Cette recherche doctorale examine, dans un pays en proie à une « passion pour l’égalité » (Forsé et al, 2013), le degré d’acceptation à l’égard des très hauts revenus. Elle se situe au croisement de la sociologie des inégalités, de l’économie du vedettariat et de la justice sociale.Déjà présente dans le débat opposant John Rawls (1971 et 2001) et Robert Nozick (1974) au travers de l’exemple de Wilt Chamberlain, la figure de la star nous permet de répondre à une question centrale et contemporaine : les très hautes rémunérations sont-elles justes socialement ? La thèse se base sur un travail qualitatif articulé autour de la réalisation et de l’analyse de 55 entretiens semi-directifs. Elle repose également sur un travail d’analyse quantitative qui a permis de représenter l’évolution des inégalités de revenus ainsi que l’évolution des revenus des sportif.ve.s et des comédien.ne.s les mieux payé.e.s en France et dans le monde. Des régressions linéaires ayant pour variables à expliquer les rémunérations des stars de football ou de cinéma permettent de mesurer l’effet propre des caractéristiques individuelles des stars.La première partie détermine la place occupée par les comédien.ne.s et les footballeurs professionnels, désigné.e.s par la presse comme stars, dans la distribution des revenus en France. La deuxième partie élabore une définition subjective du statut de star et restitue les déterminants, selon les personnes interrogées, de la rémunération des stars. L’analyse des réponses des personnes interrogées à propos des facteurs explicatifs des revenus des cadres d’entreprise permet de mettre en avant la spécificité des stars. La troisième partie analyse l’opinion des Français à l’égard des revenus des stars. Inspirée de l’enquête PISJ (Forsé et Galland, 2011), une liste de 10 métiers – ou statuts — appartenant au décile (voire pour certains au centile ou au millime) supérieur (star de cinéma, star de football, blogueur, mannequin, animateur de télévision, médecin généraliste, professeur d’université, ministre, cadre supérieur et PDG d’une grande entreprise) a permis de constituer un dispositif empirique destiné à apprécier le degré d’acceptation à l’égard des rémunérations des stars dans une réflexion élargie aux plus hautes rémunérations. Il en résulte que le niveau de la rémunération de Cristiano Ronaldo, de Lionel Messi, d’Angelina Jolie et de Gérard Depardieu n’est accepté ni en raison d’une justification libertarienne (Nozick, 1974) ni par rejet de l’arbitraire du mérite individuel (Rawls, 1971 et 2001). Les très hauts revenus — et notamment ceux des stars — font l’objet d’une acceptation qui s’explique majoritairement par la combinaison d’un principe de stratification (logique individuelle de contribution-rétribution) et d’un principe de correction (l’utilité sociale). Enfin, l’examen des variables sociodémographiques montre que plus la personne se situe à gauche du spectre politique, plus elle critique les très hautes rémunérations. L’acceptation des très hauts revenus est donc un jeu à trois pôles entre une logique économique (contribution individuelle-rétribution individuelle), un principe de correction (l’utilité sociale) et un attachement à la notion d’égalité (le positionnement politique). / Drawing on the sociology of inequality, the star system economy and social justice, this PhD dissertation aims to examine whether French people, who live in an “equality-obsessed country“ (Forsé et al. 2013), accept high earnings.The “star”, which has already been used in the debate between Rawls (1971; 2001) and Nozick (1974) through the example of the well-known NBA star-player Wilt Chamberlain, enables us to answer one key and contemporary question: do people believe that high earnings are socially fair? To investigate this issue, I used both qualitative and quantitative methods, working with a total sample of 59 interviewees and conducting 55 semi-structured interviews, each two-hours long on average. The quantitative part of my research consists of a statistical analysis using multiple data sources (INSEE, WID, annual pundit surveys…), in order to provide an account of the evolution of movie and football stars’ earnings, in relation to the general evolution of incomes and incomes in the top percentiles (top 1%, top 0.1%, top 0.01%, and top 0.001%). Regression linear analyses allow us to determine the impact of the stars’ individual characteristics.The aim of the first part of this dissertation is to find how the top paid football players and actors (dubbed as football stars and movie stars by the press) are ranked in France’s income distribution. The second part seeks to provide a subjective definition of the star’s status and to identify, according to the interviewees, how their earnings are garnered. The analysis of the factors explaining the earnings of management executives by the interviewees helps us to insist on the specificity of the stars’ earnings. The third part examines French opinion on stars’ earnings. Using a PISJ-inspired list (Forsé et Galland, 2011) of 10 jobs or statuses belonging to the 10% (or top 1% or top 0.1%) (movie star, football-star, blogger, model, TV host, doctor, university teacher, management executive), I tried to investigate empirically the interviewees’ attitude towards not only stars’ earnings but high earnings in general.Finally, my research shows that interviewees accept the position of Cristiano, Lionel, Angelina Jolie and Gérard Depardieu among top earners, and agree with their earnings exceeding millions of euros. The joint use of the two principles (on the one hand, the stratification principle, based on the acceptance of an economics-based logic, and on the other hand, the corrective principle of social utility) leads to a reasoned acceptance of the earnings of movie stars and football stars. I therefore show that the acceptance of the level of movie stars’ and football stars’ earnings differs from the libertarian approach of Robert Nozick (1974) and from the rejection of individual merit (Rawls, 1971 and 2001). The analysis of the interviewees’ answers in relation to sociodemographic variables indicates that there is a link between the interviewees’ political beliefs and their attitude toward high earnings. The more left-wing they declared themselves, the more critical they were of the perceived hierarchy in earnings and of the very high ones. The acceptance of high earnings can be seen as a ménage-à-trois between an economics-based logic (individual contribution leads to individual earning), a corrective principle (social utility) and the valuation of equality (political belief).

This thesis comprises three studies on CEO compensation in the UK. It specifically examines the role of CEO defined-benefit pensions, compensation consultants and CEO stock options. Firstly, research on the role of executive pensions is still at a stage of infancy due to data difficulties (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007). By taking advantage of better disclosure requirements with the introduction of Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (DRRR) in 2002, this thesis examines the determinants and effects of CEO defined-benefit pensions. Consistent with rent extraction hypothesis (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005; Kalyta and Magnan, 2008), it finds that pensions are largely determined by CEO power over boards of directors. There is no evidence that pensions reduce the agency cost of debt as suggested by Edmans (2008) and Sundaram and Yermack (2007). Instead they increase the agency cost of equity by discouraging CEO risk-taking and reducing pay-performance relationship. Consistent with the argument in Gustman et al. (1994), Ippolito (1991) and Lazear (1990), this thesis also finds that pensions do bond a CEO to the firm she manages. Secondly, because of the lack of disclosure regarding compensation consultants used by companies, the empirical evidence is so far limited on how the practice of employing compensation consultants influences CEO pay. By taking advantage of better disclosure requirements since the publication of the DRRR (2002), this thesis examines the effect of using compensation consultants on CEO pay. Unlike Murphy and Sandino (2008), this thesis finds no evidence that firms use multiple pay consultants to justify or legitimize higher CEO pay. In light of the managerial power theory, this thesis instead finds that pay consultants are more concerned with the risk of losing business with their client firms. This latter finding explains why the use of pay consultants is associated with greater executive pay (see Armstrong, Ittner and Larcker, 2008; Cadman, Carter and Hillegeist, in press; Conyon, Peck and Sadler, 2009; Murphy and Sandino, 2008; Voulgaris, Stathopoulos and Walker, 2009). Thirdly, despite the importance of the issue, the existence of a link between the CEO stock options and earnings management is currently understudied in the UK. The UK context is appealing because of two distinctive corporate governance features that limit opportunistic earnings management. These are the absence of CEO duality in general (Cornett, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2008) and the increased outside director’s membership on boards since the publication of the Cadbury Report (1992) (Peasnell, Pope, and Young, 2000). By examining earnings management prior to stock option grant and exercise periods, this thesis adds to the study of Kuang (2008) that examines earnings management during stock option vesting periods. Overall, some evidence has been found that earnings are managed downwards prior to stock option grant periods. Consistent with the US-based studies, this thesis finds strong evidence of upward earnings management prior to a stock option exercise period. It shows that the UK’s distinctive governance features have not restrained opportunistic earnings management prior to stock option grants and exercises. In brief, this thesis provides some empirical evidence that the use of two pay components in the CEO pay package, namely, the defined-benefit pensions and stock options, do not necessarily promote CEO-shareholder interest alignment. The use of pay consultants in CEO pay-setting is also fraught with managerial influence. In support of the managerial power theory, I therefore suggest that these three factors can be abused by CEOs to extract excess compensation at the expense of shareholders. In this context, these three factors can themselves be considered as the sources of the agency cost. Future research might examine the mechanisms that can be deployed to govern the use of defined-benefit pensions, stock options and pay consultants in CEO pay design.