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It is demonstrated that for certain markets where traders have constant elasticity of substitution utility (CES) functions, the existence of a price equilibrium can be determined in polynomial time. It is also shown that for a certain range of elasticity of substitution where the CES market does not satisfy gross subsitutability that price equilibira can be computed in polynomial time. It is also shown that for markets satisfying gross substitutability, equilibria can be computed in polynomial time even if the excess demand is a correspondence. On the experimental side, equilibrium computation algorithms from computer science without running time guarantees are shown to be competitive with software packages used in applied microeconomics. Simulations also lend support to the Nash equilibrium solution concept by showing that agents employing heuristics in a restricted form of Texas Holdem converge to an approximate equilibrium. Monte Carlo simulations also indicate the long run preponderance of skill over chance in Holdem tournaments.

This thesis examines a number of issues regarding the Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model’s empirical performance. Chapter 1 documents the volatility puzzle with the Canadian data. The combined data from both Canada and the United States present an additional difficulty. Even if the unobserved value of leisure is allowed to be as high as required to fit the business cycle in the United States or in Canada, the model cannot reconcile the similar labor cycles with the large policy differences in the UI benefits and income taxes in the two countries when the value of leisure is assumed to be the same in both countries. Chapter 2 takes into account the realistic institutional features of the UI system and investigates the impacts of the UI benefits on the labor market outcomes. If entitlement to UI benefits must be earned with employment, generous UI is an additional benefit to an employment relationship, so it promotes job creation. If individuals are risk neutral, UI is fairly priced, and the UI system prevents moral-hazard unemployed workers, the generosity of UI has no effect on unemployment. Chapter 3 shows that the Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model can be successfully parameterized to generate observed large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment and modest responses of unemployment to changes in the UI benefits. The key features behind this success are the endogenous eligibility for UI benefits and the heterogeneity of workers. With the linear utilities commonly assumed in the Mortensen-Pissarides model, a fully rated UI system designed to prevent moral hazard has no effect on unemployment. However, the UI system in the United States is neither fully rated nor able to prevent workers with low productivity from quitting their jobs or rejecting employment offers to collect benefits. As a result, an increase in UI generosity has a positive, but realistically small, effect on unemployment. This chapter answers the Costain and Reiter (2008) criticism with the Mortensen-Pissarides model.

This thesis examines a number of issues regarding the Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model’s empirical performance. Chapter 1 documents the volatility puzzle with the Canadian data. The combined data from both Canada and the United States present an additional difficulty. Even if the unobserved value of leisure is allowed to be as high as required to fit the business cycle in the United States or in Canada, the model cannot reconcile the similar labor cycles with the large policy differences in the UI benefits and income taxes in the two countries when the value of leisure is assumed to be the same in both countries. Chapter 2 takes into account the realistic institutional features of the UI system and investigates the impacts of the UI benefits on the labor market outcomes. If entitlement to UI benefits must be earned with employment, generous UI is an additional benefit to an employment relationship, so it promotes job creation. If individuals are risk neutral, UI is fairly priced, and the UI system prevents moral-hazard unemployed workers, the generosity of UI has no effect on unemployment. Chapter 3 shows that the Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model can be successfully parameterized to generate observed large cyclical fluctuations in unemployment and modest responses of unemployment to changes in the UI benefits. The key features behind this success are the endogenous eligibility for UI benefits and the heterogeneity of workers. With the linear utilities commonly assumed in the Mortensen-Pissarides model, a fully rated UI system designed to prevent moral hazard has no effect on unemployment. However, the UI system in the United States is neither fully rated nor able to prevent workers with low productivity from quitting their jobs or rejecting employment offers to collect benefits. As a result, an increase in UI generosity has a positive, but realistically small, effect on unemployment. This chapter answers the Costain and Reiter (2008) criticism with the Mortensen-Pissarides model.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Princeton University, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 110-112).

Cette thèse étudie le système de distribution alimentaire au Vietnam fondée sur une approche de concurrence imparfaite. Le premier chapitre analyse le comportement de marché des intermédiaires dans le système de distribution alimentaire traditionnel. Nous modélisons le comportement des intermédiaires dans tous les cas de compétition de marché afin d'identifier l'impact du pouvoir de marché sur les producteurs alimentaires en amont, et sur les consommateurs en aval du système de distribution alimentaire traditionnel.La relation compétitive entre les différents circuits de distribution alimentaire est étudiée dans le second chapitre. Nous modélisation la compétition entre les systèmes de distribution alimentaire traditionnelle et moderne. Nous examinons la condition de coexistence qui permet aux deux circuits d'être active dans chaque cas spécifique de compétition de marché.Le troisième chapitre étudie le choix de circuit optimal des agriculteurs quand les coopératives agricoles soutiennent les petits producteurs dans l'accès au système de distribution alimentaire moderne. Nous introduisons deux circuits de distribution verticalement liés par la demande. Nous étudions le flux de quantité des petits producteurs aux consommateurs au moyen d'un équilibre de Nash, et nous abordons la question de la distribution des agriculteurs par un équilibre de libre entrée.Finalement, le quatrième chapitre analyse l'effet direct de la politique sur le système de distribution alimentaire. Nous proposons le modèle théorique de la réforme agraire, et étudions son impact sur le système de distribution alimentaire. / This dissertation studies the food distribution system in Viet Nam based on an imperfect competition approach.The first chapter analyzes the market behavior of the intermediaries in the traditional food distribution system. We model the intermediary behavior in all cases of market competition to recognize the impact of their market power on the food producers in the upstream, and on the consumers in the downstream of the traditional food distribution system.The competitive relationship between different food distribution channels is studied in the second chapter. We model the competition between the traditional and the modern food distribution system to analyze how the market behaves at equilibrium. We moreover investigate the coexistence condition which allows both channels to be active in each specific case of market competition.The third chapter studies the optimal channel choice of the farmers when agricultural cooperatives support these small producers accessing the modern food distribution system. We introduce two distribution channel vertically linked by demand. We study the quantity flow from small producers to the consumers by mean of a Nash equilibrium and address the question of the distribution of the farmers by a free entry equilibrium.Eventually, the fourth chapter analyzes the policy implication directly toward the food distribution system. We propose the theoretical model of land reform and study its impact on the food distribution system.

Through integrated modeling of power system operations and market risks, this thesis addresses a variety of important issues on market signals modeling, generation capacity scheduling, and electricity forward trading. The first part of the thesis addresses a central problem of transmission investment which is to model market signals for transmission adequacy. The proposed system simulation framework, combined with the stochastic price model, provides a powerful tool for capturing the characteristics of market prices dynamics and evaluating transmission investment. We advocate the use of an AC power flow formulations instead since it allocates transmission losses correctly and reveals the economic incentives of voltage requirements. By incorporating reliability constraints in the market dispatch, the resulting market prices yield incentives for market participants to invest in additional transmission capacity. The second part of the thesis presents a co-optimization modeling framework that incorporates market participation and market price uncertainties into the capacity allocation decision-making problem through a stochastic programming formulation. Optimal scenario-dependent generation scheduling strategies are obtained. The third part of the thesis is devoted to analyzing the risk premium present in the electricity day-ahead forward price over the real-time spot price. This study establishes a quantitative model for incorporating transmission congestion into the analysis of electricity day-ahead forward risk premium. Evidences from empirical studies confirm the significant statistical relationship between the day-ahead forward risk premium and the shadow price premiums on transmission flowgates.