Operating at the boundaries of philosophy of mind, cognitive science, politics and social theory, this thesis aims to develop an interdisciplinary model of the relationship between agency and structure. This thesis explores the question of why the agency/structure argument in the social sciences has not yet been resolved and argues for an interdisciplinary model of agency to be utilised by social theory. In the wake of poststructuralism there has been a gravitation back towards characterising the terms of this debate in more strongly dichotomous terms, arguing for the autonomy of agency in particular as a natural kind. This trend can be seen most clearly in Archer's analytical dualism within the morphogenetic theory of social elaboration, where the desire for the clarity of dualist terms has become tangled with claims to ontology. I suggest that this tendency is not limited to social theory, but is characteristic of the neoliberal political environment from which such theory is being produced, understood and utilised. Understanding the way in which our political and social context influences the ways in which we may understand or conceptualise a problem such as this, establishing the logical intuition and methods which we use to do this kind of deductive reasoning, is key for both performing the philosophical task of engaging in the agency-structure debate, but is thoroughly interrelated with how we need to conceptualise that relationship itself. It is both the method and the content, the 'how' and the 'what', of investigating the relationship between external social structures and the feeling of autonomous authorship and choice. I argue that the political value system inherent to neoliberal and economic logics, which prioritise and naturalise individuality and autonomous, internal agentic capacity, works to make the experience of agency appear inevitable and universal. This thesis engages with the assumptions that underpin this illusion, looking to philosophy of mind in order to etch out a framework for understanding agency. This framework has two necessary components. Firstly, that it acknowledges the experience of agency as real, and that as a way-of-being-in-the- world it is necessary to continue to explore how individuals experience agency in their environments. Secondly, and most importantly, that this 'realism' about agency, does not inevitably indicate that agency has an ontological and epistemological reality that transcends the particular social and political contexts in which it makes sense. The thesis explores how the fundamental components of agency, intelligence and cognition are produced in the interrelationships between a subject and their physical, social and political environment. The argument presented is that deliberative consciousness and self-awareness emerge as a response to, and as an effect of, complex social interaction. In contrast to Archer's conception of the sui generis, causal efficacy of reflexive agency, this thesis argues that smooth, embodied, coping with the environment is the preferred mode of interacting with the world. By critically engaging with the idea that those studying social dynamics should conceptualize agency as internal and inherent the thesis explores and critiques the prevalent use of the term 'agency' within social theory, arguing that an explicit engagement with what agency is is an understudied but fundamental and necessary philosophical task within sociology. A strong position is proposed that social institutions not only precede the self-aware, experience of choice and autonomy, but actively produce it. This proposition stands in opposition to dualistic notions of agency and structure as they are conceived by critical realism. This has widespread political implications in a field that often assumes agency to be an intrinsic part of human nature that stands outside of socialisation. This goal of this thesis is to demonstrate that in order to understand the experience of agency within our particular contexts and how it manifests as a force for social change, social theory must engage critically with philosophy of consciousness.

The substantive task of the thesis is to explore a dimension of social change - the emergence of social science research within New Zealand by 1984. The thesis begins by asking questions about the status of any account - as description, understanding, or explanation. In the first instance, these questions are discussed within positivist and anti-positivist traditions. Following on from these, the work examines a series of post-positivist approaches that focus on method, general theory, and methatheorising. Many accounts of social science development emphasise the role of a rational social science idea, others stress contextual considerations. In finding these wanting, the thesis argues for the incorporation of culture, structure and agency, and discusses attempts at resolving these within the work of Anthony Giddens and Andrew Abbott. The final part of the theoretical discussion explores the potential of Critical Realism for causal analysis. Within this tradition, Margaret Archer's work is particularly useful with its commitment to robust notions of agency, culture and structure, and emphasising their interplay through time. With some modest revision to attune her position to the demands of practice, the thesis suggests 'Retroductive Narrative Realism' that incorporates ontological insights and the two practical moves of analysis and narrative. The thesis argues that these moves must be explicit, using the analytic to create hypothesis that are then tested via narratives that link emerging structural and cultural forms. The thesis uses this approach for the substantive task of writing a theoretically informed account of social science research. It works within the spheres of State, University and broader social spaces, centring interests and the role of conditioned interaction. The account is presented within four phases: the inheritance - research by the State for the purposes of the State; in search of independent means - research by the State of broader social forms; alternative benefactors - research of social issues by broader social and University interests; on the brink of bankruptcy - a questioning of the State and social forms by social and University interests. Over these four periods it is possible to trace the emergence of social research, then social science, and then specific disciplines.

Research on the experience of international students often suffers from conflation, in that it uses culture (or nationality as a proxy for culture) as a categorising agent, thereby granting causal powers to cultural differences, and contributing to a deficit model of international students. In this research, I will argue that, while culture and structure both provide new sets of constraints and opportunities for international students, participants are active agents in shaping their own experiences, as they think, reflect and act in response to their situational context. Drawing on Archer’s concept of reflexivity, this thesis demonstrates that because international students are often not immediately able to exercise agency through conversation (thought and talk), they find a need to reflect on their experiences and develop a course of action based on greater autonomy (that is, they become more independent). However, while some students make the transition to independence relatively smoothly, for others, it is not so easy, and some participants may find it difficult to convert thoughts into effective action (or displaced reflexivity). Participants in the international student experience confront a situational context marked by four specific features: first, a lack of a sympathetic interlocutor (that is, they find themselves on their own); second, contextual incongruity (commonly conceptualised as culture shock); third, shared experiences, which leads to congruity; and fourth, troublesome events, which blocks agential action. This research provides empirical evidence of specific generative mechanisms which contribute to the shaping of agency in the international student experience.