Thesis (D. Min.)--Bethel Theological Seminary, St. Paul, MN, 2003. / Abstract. Includes "Policies and guidelines manual for military chaplains." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 124-135).

Thesis--Toulouse. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [7]-9).

Thesis (D. Min.)--Bethel Theological Seminary, St. Paul, MN, 2003. / Abstract. Includes "Policies and guidelines manual for military chaplains." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 124-135).

This thesis is an exercise in military history and takes the form of an investigation into a notable late-nineteenth century blunder; the British Army’s failure to relieve Gordon at Khartoum. It seeks to lay bare operational realities which to date have been obfuscated by substantially successful acts of scapegoating and cover-up. Although political procrastination in Whitehall did not abate until August, the thesis contends that a timely operation of war would still have been possible, if only General Lord Wolseley had recognized that the campaign plan he had designed in April might not, some four months later, be fit for purpose. It proceeds to demonstrate that given revised constraints on time, a full-length Nile Expedition was no longer tenable. Alternative courses of action are also tested. Popular myth would have it that the relief expedition arrived at Khartoum only two days too late. The thesis contends that this is a contrivance propagated by Wolseley out of selfishly motivated concern for his place in history. Wolseley explained away the purportedly critical 48-hours by asserting that Colonel Sir Charles Wilson had unnecessarily stalled the campaign for two days. It was inferred that Wilson was professionally inept, lost his nerve and did not press far enough upriver to be certain that Khartoum had fallen. The thesis traces the course of the ‘Wilson Controversy’, analyses ‘Campaign Design’ and ‘Campaign Management’ in order to identify how and why the relief expedition went awry, and culminates in a closely reasoned adjudication on the validity of the allegations levelled against Wilson. The thesis concludes that the true extent of the British failure was in the order of 60 days; that the failure occurred at the operational level of war, not the tactical; and that accordingly culpability should properly be attributed to Wolseley.

<p> The paper focuses on the Battle of Peleliu and how it was interpret throughout the decades following World War 2. While doing so the paper will answer the question on why the Battle was overshadowed and forgotten through history.</p><p>

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision Making and Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Dahl, Erik. Second Reader: Roberts, Nancy. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 28, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Persistent surveillance. Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-66). Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2003. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xiii, 225 p.; also includes graphics (some col). Includes bibliographical references (p. 191-211). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center

Der Arbeitskreis Militär und Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit e. V. wurde im Frühjahr 1995 gegründet. Er hat es sich zur Aufgabe gemacht, die Erforschung des Militärs im Rahmen der frühneuzeitlichen Geschichte zu befördern und zugleich das Bewusstsein der Frühneuzeit-HistorikerInnen für die Bedeutung des Militärs in all seinen Funktionen zu wecken. Das Militär steht somit als soziale Gruppe selbst im Mittelpunkt der Aktivitäten des Arbeitskreises, wird aber auch in seinen Wirkungen und Repräsentationen thematisiert. Ziel ist es, die Rolle des Militärs als Teil der frühneuzeitlichen Gesellschaft umfassend herauszuarbeiten und zu würdigen. Insofern versteht der AMG seine Arbeit nicht nur als Beitrag zur Militärgeschichte, sondern vor allem als Beitrag zur Geschichte der Frühen Neuzeit insgesamt. Der Arbeitskreis bietet ein Diskussions- und Informationsforum durch die Organisation von Tagungen, die Herausgabe der Schriftenreihe ‚Herrschaft und soziale Systeme in der Frühen Neuzeit‘, die Zeitschrift ‚Militär und Gesellschaft in der Frühen Neuzeit‘ und die Mailingliste mil-fnz.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Women in the military are considered a minority population. Recent numbers reflect a 16% representation by women in the total Armed Forces population, with the Air Force displaying the largest proportion (17%), while the Marine Corps has the smallest proportion (6%). Multiple Defense organizations have expressed concern about the progression of women officers into senior leadership positions and the barriers they face to their continued success in the military. This thesis explores the officer career path experienced by women officers progressing through the ranks, primarily during the mid-level grades of Captain (O-3) through Lt Colonel (O-5). It specifically examines women in the United States Marine Corps and Air Force because these two branches of service currently maintain the smallest and largest proportion of women, respectively. The researchers examined the demographic composition of the individual service communities and conducted personal interviews with mid-level (O-3 to O-5) and senior (O-6 and above) officers to investigate any commonalities paralleling the military to the civilian sector. Specifically, this inquiry looks at the "glass ceiling" effect and any strong similarities or differences that may exist between the Marine Corps and the Air Force. Resulting information is expected to reveal a better understanding of military women's career progression and factors that may exist in today's Armed Services, which influence their decision to continue or separate from the military. / Captain, United States Air Force / Major, United States Marine Corps

This paper explores transformation of Norwegian Special Operation Forces, raising the hypothesis that current organizational structure is inconsistent with future roles and missions. The inconsistency is derived from official documents pertaining to the transformation of Norwegian Armed Forces for the period 2005-2008. Where the military recommends disbanding two existing units, Marinejegerkommandoen and Hærens Jegerkommando, to re-commission a single unit under a single, unspecified command, the Government insists on maintaining the status quo. A likely consequence is a sub-optimal development of NORSOF as a strategic asset. Using the dichotomy of direct action vs. indirect action capabilities as a framework for understanding how Special Operation Forces (SOF) in general conduct operations, the author claims NORSOF possess capabilities only for the former. Analysis of the forces themselves, the security environment, and the strategies adopted to deal with current and future threats leads to the conclusion that NORSOF will increase its relevance by acquiring competency in indirect capabilities. If indirect capabilities become a core task for NORSOF, then the current organization should be maintained. If not, both units will continue to maintain overlapping tasks in direct capabilities. Future transformation issues will then evolve based on traditional arguments related to the maritime and land domains. / Royal Norwegian Navy author