to Washington, D.C., a small group of newly graduated lawyers started quietly resurrecting Indian rights through the law. Between 1964 and 1974, these non-Indian and Native American lawyers litigated on behalf of Indians, established legal assistance programs as part of the War on Poverty efforts to provide American citizens with equal access to a better life, and founded institutions to support the protection of tribal rights. In the process, they would also inadvertently create both a profession and an academic field—Indian law as we know it today—which has since attracted an increasing number of lawyers, including Native Americans. This story is an attempt at reconstituting a major dimension of the rise of tribal sovereignty in the postwar era, one that has until now remained in the shadows of history: how Indian rights, considered obsolete until the 1960s, gained legitimacy by seizing a series of opportunities made available in part through ‘accidents’ of history. The work done by this new generation of Indian rights lawyers between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s recast definitions of tribal sovereignty in Indian Country as well as the practice and teaching of Indian law. At its core, this project seeks to realize three aspirations: First, to explain where Native American rights come from and how they interact, engage, and fit in with American law; second, to dissect the uses and limitations of law as an avenue for the pursuit of social justice; and third, to probe the question of whether the United States can function as a plural state capable of hosting multiple visions of politics, law, and culture.

The purpose of this study was to assess the effects of selected characteristics on the outcomes of those special education due process hearings brought forth in the state of Texas from September 1, 1983, to September 1, 1992. A further purpose was to determine if district characteristics of size or location affect the likelihood of a district's becoming involved in a special education due process hearing. Data for the study was collected for all special education due process hearings conducted in the State of Texas from September 1, 1983, to September 1, 1992. A coding system was used to record the data for the study and the Chi-square test of independence was used to determine whether a relationship existed between the selected variable (hearing issue, disability classifications and restrictiveness of placement) and hearing outcome. The frequency of involvement in hearings for districts of various size and urban characteristics was displayed as a percentage.

Thesis (LLM) --University of Limpopo, 2010

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This thesis looks at the reality of the situation of the Tasmanian Aborigines using the theme of the 19th Century genocide of the Tasmanian Aborigines and the Sacred wound in the context of the law and spirituality. The methodology of the lived experience of the author is drawn upon for a legal and spiritual analysis of cases lived by the author, which provide a backdrop to the handing back of certain Aboriginal lands in Tasmania as well as reflecting on the intersection of Aboriginal lore and the legal system. The meaning of these cases goes beyond a rational legal analysis as the idea that genocide is still continuing is a difficult one for Australians to understand due to compartmentalisation between spirituality and the law in the context of modern Australia. The High Court case of Mabo poses a dilemma for Aborigines as it contains an opportunity to move beyond terra nullius thinking, but at the same time it limits claims in a way that continues dispossession and may in certain circumstances disallow aspects of Aboriginal self determination. Within this apparent standoff lies the possibility for a development of the law that can embrace or incorporate the Aboriginal spiritual attachment to the land, ancestors and artefacts. There is no word in the English language that can describe the multifaceted, inside and outside, perspectives required to carry out the required discussion that could bring the law more into tune with the people, the land and the original inhabitants. The spiritual direction of Australia, however, could be affected by the turning away from a material, logical rational perspective to the embracing of connection as a value in itself: to spiritual values and a personal sense of calling. The Sacred wound is the meditation around which the discussion of all these themes of lived experience, the law and spirituality moves and ultimately rests. / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

This thesis argues that native title rights are fundamental to Indigenous citizenship in Australia. It does this by developing a normative conception of citizenship in connection with a model of constitutionalism. Here, citizenship is more than a legal status. It refers to the norms of individual rights coupled with democratic responsibility that are attached to the person in a liberal-democracy. Constitutionalism provides the framework for understanding the manner in which Australian society realizes these norms. This thesis focuses on a society attempting to grapple with issues of postcolonialism. A fundamental question faced in these societies is the legitimacy of group rights based in pre-colonization norms. This thesis argues that these rights can be legitimized when constitutionalism is understood as originating in the deliberations connecting civil society with the state; which deliberations reconcile individual rights with group rights in such a way as to resolve the issue of their competing claims to legitimacy. Civil society is the social space in which politico-legal norms collide with action. The argument constructed here is that native title is built on norms that have the potential (it is a counterfactual argument) to contribute to a postcolonial civil society. This is one in which colonizer and colonized coordinate their action in a mutual search for acceptable solutions to the question 'how do we live together?'. The optimistic analysis is tempered by a consideration of the development of native title law. The jurisprudence of the High Court after the Wik's Case has undermined the potential of native title to play a transformative role. It has undermined Indigenous Australians' place in civil society, and their status as equal individuals and responsible citizens. In seeking to explain this, the thesis turns from jurisprudence to political sociology, and argues that an alternative model of constitutionalism and civil society has supplanted the postcolonial; viz., the neoliberal.