In 1918, the signing of the armistice at the end of the First World War, brought about the return of the region known as Elsaß-Lothringen, Alsace-Lorraine, to France after 47 years of German rule. This thesis examines the problems which the integration process created for the heterogeneous population of the Moselle (annexed Lorraine), a population which included those who were indigenous to the region, Germans from all over the German Reich, and immigrants from elsewhere in Europe. In this integration process, the French authorities attempted to undo the effects of Germanisation on all levels: linguistic, cultural, political, economic, administrative, and demographic. However, the manner in which they attempted to achieve francisation, soon alienated large sections of the indigenous population. This sense of unease and dissatisfaction manifested itself within weeks of the entry of French troops to the region and became known as the malaise lorrain. Sacrifices forced upon the region by integration included a disappointingly sluggish economic recovery. Equally, whilst a process of epuration, or ethnic cleansing, deported three quarters of the Moselle's German community, many among the indigenous population were obliged to prove their loyalty to France at specially created tribunals to allow them to remain in the region. This thesis brings to light the region's experience which the historiography has hitherto treated as less controversial and less problematic than that of its neighbour, Alsace. Mosellan particularisme, which sought a middle ground between separatist regionalism and complete assimilation into France, was not as radical, reactionary, or well publicized as Alsatian autonomism. However, it was, in the long-term, far more successful.

Thesis (Doktorwürde)--Grossherzoglich Badische Ruprecht-Karls-Universität in Heidelberg, 1913? / Includes documents and text in French. Cover title. Includes bibliographical references (p. [5-9]).

Lorraine and Savoie were both occupied twice by French armies during the personal rule of Louis XIV. Lorraine was initially invaded and occupied in 1670 to support the French strategic and logistic position in the Dutch War, yet due to political expediency this developed into a policy of outright annexation. The French relinquished Lorraine due to international pressures in 1697, but partially reoccupied it from 1702 to 1714, again as a result of strategic and logistical necessity. Savoie was occupied from 1690 to 1696 and again from 1703 to 1713 as a response to successive breakdowns in Franco-Savoyard relations, and to guarantee the south-eastern frontier of the kingdom. There was no pre-conceived or uniform policy practiced by the French when it came to the occupations of these territories, and these instead developed on the basis of events and pressures that were often beyond the control of the French government. In essence, the principal French approach to occupied territories was paternalistic, their main priority being to uphold Louis’s newly-asserted sovereignty and pay the costs of the occupation while impressing upon the local elites the benefits of collaboration and the pitfalls of continued loyalty to their old ruler. The French became more sophisticated generally towards occupied territories as the reign progressed, at least as far as circumstances allowed. In sum, the key variables that influenced how the French handled these lands, other than time and place, were security issues, local loyalties, and the expectation of either retention by France or restitution to the original sovereign.

Thèse (M.A.)--Université Laval, 2008. / Bibliogr.: f. [124]-133. Publié aussi en version électronique dans la Collection Mémoires et thèses électroniques.

À l'automne 1914, la Première Guerre mondiale éclate. Pour la France et l'Allemagne, il s'agit de la deuxième guerre en moins d'un demi-siècle. Au terme du premier conflit en 1870, la Prusse victorieuse avait annexé l'Alsace- Lorraine. De ces événements est né en France le mythe des provinces perdues, et s'est développé en parallèle le culte de la Revanche. Raymond Poincaré, porté au pouvoir en 1913, sera donc le président de la République qui vena la Revanche se matérialiser en 1918 avec le retour de l'Alsace-Lorraine à la France. À quelle occasion, de quelle façon, dans quel contexte et dans quel but évoque-t-il le mythe dans ses discours de 1914 à 1919 ? Depuis la fin de la Grande Guerre, un débat fait rage en France à savoir si Poincaré a ou non souhaité une guerre de revanche. L'analyse des allusions au mythe alsacien-Lorraine dans ses discours, qui, à travers ce mémoire, nous est ici proposée, nous aidera à mieux comprendre comment Poincaré a participé à une telle guerre, notamment en utilisant la question de l'Alsace- Lorraine à des fins politiques dans le but de promouvoir son nationalisme haineux et revanchard.