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For both John Zizioulas (1931), prominent Greek theologian, and Nikolai Berdyaev (1874-1948), renowned Russian religious philosopher, freedom is the question of ontology, i.e., freedom is about absolute otherness. Since to be is to act, and because to act means to create, we are only as long as we are capable of creating a radically unique reality. Being unique, our creation appears to every other person, including God, as a new reality. However, theistic theology claims that God added nothing to Himself by the creation of the world. Since according to this scenario human person cannot add anything to Being, we cannot speak about her ontological freedom. The doctrine of the divine image seems to be incompatible with the theistic concept of the divine omnipotence. Inquiry into the human freedom is therefore inevitably intertwined with the question of how God is God. Zizioulas's concept of the divine omnipotence does not envisage a space of freedom that God provides for human person from which she could create surplus in being. The French philosopher Etienne Gilson is therefore right when he writes that 'homo faber can never become homo creator because, having only a received being he cannot produce what he himself is not.' Berdyaev on the other hand locates the origin of our being in the Bottomless freedom or the Ungrund. The Bottomless freedom is Godhead from which both freedom of the divine Persons and that of the human person originate. Berdyaev explains that person can never create another person (something that is possible only for God). However, because person in spite of being created is not causally determined by the Creator, she can create her radically unique reality and thus realize her ontological freedom. Clearly, homo faber can never become homo creator (creator of other personalities), but this does not preclude person's power to create surplus in being and to be homo theurgos.

The relation between revelation and reason is a matter of interest for human beings and is connected with the development of reason and knowledge in modern society. Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i, a modern Muslim scholar who was an expert in both Islamic philosophy and Qur'anic interpretation, developed new approaches to such issues as the role of human rational ability, logic and philosophy in religious knowledge. Furthermore he deals with such specific controversial topics on the subject of revelation and reason as, social freedom and freedom of thought and belief in Islam. He tends to elaborate his view of freedom based on both the Qur'an and rational bases. Tabataba'i's approach to revelation and reason, his reconciliation of them in general, and his specific perspective of freedom are studied in this thesis with respect to their underlying principles and their scopes.

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Wong Kun Chun, Eric. / Bibliography: leaves 70-88 / Thesis (M.Div.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong

Ip Hon Ho. / Thesis (M.Div.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 80-82). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.3 / Chapter 2. --- Different beliefs of the free market --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- Market' as invisible hand guided by self-interest --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Market as a platform to promote prosperity of life and freedom --- p.7 / Chapter 2.3 --- Market as a place of competition --- p.8 / Chapter 2.4 --- Market as a self-regulating system --- p.9 / Chapter 2.5 --- Private Property right as the necessary condition for free market economy --- p.9 / Chapter 3. --- Review of contemporary Christian critiques of market --- p.10 / Chapter 3.1 --- Michael Novak: defense of classic liberal economy --- p.11 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- The concept of liberty --- p.11 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- The 'co-creation' role of man --- p.12 / Chapter 3.1.3. --- The tripartite system and the sinful nature of man in a free market economy --- p.13 / Chapter 3.2 --- Rebecca M. Blank: Criticism on Market from an economist and a theologian --- p.14 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- The model of competitive market --- p.14 / Chapter 3.2.2. --- Conflicting values between beliefs in competitive market with Christian values --- p.15 / Chapter 3.3 --- Paul Tillich's critique on free market --- p.19 / Chapter 3.3.1. --- The religious relevance of Capitalism and Free market --- p.20 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Tillich model of criticism --- p.21 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- Depending Conditions for capitalism: Technical reasons --- p.22 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- Criticism of the Spirit of Capitalism and Free market --- p.23 / Chapter 3.3.5 --- Criticism of the form of capitalism --- p.26 / Chapter 3.3.6 --- The big machine --- p.27 / Chapter 3.4 --- The insufficiencies of the above Christian Critique --- p.30 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Michael Novak: --- p.31 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- Rebecca Blank --- p.32 / Chapter 3.4.3 --- Paul Tillich --- p.32 / Chapter 4. --- The discussion on the freedom in free market --- p.33 / Chapter 4.1 --- Economic Compulsion --- p.34 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Economic reason: Monopolistic power --- p.35 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Political Reason: Political Economy --- p.37 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- Short Summary --- p.39 / Chapter 4.2 --- Slavery Characteristics of free market --- p.40 / Chapter 4.3 --- Basic Characteristics of a slavery system --- p.40 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Backgrounds of Slavery system in Greco Roman Empire --- p.41 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Structure of the working relationship: Dehumanized structure --- p.42 / Chapter 4.3.3 --- Social status: Alienation --- p.43 / Chapter 4.3.4 --- Incentive system: Another form of Economic Compulsion --- p.44 / Chapter 4.3.5 --- Short summary --- p.47 / Chapter 4.4 --- Slavery characteristics of the free market --- p.47 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Working relationship: dehumanized structure --- p.48 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Social status: Alienation --- p.50 / Chapter 4.4.3 --- Incentive system: Another form of Economic Compulsion --- p.51 / Chapter 4.4.4 --- Short Summary --- p.54 / Chapter 5. --- The critique of the spirituality of market by the concept of 'market spirituality' --- p.54 / Chapter 5.1 --- The ground of understanding spirituality --- p.55 / Chapter 5.2 --- Basic Characteristics of spirituality --- p.57 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- First-order and second-order experiences of Spirituality --- p.57 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- The trainable quality of Spirituality: Ascetical and Mystical aspect --- p.58 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- The unintentional ascetical aspect of spirituality --- p.59 / Chapter 5.3 --- The understanding and basic assumptions of Market Spirituality --- p.62 / Chapter 5.4 --- The Formation of spirituality in our daily routine --- p.64 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- Pathway of knowing in free market --- p.66 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- Pathway of acting in free market --- p.67 / Chapter 5.4.3 --- Pathway of relating to others in free market --- p.69 / Chapter 5.5 --- Common examples of market spirituality --- p.69 / Chapter 5.5.1 --- Believing in the self-regulatory mechanism --- p.69 / Chapter 5.5.2 --- Competitive spirituality --- p.70 / Chapter 5.5.3 --- Detachment relationship --- p.72 / Chapter 5.5.4 --- Consumerism --- p.73 / Chapter 5.5.5 --- Commodification --- p.74 / Chapter 5.5.6 --- Short summary --- p.75 / Chapter 5.6 --- Theological reflections on market spirituality --- p.76 / Chapter 5.6.1 --- The penetration of the market spirituality into our church and individual life --- p.76 / Chapter 5.6.2. --- Contrast with the Christian Spirituality --- p.77 / Chapter 6. --- Conclusion --- p.79 / Bibliography --- p.80

Freedom is a central concept in contemporary theology. However, what freedom means is blurred and unclear. To try to understand more precisely, the thought of a theologian who stands at the mid-point of the debate has been studied. Rosemary Ruether is a modern feminist theologian who has considered Christian origins and the human quest of liberation in detail as well as in considerable breadth, touching upon a wide variety of concerns that contribute to her concept of freedom. In Ruether's work certain key themes emerge. She stresses the ideas of creation (as a continuum that includes redemption and new creation), gnostic and apocalyptic dualism, ecclesiology, eschatology, and christology. From these preoccupations arises Ruether's understanding of freedom as wholeness, mutuality, struggle towards the future, and participation in the people of the promise. For Ruether, freedom means salvation in the biblical and Hebraic sense. Although the theology of the women's movement covers a broad spectrum, Ruether's concept of freedom is consistent with that of most other feminist theologians. The feminist concept of freedom, as expressed by Ruether, has much in common with the socio-political liberation theology of Gustavo Gutierrez. Like Latin American theology, Ruether's theology is biased towards the oppressed; it is based on a corporate understanding of faith, and it proposes a new way of doing theology which arises out of the context. But Ruether does not regard Marxist analysis as sufficient, and sees the limitations of apocalyptic tendencies in liberation theology. In ways, Ruether's theology is less dependent on traditional approaches than that of Gutierrez. The self-actualisation psychology of Abraham Maslow also has a number of resemblances to Ruether's feminist idea of freedom: both emphasize wholeness, humanism, mutuality, transcendence, utopian hope, and struggle. But Ruether's theology of freedom is not merely an adaptation of Maslovian psychology, since they differ on their commitment to the poor, on theism and organised religion, and on Maslow's emphasis on the individual. The concept of freedom held by Rosemary Ruether (and by many other feminist theologians) has much in common both with the liberation theology of the poor world and with the approach to freedom through personal fulfilment that is characteristic of affluent culture. Ruether is correct in saying that woman's growing awareness stands at the intersection between the freedom movements of the first and third worlds. But Ruether's freedom is not merely a combination of the two, but a unique contribution to modern theology. Despite some limitations, Ruether has contributed significantly to the theological quest for the meaning of freedom and can be expected to continue to do so.

This thesis endeavors to reveal that Martin Luther's dogmatic adherence to one absolute interpretation of the Word of God restricted man's freedom, both religious and personal. His intolerant and authoritarian attitude toward individualistic groups, called into existence by his polemics stressing Christian freedom, is broadly discussed. Luther's theology denied man responsibility for his salvation, either through works, the exercise of divine reason, or through living a lifestyle in the imitation of Christ, leaving man with the inability to accept responsibility for his actions. The authoritarian religions that developed after Luther brought confusion and indifference regarding the nature of religion, leaving modern man in search of alternate authorities in which to place his faith and assume responsibility for his actions, thereby limiting his independence and freedom.

This thesis lays out a critique of the libertarian autonomy in Clark Pinnock's open theism. It contends that libertarian autonomy (defined as the choice to do otherwise) is unable to do justice to the fuller sense of freedom described in the biblical narrative. Offering more than a critique, this thesis suggests an alternative definition of freedom by qualifying Karl Barth's "freedom as obedience" as 'freedom as faithfulness'. As such, true freedom is contrasted to the autonomy that leads to evil, and is found beyond the false dichotomy of compatibilism and incompatibilism, heteronomy and autonomy. Freedom is recognized as a good gift of creation and a promise of the eschaton, and thus must be distanced from the shadow of evil which haunts human autonomy. Ultimately, this thesis contends that faithfulness to God as the source and call of life leads to responsive, transformative, and eschatologically unlimited freedom.