New archival materials have become available that allow us to test the conventional interpretation of Warsaw Pact policy towards conventional arms reductions in Europe. They shed new light on the objectives of the Eastern side in talks on mutual and balanced arms reductions, how it approached the dispute over the assessments of the military balance and sought to preserve its advantages while constraining West German military capabilities, and demonstrate that Soviet military leaders perceived a shift in the conventional military balance in favour of the West in the 1980s.

No / The military dimension of the Cold War was characterised by the strategic nuclear stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the large-scale regional military confrontation in Central Europe. As part of the process of East-West détente there was an effort to address the risks of war in Europe by means of an arms control process referred to as MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions). The true purposes and intentions of both sides (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) in these negotiations has so far not been fully understood. This book is based on path-breaking archival research that clarifies the objectives and tactics of the parties to the negotiations and the reasons for why the negotiations ended without an agreement. It makes a major new contribution to the understanding of Cold War History.

Si la France n’est plus qu’une puissance moyenne en déclin relatif, la RFA est dans une phase de take off économique et amorce un rayonnement international. Dès son investiture, Brandt lance l’émancipation de l’Allemagne. L’Ostpolitik pourrait-elle avoir la priorité pour le gouvernement fédéral sur la politique communautaire ? La menace soviétique sur l’Allemagne est à prendre très au sérieux pour Pompidou. Réunification ; Neutralisation. Face à cette situation pluriellement très préoccupante, Pompidou a besoin de l’Europe ; mais en 1969, la construction européenne est dans l’impasse. 1971, Pompidou lance son modèle de construction de l’Union Européenne : le ‘gaullisme européen’. Son atout, Edward Heath, un ‘Européen sincère’. « On œuvre en commun, même avec l’Allemagne », affirme le Président. Le traité de l’Elysée : essentialité majeure dans l’apprentissage de l’autre ; embrayage du moteur franco-allemand ; banalisation des relations franco-allemandes. Ses enjeux : Pôle monétaire européen ; Coopération politique extérieure commune (Moyen-Orient) ; Programme ambitieux de la Conférence de Paris ; Identité Européenne ; Politique extérieure commune franco-allemande face à Moscou. Mais une politique autonome européenne pouvait-elle exister pour Washington ? Nixon et Kissinger manœuvrent pour imposer le partnership atlantique aux Européens. Crises du dollar (1971, 1973) ; Condominium américano-soviétique ; Conférence sur l’énergie. Bonn s’évertue en vain à œuvrer comme médiatrice entre Paris et Washington. / While France is only a middle power in relative decline, the FRG is in a phase of economic take off and begins an international influence. Upon his nomination, Brandt launches the emancipation of Germany. Could Ostpolitik have priority for the federal government over European Community policy? The Soviet threat to Germany is to be taken very seriously for Pompidou. Reunification; Neutralization. Faced with this plurially worrying situation, Pompidou needs Europe; but in 1969, the construction of Europe is deadlocked. 1971, Pompidou launches its construction model of the European Union: 'European Gaullism'. His asset, Edward Heath, a 'sincere European'. "We work jointly, even with Germany," says the President. The Elysée Treaty: major essentiality in the learning of the other; clutch of the Franco-German engine; normalization of Franco-German relations. Its challenges: European Monetary Pole; Common foreign policy cooperation (Middle East); Ambitious program of the Paris Conference; European identity ; Franco-German Common Foreign Policy against Moscow. But could an autonomous European policy exist for Washington? Nixon and Kissinger maneuvered to impose Atlantic partnership on Europeans. Dollar crises (1971, 1973); US-Soviet Condominium; Conference on Energy. Bonn strives in vain to work as a mediator between Paris and Washington.