<p>The distinction between that which can be said with a language and that which must be shown by a language is central to Ludwig Wittgenstein/s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The theme of "saying and showing" has at least three distinct but related connotations in that work. First, the theme constitutes the core of the Tractarian view of the logic of language and, with this, the core of its view of metaphysics. The logical form of a proposition must show itself thereby allowing the proposition to picture a possible state of affairs in the world and, consequently, allowing a language-user to claim that that state of affairs is actually the case in the world. Second, the theme of saying and showing is apparent in Wittgenstein/s view of the elucidating activity that is philosophy, as the philosopher brings one to see that which shows itself and thereby brings one to see the world aright. Third, the theme of saying and showing accounts for Wittgenstein's remarks on the ineffability of the mystical/ethical: why one must remain silent concerning that which is "higher" and what this silence means. The implications of the third connotation of the theme of saying and showIng, however, make possible a critique of and a development within the first connotation of that theme. This third sense of the theme, therefore, makes possible a changed view of language, logic and the world. Exactly such a view is developed in the Philosophical Investigations and other later writings of Wittgenstein. The theme of saying and showing can thus be traced into Wittgenstein's later writings. Further, having found the theme in the later writings as well as in the earlier work and having linked the theme with Wittgenstein's views on the mystical/ethical, it becomes reasonable to postulate a unified ethical project of showing the limitations of language as underlying the entire corpus of Wittgenstein's work.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)