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This thesis is a study of the Sanusiyya order, in which particular emphasis is placed on its role as a resistance movement. Based on a survey of the social, economic, religious and political activities of this sufi brotherhood and its involvement in the tribal system of the North Africa during the first three decades of this century, an attempt will be made to identify on the one hand the factors that contributed to the strength of its resistance to Italian invasion, and on the other, the elements that led to its failure. It is argued that its initial success in the resistance benefited from the network of the zawiyas where ikhwan from different tribes were integrated socially and economically in accordance with strong Islamic values. However, lack of military training and weapons, dependency on a prominent figure, competing ambitions within the Sanusi family and geographical distance ultimately weakened the resistance.

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Both interventionist and anti-interventionist scholars have advanced the view that the 2011 Libyan conflict probes the need to establish an international organisation to settle disputes between nations with a view to maintaining international peace and security. Ironically, 67 years after the founding of the United Nations, post-colonial African states remain deeply troubled and affected by conflicts that are often exacerbated by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions. The 2011 Libyan conflict was not a war for democracy; rather, it represented and demonstrated clearly the asymmetrical relations between Africa and Europe. This study therefore, is anchored on the thesis that the Western Countries—especially Britain and France—within the UNSC ignore the values that are embodied in the Treaty of Westphalia which established state sovereignty. Some Permanent five (P5) members of the UN were typically insensitive to Libya’s sovereignty and to the creed of democracy and this inevitably undermined the national security of the state in favour of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ clause. The outsourcing of the UNSC’s mission, among other things, in Libya to ensure ‘international peace and security’ to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was a critical reason for the loss of human lives and values in the 2011 Libyan pogrom. The introduction of a no-fly zone over Libya and the use of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) contained in UNSC Resolution 1973 clearly stoked the conflict in Libya in order to further the political and pecuniary interests of some of the P5 members. The involvement of NATO and the attendant bombing campaign in Libya served to undermine the militarily weak continent of Africa in its effort to broker peace under the umbrella of the African Union (AU). In order to secure these political and economic interests, the NATO jet bombers declared war against a sovereign UN member state and openly participated in the eventual overthrow and death of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi. In essence, this study underscores that the use of Responsibility to Protect in Libya was orchestrated at the highest level of international politics to justify external interference and ultimately, to secure regime change in Libya. The net effect of the outcome of the 2011 Libyan conflict is the post-war imperial control of Libya’s natural resources facilitated by the National Transition Committee established by these imperial forces. The extent of the damage caused by the UN-backed NATO intervention in Libya is also the result of the collective failure of the African Union to assert itself in the Libyan situation. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2013.

Humanitarian intervention has long been a secondary or tertiary concern in a security driven international system. Since NATO's intervention during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 there have been significant developments in both the language and form of humanitarian intervention as a matter of international law. The events in Kosovo sparked debate about how to handle humanitarian crisis in the future and thus humanitarian intervention evolved into a redefinition of sovereignty as responsibility and the Responsibility to Protect. The Responsibility to Protect has had a number of opportunities to continue to evolve and assert itself in an international legal context throughout the ensuing years since the Kosovo intervention. The purpose of this research is to explore the moral, legal and practical implications of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Classical and contemporary theories of international relations and moral philosophy are applied in the context of the Responsibility to Protect and its effect upon the international system and specific states to cultivate a sense of the development of the norm and different actors' attitudes towards it. A literature review is conducted to show the practical and conceptual issues inherent in the framework of the Responsibility to Protect. The norm is then applied to the cases of Kosovo, Libya, and Syria to assess its effect in practice and determine its origins. The analysis of these case studies leads to a number of conclusions regarding its effectiveness and future application. The case studies chosen for this research are Kosovo, Libya, and Syria. The case of Kosovo helps to establish a humanitarian intervention framework, the need for redefinition, and the beginning of the Responsibility to Protect. Libya shows the first strong case for the positive application of the Responsibility to Protect in a practical sense. The non-intervention in Syria shows the difficult political issues involved in intervention and presents uncertainty as to the positive develop of the norm. These cases clearly show the myriad of practical challenges to RtoP that are borne out the theoretical, moral issues embedded in its philosophy. The conclusion drawn from the literature review and subsequent case studies is that the current efforts to assert the Responsibility to Protect are aimed at the wrong areas of international law and states, and that the norm is not developing positively in a linear pattern. To successfully promote its acceptance the Responsibility to Protect must build institutional linkages to make intervention more cost effective, exercise the regional options available to promote and ensure the legitimacy of intervention, and assure the acceptance of RtoP by the major powers in the Security Council.