Submitted by Mônica Correia Aquino (monicacorreiaaquino@gmail.com) on 2013-07-18T20:02:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2012_dissert_fblholanda.pdf: 196369 bytes, checksum: 075b966a0cbecfa7d12e3251792d0aaa (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Mônica Correia Aquino(monicacorreiaaquino@gmail.com) on 2013-07-18T20:03:15Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2012_dissert_fblholanda.pdf: 196369 bytes, checksum: 075b966a0cbecfa7d12e3251792d0aaa (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-07-18T20:03:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2012_dissert_fblholanda.pdf: 196369 bytes, checksum: 075b966a0cbecfa7d12e3251792d0aaa (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / In this work, let’s apply auction theory to solve a parsimonious procurement model in a situation where there is a contracting firm by the Government. It’s a natural extension of the bidimensional auction model proposed by Yeon-Koo Che (1993) to model actions of the Department of Defense (DoD) in United States. The extension will be made based in a secret reservation price model proposed by Laffontet at. (1994) to unidimensional case. At end, we will make a short numerical analysis of the model proposed in this work. / Neste trabalho, vamos aplicar a teoria dos leil˜oes para resolver um modelo parcimonioso de uma licita¸c˜ao p´ublica em uma situa¸c˜ao em que h´a a contrata¸c˜ao de uma firma pelo Governo. Trata-se de uma extens˜ao natural do modelo de leil˜ao bidimensional proposto por Yeon-Koo Che (1993) para modelar leil˜oes do Departamento de Defesa dos Estados Unidos. A extens˜ao ser´a feita baseada em um modelo de pre¸co reserva secreto proposto por Laffont et al. (1994) para o caso unidimensional. Por fim, faremos uma breve an´alise num´erica do modelo desenvolvido neste trabalho.