This report, rooted in the conflict over the control of natural resource wealth, departs from the widely-accepted findings of two disparate literatures. First, while recent analyses correctly conclude that natural resources rents play a contingent role in development, this study deviates from the conventional wisdom attributing the variation of the resource curse to formal institutions. Secondly, as opposed to the recent wave of “political insurance” arguments that ascribe the creation of reforms to weak incumbents attempting to tie the hands of their successors, I argue that actors pursue similar institutional reforms for economic and political reasons. I build on these literatures by examining the commitment to a specific government institution—stabilization funds, which manage the fluctuations of natural resource rents and stop natural resource wealth from being a curse—across three natural resource-rich Latin American countries: Chile, Mexico and Venezuela. Paradoxically, because successful stabilization funds provide greater political benefits when rents are saved, I argue that these institutions only tie the hands of political successors from using rents for political purposes when they are created for economic purposes. / text

This thesis compares Norway, Botswana and Venezuela and their sovereign wealth funds. The first two countries are referred to as exceptions to the theory of the resource curse, which explains the phenomenon that shows that countries with a high dependence on income from the export of natural resources have a slower rate of economic, political and institutional development. On the contrary, Venezuela (although it was considered an exception in the past) is severely affected by this phenomenon and thus serves as a negative example in this thesis. The thesis focuses on state sovereign wealth funds and examines whether and under what conditions these funds have an effect on reversing the resource curse. Based on the theoretical part, five key characteristics are identified that the fund must meet in order to function against the negative manifestations of the curse of natural resources - (1) offsetting the effects of volatility, (2) diversifying the economy, (3) budgetary policy, (4) controlling the allocation of expenditure, (5) transparency of funds. Based on these characteristics, it is possible to observe that the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund works best from selected funds as a defense against the resource curse, followed by the Botswana fund and third by the Venezuelan fund. Norway and Botswana...