Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 105-111). / This thesis addresses the longstanding debate in the psycholinguistics literature about the correct way to characterize the psychological status of morphological relatedness and irregular allomorphy. The model argued for here is one in which the mental lexicon consists of lexical roots (sound -meaning pairs that are arbitrary in the Saussurian sense, such as CAT: 'feline'<->/kaet/) and functional morphemes (affixes such as the plural marker -s, that carry purely grammatical information). Complex words are assembled by the grammar out of these roots and affixes. We argue that this is true even for words like "gaze" which don't clearly separate into two pieces, but are abstractly parallel to "walked," which does. Evidence for this full, across the board decomposition model is provided in a series of priming experiments that use magnetoencephalography to measure the earliest stages of lexical processing. Both regular and irregular allomorphs of a root are shown to access their root equally. These results, then, are incompatible both with connectionist models which treat all morphological relatedness as similarity, and with dual mechanism models which argue that regular allomorphy and irregular allomorphy arise from completely different systems, and only regular allomorphy involves root activation and composition. In this model, morphological relatedness is argued to be an identity relation between various allomorphs of a single, shared root, and is therefore clearly distinguished from semantic and phonological relatedness, which merely involve similarity between the meaning, or form, of different roots. The experiments reported in this dissertation support this model: the neural responses evoked by identity are significantly distinct from / (cont.) the neural responses evoked by similarity. / by Linnaea C. Stockall. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2009. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 121-124). / Antidepressants and bioenhancement technologies raise special concerns - both for those who use them and those who don't - about who we are and how we should treat ourselves. In this dissertation, I confront these concerns by asking and answering two ethical questions about different forms of self-treatment. These are: 1. Is antidepressant use morally problematic insofar as it is self-objectifying?, and 2. Is bioenhancement use morally problematic insofar as it undermines self-respect? (Note: by "morally problematic," I mean "possessing a wrong-making feature," not "always wrong, all things considered.") The first two chapters focus on the former question - the question of whether antidepressant use is morally problematic insofar as it is self-objectifying. In order to answer this, I first step back, in Chapter 1, and look at the phenomenon of self-objectification generally construed. I draw from Martha Nussbaum's and Rae Langton's work on objectification to formulate my own definition of "self-objectification." I then argue that self-objectification is indeed possible, and that it assumes a number of interesting forms. The second chapter turns to the specific bioethical question of whether antidepressant use is morally problematic insofar as it is self-objectifying. I argue that the answer is "yes." Although I'm not the first to voice this particular objection to antidepressant use, I extend this previous scholarship in two principal ways. First, I draw from my definition and analysis of self-objectification in Chapter 1 to characterize exactly how antidepressant use is self-objectifying, and to pinpoint the accompanying specific moral offense. / (cont.) Second, I argue in detail against Neil Levy's contention that some cases of self-objectification with antidepressants are completely permissible. In my third and final chapter, I turn to the second question: whether bioenhancement use is morally problematic insofar as it undermines self-respect. I argue that it is, while also acknowledging that there are other senses in which it, simultaneously, can promote self-respect. I offer a few options for conceptualizing this tension, and maintain that the undermining of self-respect nevertheless constitutes one reason to worry about bioenhancement technologies. / by Virginia A. Hoffman. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 1991. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 222-229). / by Lisa Lai Shen Cheng. / Ph.D.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2000. / by Jessie Little Doe Fermino. / S.M.

Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Philosophy. Thesis. 1973. M.S. / MICROFICHE COPY ALSO AVAILABLE IN HUMANITIES LIBRARY. / Bibliography: leaves [95]. / M.S.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 215-219). / by Timothy John Hinton. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 1983. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND HUMANITIES / Bibliography: leaves 205-207. / by Paula Maria Pranka. / Ph.D.

Thesis: Ph. D. in Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2015. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 267-284). / This dissertation argues that all instances of phrasal movement are the result of Agree and Merge (Chomsky 1995, 2001), and, in addition to this, that the existence of different types of movement derives solely from variation in properties of the feature involved in the Agree relation. Guided by novel data from the Nilotic language Dinka Bor (South Sudan), I apply this view to three kinds of movement: A-movement, A-movement, and intermediate movement steps of successive-cyclic dependencies. In addition, I present a novel argument, from patterns of pronoun copying, that all phrasal movement arises from Merge. / by Coppe van Urk. / Ph. D. in Linguistics

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 234-240). / How many different types of control relations exist? Is the classical distinction between Obligatory Control (OC) and Non-Obligatory Control (NOC) well-founded? What semantic and syntactic properties of infinitives determine their place in the control typology? How is the "understood subject" PRO linked to the controller? This thesis investigates these questions in two steps: First, we establish a typology of control and characterize the empirical profile of each type; second, we propose mechanisms of derivation and interpretation to account for the different types . The OC category is shown to consist of two subtypes, Exhaustive Control (EC) and Partial Control (PC). Tense in EC complements is null, and PRO must be referentially identical to the controller; Tense in PC complements is contentful, and PRO need only include the controller (although matching in syntactic number is still required). OC establishes an Agree relation between a matrix functional head and either PRO (in EC) or the infinitival Agr (in PC). The latter is parasitic on T-to-C movement occurring in tensed complements. Control via Agr blocks the transmission of semantic number from the controller to PRO, giving rise to the PC effect. The OC/NOC distinction is traced to the position of the infinitive: VP-internal clauses fall under OC, extraposed and intraposed clauses under NOC - a corollary of the CED, which constrains Agree. Extraposed clauses may be interpreted and pronounced in different positions - a claim that is supported by asymmetries between psych and non-psych predicates in Super-Equi constructions. Converging evidence from extraction confirms that infinitives displaying OC and those displaying NOC occupy different positions at LF although the same position at PF. As for the interpretation of OC, the choice of controller is subject to complex semantic/pragmatic considerations, rather than some syntactic locality principle. We also argue that OC cannot be reduced to predication, at least in the domain of adjectival complementation. Systematic contrasts between subject-gap and object-gap infinitives show that the former may denote either propositions (when occurring as arguments) or predicates (when occurring as modifiers). Thus, two sources exist for subject gaps - PRO (universally available) or A-bar trace (language-particular). / by Idan Landau. / Ph.D.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2016. / Page 166 blank. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 157-165). / In this thesis, I present an action-first theory of knowledge and belief. We have a mutual interest in the successful action of our peers, and the significance of belief and knowledge stems from their role in promoting this success. Knowledge states tend to guide successful action, in an appropriately systematic manner. Belief states systematically guide our attempts to achieve our goals, and would lead to success if all went well. In defending the action-first account, I draw on a kind of pragmatism: we should look to the practical role of belief and knowledge attribution, in a social setting, to determine the nature of belief and knowledge themselves. The action-account states that the role of knowledge attribution is to identify and promote successful agents. This implies that knowledge itself is a state that tends to guide successful action. Similarly, the role of belief attribution is to help us predict how people will attempt to achieve their goals, and correct them to avoid failure where necessary. This implies that beliefs are action-guiding states that may not be success conducive - these are states that are apt to become knowledge given the appropriate evidence or argument. A final point is that the role of our ascriptions of rationality (and irrationality) is to promote practices that tend to lead to knowledge. This gives us a unified account of our concepts of knowledge, belief and rationality, founded in a cooperative society's interest in mutual success. Granting the action-account leads to significant consequences in epistemology and philosophy of mind. It gives us reason to reject various accessibility principles, and accept intellectualism with regard to know-how. All states that lead to successful action in a systematic manner, even if we do not consciously endorse their content, fit with the rationale of the action-account. Further, the account suggests a new way to model conflicted mental states, and suggests rethinking the role of the Bayesian ideal in our conception of rationality. These consequences, in turn, provide motivation for the action-account itself on pragmatic grounds: it opens up promising new lines of inquiry in philosophy. / by Jack Marley-Payne. / Ph. D.