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This research aims to develop and empirically validate an approach to using managerial judgments as a basis for competitive strategy decisions. Our premise is that by using structured elicitation methods that rely on the underlying logic of competitive market structure analysis (CMSA) models (e.g., perceived competitive similarities (PS) and forced choice (FC)), it may be possible to effectively extract and organize managers' knowledge of competitive relationships. Moreover, these judgments may be primed using competitive criterial cues such as brand image, features and usage situation. Based on psychological theories, we offer hypotheses (about how managerial judgments will be influenced by different elicitation methods and priming cues) which are tested in an experiment where subjects gained experience in a simulated market with a pre-specified structure (based on overall similarity (OS) of the products). We also test for experiential learning of this structure. The findings suggest that unaided judgments did not change as a function of outcome feedback. However, structured judgments showed significant effect of both feedback and elicitation method. Initially, OS-based structure measures received high ratings, suggesting that subjects may have recognized the 'true' structure. However, with feedback, they placed greater emphasis on the usage situation-based measure which were more concrete in their extra-experimental experience. Relative to the PS method, the FC method helped subjects articulate better that the market was partitioned on the basis of OS. Also, subjects who gave FC judgments first, provided concordant judgments when given the PS method thereafter. In contrast, subjects' judgments were more susceptible to change when the method order was reversed. Thus, the FC judgments produced both more veridical and more stable perceptions of market structure. Subject to study limitations, the findings provide a basis for incorporating even partially fallible managerial judgments in CMSA tasks (and toward development of an expert system). It shows how structured methods for eliciting such judgments can be meaningfully implemented and suggests that these methods may elicit both veridical and stable judgments of competitive relationships in a market. Moreover, the study examines the convergent validity of different methods and priming cues on managerial judgment as well as its potential biases and inconsistencies.

This study extends a research stream calling for further research regarding pricing and accounting feedback. Marketing executives rely heavily on accounting information for pricing decisions, yet criticize accounting feedback usefulness. To address this criticism, this research integrates the cognitive psychology and accounting literature addressing feedback effectiveness with pricing research in the marketing discipline. The research extends the scope of previous accounting feedback studies by using a control group and comparing two proxies of subject task knowledge; years of pricing experience and a measure of the cognitive structure of pricing knowledge. In addition, this research manipulates task complexity by using two different accounting systems. These systems vary in the number of cost pools used in allocating overhead, resulting in differentially projected cost and profit information. A total of 60 subjects participated in a computer laboratory experiment. These subjects were non-accountants with varying amounts of pricing knowledge. Subjects were randomly assigned to six experimental groups which varied by feedback type (no accounting feedback, outcome feedback only, or a combination of outcome and task properties feedback) and task complexity (high or low number of overhead cost pools). The subjects attempted to (1) maximize profits for a product during 15 rounds of pricing decisions, and (2) accurately estimate their profit for each round. The experimental results indicate no difference in performance between the three feedback types examined. However, increases in both subjects' pricing knowledge and the number of cost pools do influence feedback effectiveness. This study suggests that the amount of the users' task knowledge may influence the effectiveness of current accounting reports. In addition, increasing the number of cost pools in accounting systems may be beneficial for all users.

Ding, Ling. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [43]-45). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Thesis Committee --- p.i / Abstract --- p.ii / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Background --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Motivation --- p.3 / Chapter 1.3 --- Thesis Organization --- p.4 / Chapter 2 --- Representative Skylines and Basic Properties --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- Existing Formulation --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Max-dominance Representative Skyline --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Defects of the Existing Formulation --- p.7 / Chapter 2.2 --- Our Formulation --- p.9 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Distance-based Representative Skyline --- p.9 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Properties of Our Formulation --- p.10 / Chapter 2.3 --- Problem Definition --- p.12 / Chapter 3 --- The Two-dimensional Case --- p.13 / Chapter 3.1 --- Algorithm 2D-opt --- p.13 / Chapter 3.2 --- Time Complexity --- p.15 / Chapter 3.3 --- Computing Covering Circles --- p.15 / Chapter 4 --- The Higher-dimensional Case --- p.18 / Chapter 4.1 --- NP-hardness and 2-approximation --- p.18 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Proof of NP-hardness --- p.18 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Algorithm naive-greedy --- p.19 / Chapter 4.2 --- Algorithm I-greedy --- p.20 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Conservative Skyline --- p.22 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Access Order --- p.23 / Chapter 4.3 --- Computing the Maximum Representative Distance --- p.27 / Chapter 5 --- Experiments --- p.30 / Chapter 5.1 --- Data --- p.30 / Chapter 5.2 --- Representation Quality --- p.31 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Representative Skylines --- p.31 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Representation Error Comparison --- p.33 / Chapter 5.3 --- Efficiency --- p.34 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- Running Time Comparison --- p.34 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Scalability Comparison --- p.37 / Chapter 6 --- Related Work --- p.39 / Chapter 7 --- Conclusions --- p.41 / A List of Publications --- p.42 / Bibliography --- p.43

Wu, Xiaobing. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [48]-51). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Thesis Committee --- p.i / Abstract --- p.ii / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Motivation --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Thesis Organization --- p.7 / Chapter 2 --- Related Work --- p.9 / Chapter 2.1 --- Static Skyline --- p.9 / Chapter 2.2 --- Monochromatic Reverse Skyline --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3 --- Other Skyline-Related Topics --- p.13 / Chapter 2.4 --- Bichromatic Reverse Nearest Neighbor --- p.14 / Chapter 3 --- Basic Properties of Bichromatic Reverse Skyline --- p.16 / Chapter 3.1 --- Bichromatic Reverse Skyline --- p.16 / Chapter 3.2 --- Basic Properly --- p.19 / Chapter 4 --- The BRS Algorithm --- p.24 / Chapter 4.1 --- Midway Conversion --- p.24 / Chapter 4.2 --- Heuristics --- p.27 / Chapter 4.3 --- The Algorithm --- p.32 / Chapter 5 --- Any Mixture of Bi- and Uni-directional Dimensions --- p.37 / Chapter 6 --- Experiments --- p.40 / Chapter 6.1 --- Bi-directional Retrieval --- p.40 / Chapter 6.2 --- Mixture of Bi- and Uni-directional Axes --- p.44 / Chapter 7 --- Conclusions --- p.46 / Chapter A --- List of Publications --- p.47 / Bibliography --- p.48

This dissertation considers organizational problems of market entry. The research follows the experimental path. Game theoretic models are combined with laboratory experiments to produce a set of empirical findings. Two market entry problems are studied. The first considers the chain store paradox developed by Selten (1978). This game considers an established chain store with locations in numerous towns. In each of these towns a different competitor decides whether to enter and compete with the chain store. When entry occurs, the chain store can respond cooperatively or aggressively. The game proceeds sequentially, the players are not symmetric, and the critical solution concept is the subgame perfect equilibrium. Three experiments are conducted for a total of 550 trials of the game. Experiments differ in the size of payoffs, the number of entrants, the anonymity of the chain store, and whether subjects play in both the role of the chain store and an entrant or in just one role. There is qualified support for the game theoretic prediction that a chain store cannot deter the sequential entry of competitors. Entry occurred on 459 of 550 trials; while some chain stores pursue deterrence, it largely is not effective in these specific experimental environments. It is suggested that deterrence might be effective if the number of entrants or payoffs are increased. The results have implications for discussions on predatory pricing, reputation, and the value of backwards induction as a solution concept. The second market entry problem is based on a simultaneous market entry game developed by Rapoport (1994). In this game symmetric players decide simultaneously whether to enter a market with a specified capacity. The game theoretic prediction for the number of entrants is based on a Nash equilibrium (in pure or mixed strategies). Again, experimental results support game theoretic predictions. Across three experiments the correlation between the number of entrants and the size of the market capacity is consistently above 0.90. Taken together, these experiments on market entry problems provide strong support for the conceptual use of game theory and the methodological use of controlled laboratory experiments in the field of strategic management.

by Chan Ka Wah. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1984. / Bibliography: leaves 175-184.

by Chan Kok-Wing, Chu Ming-Cheung. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1985. / Bibliography: leaves 100-102.

Everyone makes decisions, some simple, others complex. In business-to-business (B2B) marketing environments, decision-making becomes even more complicated. The decision-makers require an adequate set of facts to support their decision-making. In order to provide the necessary decision-support, B2B organisations invest huge amounts of money in information systems such as enterprise resources planning applications, customer relationship management software, and other types of databases. These systems store, analyse, manipulate and/or integrate internal data and perhaps force-feed it to the decision-makers; what we call a foie-gras approach. On the other hand, organisations may allow the decision-makers to search for the desired facts or decision-support by themselves; what we refer to as anarchic resources utilisation. Alternatively, the decision-makers may utilise resources with a combination of the two approaches. Previous studies have shown that many factors may influence the resources utilisation; however, not many studies have been conducted in the B2B context. This research, therefore, aims to provide a better understanding of how decision-makers utilise the available resources by firstly identifying B2B factors affecting the resources utilisation, and then explaining how these factors influence them. Results from in-depth interviews with the marketing decision-makers from three case studies show that the value of customers, supplier-customer relationships, and the nature of demand are the most influential B2B factors affecting the resources utilisation of the decision-makers. Other factors such as experience, nature of decisions, and management style are also found to have considerable impact on the approach the decision-makers adopt. In order to provide adequate decision-support, the providers may need to consider these factors and understand their effects on the decision-makers in the organisation, and design or choose the right information system(s); this should then result in better quality decisions.