Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 167-171). / In this dissertation, I investigate the grammatical effects of focus and the inseparable phenomenon of givenness. As Schwarzschild (1999) has proposed, a proper understanding of givenness eliminates the need for a separate concept of focus, which is notoriously hard to define, either semantically, syntactically, or phonologically. I propose a semantic constraint, the Givenness Interpretation Principle based on Rooth's (1992) Focus Interpretation Principle, that accounts, in part, for the semantic effects of givenness and focus. I also propose a phonological constraint, *GIVEN, that accounts for the prosodic effects of givenness and focus in Chichewa, Japanese, Hungarian, and Italian. Givenness and focus are represented in the syntax by a functional head G which takes a given constituent in its complement and a focussed constituent in its specifier. This is demonstrably the correct representation in Hungarian, and I propose that this is the representation of givenness and focus in Universal Grammar. A phrase may raise out of the complement of G to its specifier, either overtly as in Hungarian, or covertly at LF. / (cont.) Givenness has demonstrable phonological effects that, as I show, cannot be ascribed to a FOcus constraint (Truckenbrodt 1995) requiring focussed constituents to be the most prominent in their domains of focus. The constraint *GIVEN bars given constituents from being metrically prominent. Since the effects of FOcus and *GIVEN are sometimes difficult to tease apart, I present an in-depth study of the phrasal phonology of Italian, showing how phonological and intonational phrases are formed in Italian, with the aid of the segmental phenomena of raddoppiamento sintattico and gorgia toscana. Once the constraints governing these phenomena are established, I present a rigorous, controlled comparison of the effects of *GIVEN and FOcus in Italian, showing that it is *GIVEN, not FOCUS, that gives the correct results. / by Christopher Bader. / Ph.D.

Thesis (M.S.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 1987. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND HUMANITIES. / Bibliography: leaves 196-197. / by Corey Glenn Washington. / M.S.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2016. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 149-154). / This dissertation concerns cluster-dependent asymmetries in vowel epenthesis in loanword adaptation and in non-native cluster perception. The central argument is that auditory factors affect the relative perceptual similarity between consonant clusters and the corresponding epenthesis forms, which in turn plays an important role in determining the site of epenthesis in loanword adaptation. This dissertation provides an extended typology of vowel epenthesis sites in consonant cluster adaptation, considering a variety of clusters both in word-initial and in word-final positions. It will be argued that the cluster-dependent asymmetries in epenthesis sites are best explained by the auditory properties of consonant clusters, such as intensity rise. Specifically, if a cluster involves an intensity rise inside the cluster, epenthesis occurs inside the cluster; if a cluster involves an intensity rise outside the cluster, epenthesis occurs outside the cluster; and if a cluster involves two intensity rises, either internal or external epenthesis can occur. I argue that this is because the epenthetic vowel insertion where there is an intensity rise makes a perceptually less salient change from the original cluster than epenthesis where there is no intensity rise, based on the P-map hypothesis (Steriade, 2008) that an output involving a perceptually smaller change is more optimal. The results of several perception experiments support the hypothesis by showing that not only intensity rise but also C1 voicing have a significant effect on the perceptual similarity between the consonant clusters and the corresponding epenthesis forms. Crucially, it will be shown that the novel generalization about vowel epenthesis sites and the results of perception experiments employing phonetically diverse stimuli can be best explained by the auditory properties, and not by the sonority profile, which has traditionally been used to explain these data. / by Suyeon Yun. / Ph. D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2013. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 221-227). / This thesis focuses on concord structures found in Western Armenian. I label a structure as concord if two morphemes found in the same clause bear the same feature, yet only result in one semantic interpretation of that feature. The main focus of the thesis is that of negative concord in Western Armenian. Other concord phenomena are also examined: complementizer and additive concord. I draw a parallel between all of these structures, demonstrating that they can be analyzed using the same system of Agreement of the relevant features. A striking similarity between all these concord structures is the optionality of the morphemes involved. Negative morphemes, complementizer heads, and additive markers are optional in Western Armenian. These concord structures bring about some issues regarding head directionality. Western Armenian is a generally head-final language. Certain domains exhibit both head-initial and head-final possible structures. These are found in the complementizers and the adpositions of the language. The complementizer phrases (CPs) which contain more than one morpheme bearing the same feature, are comprised of one head final and one head initial morpheme. Either can be uttered without the other being realized, and both are possible in the same clause as well. Variation, in this case with regards to head direction, is usually studied across multiple languages or across phrase types within a single language; however, WA is a language where variation is seen within the same type of phrase. Western Armenian gives us insights into systems that usually only show one setting in any given language. In analyzing these novel patterns of variability I argue that unique stress and prosodic properties help me unlock these puzzles. / by Hrayr Khanjian. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 1991. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 280-289). / by Susan Jane Dwyer. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references. / (cont.) Dennett's and Fodor's positions on propositional attitudes, and offer alternative criteria to theirs for what features a system must have to have propositional attitudes. / This dissertation explores the relation between the mental lives of humans and animals, and argues that many of the differences that have been proposed by philosophers to set humans apart from animals are erroneous. Chapters 1 and 2 contest the hypothesis that the mental lives of humans and animals differ in kind because the content of human experience is conceptual--it necessarily involves the possession and exercise of concepts that characterize that content--whereas the content of animal experience is nonconceptual. In Chapter 1 I present an argument to expose the serious costs of such a view: if the content of our experience is entirely conceptual, then we cannot account for concept learning. The cost of denying nonconceptual content of experience is a radical nativism about concepts, a position which is both biologically and psychologically implausible. Chapter 2 further explores the implications of the learning argument put forth in Chapter 1. I consider the most effective defense conceptualists have wielded against arguments for nonconceptual content of experience: that our ability to form demonstrative concepts (concepts such as "that shade") obviates the need for nonconceptual content in experience. I show that nonconceptual content of experience is crucial in enabling us to form novel demonstrative concepts. Thus, far from being a strategy that allows the conceptualist to circumvent the need for nonconceptual content, appeal to demonstrative concepts further commits him to nonconceptual content of experience. Chapter 3 considers what cognitive resources are required to have propositional attitudes. I argue against Davidson's claim that animals can't think, because having propositional attitudes requires language. I consider / by Adina L. Roskies. / Ph.D.

Thesis: Ph. D. in Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2018. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 99-104). / This dissertation focuses on subjective or epistemic readings of the modals 'might' and 'should' and considers how they fit into broader theories of modal vocabulary. Chapter 1, 'What the Future "Might" Brings', develops a puzzle about epistemic modals and tense, showing that future tensed epistemic modals are surprisingly marked in cases of predictable forgetting. It gives a solution whereupon epistemic modals are monotonic: their domains only shrink going forward in time. It is noted that this property is also a feature of circumstantial modals and a new general picture of how epistemic and historical modality are related is proposed. Chapter 2, 'Putting "Ought"s Together', argues that deontic but not epistemic 'ought's appear to obey the inference pattern Agglomeration. It gives a new semantics for 'ought', where it is an existential quantifier over best propositions, and shows how this semantics together with pragmatic features of deontic contexts can explain the differing inferential properties of deontics and epistemics. Chapter 3, 'More Miners', generalises the now infamous miners problem to epistemic 'ought's. It shows that conservative non-probabilistic solutions do not extend to epistemic cases with the same structure. It solves the problem using probabilisitic orderings over propositions and draws some morals about the metasemantics of such orderings and the role of neutrality in the semantics of deontic modals. / by David Boylan. / Ph. D. in Linguistics

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 213-226). / by Masatoshi, Koizumi. / Ph.D.

Thesis: Ph. D. in Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2017. / "September 2017." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references. / I use evolutionary science - its tenets and theory, as well as the evidence for it - to investigate the extent and nature of human knowledge by exploring the relation between human cognition, epistemic luck, and biological and cultural fitness. In "The Epistemic Upshot of Adaptationist Explanation," I argue that knowledge of the evolution by natural selection of human cognition might either defeat, bolster, or preclude the epistemic justification of our current beliefs. In "The Evolutionary Challenge and the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality," I argue that we lack the evidence to know whether human moral knowledge evolved or exists. In "Human Morality: Lie or Heirloom?," I argue that, contrary to the popular conception of their descent, human moral belief systems might ultimately be the result of ancient parental deception. The project unfolds against the backdrop of Darwinian naturalism, that all living beings on Earth are related by descent with modification and that natural selection has been the main (but not exclusive) means of modification. The central lesson is that human knowledge attribution is more epistemically demanding than previously thought because to self-ascribe knowledge with justification we must justify the assumption that certain unconfirmed evolutionary hypotheses are correct. The ultimate hope is to give epistemology a Darwinian update and, in consequence, human knowledge its proper place in nature. / by Said Saillant. / Ph. D. in Philosophy

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2012. / "September 2012." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 75-78). / This thesis concerns epistemic and practical rationality. That is, it is about what to believe and what to do. In Chapter 1, 1 argue that theories of practical rationality should be understood as evaluating decisions as opposed to ordinary sorts of non-mental actions. In Chapter 2, I use the machinery developed in Chapter 1 to rebut 'Money Pump' or 'Diachronic Dutch Book' arguments, which draw conclusions about rational beliefs and preferences from premises about how rational agents will behave over time. In Chapter 3, I develop a new objection to the Synchronic Dutch Book Argument, which concludes that rational agents must have probabilistic degrees of belief in order to avoid predictable exploitation in betting scenarios. / by Brian Hedden. / Ph.D.