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This dissertation comprises three essays under the title "Three Essays on Trade, Resource and Environment". / The first essay develops a model of international duopoly involving competition both in prices and in levels of environmental friendliness, and studies the implications of government policies. It is shown that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, a regulatory increase in the minimum required level of environmental friendliness of the imported goods may harm the home firm, and may result in an increase in the volume of imports. It may also have adverse effects on the environment. Whether consumers lose or gain from such a regulatory increase depends on consumption spillover effects. We also show that, under certain conditions, the duopoly's equilibrium choice of levels of environmental friendliness is socially optimal. / The second essay investigates the properties of the dynamics of population and resource in a model where the objective function is to maximize the utility level of the least advantaged generation. Unlike in models with a utilitarian objective where the typical outcome is a unique steady state, it is found in our model that there is a continuum of steady states. Which steady state will be approached depends on the initial conditions. We show that for relatively large values of the resource stock, each steady state is conditionally stable in the saddlepoint sense; but for small values of the resource stock, the approach path to a steady state is non-monotone in the state space. Along the approach path to a steady state, the implicit discount rate varies over time. / The third essay extends the existing literature on regulation of polluting firms by taking into account the dynamics of investment in pollution abatement capital. It confirms that, under perfect competition, a Pigouvian tax can create the correct incentive for firms to invest and guide firms to achieve the social optimum. This tax path is time consistent. However, when there is a large polluter with price taking behavior, while an efficient and time consistent tax path exists, it is no longer subgame perfect unless the damage cost function is linear in emission. A non-linear taxation rule needs to be designed to achieve the socially optimal outcome. In the case of monopoly, a pair of instruments, an emission tax and a production subsidy, can lead the monopolist to achieve the social optimum. However, if pre-commitment is not possible, it is shown that linear feedback rules cannot achieve the first best outcome.

This dissertation is an extension of Leland and Pyle's (1977) signaling model. It introduces the length of the retention period to which the entrepreneur commits in the prospectus as a signal of firm value, in addition to the retention level. The analysis uses concepts of game theory to examine a two-period model where an entrepreneur seeks to issue shares on the market and invest in a productive project that generates outcomes which are publicly announced at the end of the next two periods. The entrepreneur can retain some of her firm's shares and trade them later on the secondary market, after information has been released about the outcomes. The length of the retention period is found to be a signaling mechanism that complements ownership retention. Depending on the information structure of the firm, a longer retention period may reduce or increase the retention level necessary for separation. The model also shows that there are realistic situations in which entrepreneurs prefer to retain a portion of their firm's shares for longer than the minimum retention period imposed by regulations, and others in which she prefers the shortest period possible. The optimal combination of under-diversification and commitment is shown to depend on the information structure and the probability distribution of outcomes of the firm. The empirical implications of the model are tested on the set of firms that made an initial public offering in 1981. Although the results of the tests are generally consistent with the predictions of the model, they are not strong enough to reject the null hypotheses.

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In this thesis, we discuss a novel approach to the dynamics modelling and analysis of impact in unilaterally constrained multibody systems. This approach is based on an analysis of energy absorption and restitution during impact, using a decomposition technique, which decouples the kinetic energy associated with the spaces of admissible and constrained motions of unilateral contacts. This is done based on the decomposition of the tangent space of the configuration manifold at the pre-impact instant. The decomposition of the kinetic energy can provide a picture of how the energy absorption and dissipation during impact is related to the variation of the generalized velocities and the configuration of multibody systems. / Further, based on the above analysis approach, we introduce a new interpretation of the energetic coefficient of restitution, specially applicable to contact involving multibody systems. This interpretation generalizes the concept of the energetic coefficient of restitution and allows for consideration of simultaneous multiple-point contact scenarios. Moreover, based on the concept of the generalized energetic coefficient of restitution, the contact modes and the post-impact state of planar single-point impact are determined. Further, the problem of simultaneous multiple-point impact is considered, where it is shown that our approach can also be advantageous to characterize the dynamics of interaction in such systems. / The use and applicability of the approach reported are further investigated by conducting an experimental study on a robotic testbed. The open architecture of the testbed allows us to perform various contact experiments, such as single- and multiple-point impact scenarios, with different pre-impact configurations and velocities. The kinematic and dynamic models of the system have been developed and implemented for real-time analysis. It is shown that impact between multibody systems is considerably affected by not only the local dynamics characteristics of the interacting bodies, but also the (global) configuration of the interacting multibody systems. The reported results suggest that the material presented herein offers a useful means to characterize impact in complex systems.

This thesis addresses the problem of pricing perishable inventories such as airline seats and hotel rooms. It also analyzes the airline seat allocation problem when two airlines compete on a single-leg flight. Finally, several existing models for seat allocation with multiple fares on a single-leg flight are compared. The pricing framework is consistent with modern yield management tools which utilize restrictions such as weekend stayover to segment the market. One model analyzed considers a restriction which is irrelevant to one set of consumers, but which the others find so onerous that they will not purchase a restricted ticket at any price. If the consumers who do not mind the restriction are less price sensitive than those who find the restriction onerous, then the thesis shows that there is an optimal policy for a monopolist which will sell fares at no more than three price levels. When two restrictions are allowed in the model, if one is more onerous than the other in the sense that the set of consumers who would not buy a ticket with the first restriction is a subset of those who would not buy it with the second restriction, then the restrictions are said to be nested. If the sets of consumers who would not buy tickets with the first restriction is disjoint from those who would not buy with the second restriction, then the restrictions are said to be mutually exclusive. If two restrictions are either nested or mutually exclusive, then a monopolist needs at most four price levels with three types (i.e. combinations of restrictions) of product. With two general restrictions, the monopolist may need five price levels with four types of product. The pricing model is applied to restrictions which are based on membership in a particular organization. For example, employees of an airline are frequently eligible for special fares. Some airlines provide special fares for government employees or for employees of certain corporations. An analysis is given to help airlines understand the costs and benefits of such arrangements. A model of two airlines competing on a single-leg flight is developed for the case where the airlines have fixed capacity and fixed price levels for two types of fares-full and discount. The airlines compete by controlling the number of discount fares which they sell. The split of the market between the airlines is modelled in two different ways. First, the airlines might share the market for a fare class proportionally to their allocation of seats to that fare class. In this case, under certain conditions, there exists an equilibrium pair of booking limits for the discount fare such that each airline will protect the same number of seats for the full fare customers, even when the demands are random and stochastically dependent. The second market sharing model assumes that the two airlines share the market demand equally. In this case, when the demands are deterministic, then there is an equilibrium solution where each airline will protect enough seats to split equally the market for the full fares. Finally, three existing seat allocation models for multi-fare single-leg flights with stochastically independent demands are compared. It is shown that the optimality conditions for each of these models are analytically equivalent, thus providing a unified approach to this problem.

Research on justice in social exchange distinguishes between fairness as a goal and fairness as an interpersonal influence strategy. Strategic fairness is considered to be epiphenomenal and explainable by more basic motives, most notably, self-interest; fairness as a goal is based only on Lerner’s (1982) model. Recent findings contribute to a new model which specifies that allocators of resources use fairness strategically while recipients treat justice as a goal by reacting to perceived injustice. This dissertation presents the model along with an experimental test of its predictions, which also addresses an ongoing debate in experimental economics on the role of fairness in ultimatum and dictator games. The experiment was designed to distinguish between fairness as an interpersonal strategy and fairness as a goal. Participants moved from allocator to recipient roles in various experimental conditions that varied their information and interdependence. Results show that ultimatum offerers made smaller offers when respondents knew how much they were dividing and larger offers when fairness was salient. Dictators made smaller offers than ultimatum offerers, but did not reduce their offers as much as ultimatum offerers when the respondent did not know how much was being divided. They appeared unaffected by the salience of fairness. Respondents rejected more small offers than large ones and more offers when they knew the amount being divided. The rejection rates of ultimatum and dictator offers did not vary. The results show substantive support for the idea that justice motives are role specific. Unexpected findings led to modifications of the model with respect to the interdependence of the actors. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for the study of justice in general and for the specific case of fairness concerns in bargaining games.

Many landscape evolution models have considered the interaction of exogenic and endogenic processes. However, geomorphological processes have not been successfully incorporated in landscape evolution models. The thesis begins with a critical analysis of methodologies for the study of large-scale geomorphological processes. A framework based on a generalization of the relevant processes is recommended. Hillslope and channel submodels, which are based on typical processes operating in coastal regions of British Columbia, are introduced. The following hillslope processes are considered: (i) slow, quasi-continuous mass movements; (ii) fast, episodic mass movements; and (iii) weathering. The transport relation for fast, episodic mass movements was found to be nonlinear. Fluvial transport in both low and high-gradient channels and debris flow transport are considered in the channel submodel. A bed load transport equation, which is a revised version of the Bagnold stream power formula, is derived. Suspended load is calculated using a suspended load/contributing area correlation. Connections between hillslope and channel processes are considered to ensure adequate representation in the model. The hillslope and channel submodels are explored in one-dimensional and surface model runs for small drainage basins in the Queen Charlotte Islands, British Columbia. Tests of the fluvial submodel demonstrate the robustness of the bed load equation used in this study. A conceptualization of the landscape into unstable and stable regimes is introduced. Results of surface model runs emphasize the key role of low-order channels in transferring sediment from hillslopes to main channels. The exercise of constructing and running the model highlighted major gaps in our present understanding of geomorphological process operation and sediment routing. Suggestions for future research are extensive and are outlined in the concluding chapter of the thesis.

The focus of the following three essays rests on the Kydland-Prescott (1977) and Barro-Gordon (1983) model of time inconsistent discretionary monetary policy. The first essay derives a model in which the costs and benefits to inflation are tied to the underlying features of the economy. The benefit to inflation arises due to monopolistic competition among firms and the cost is due to a staggered timing structure for nominal money. The benefit of this approach is that it can be shown that factors that increase the monetary authority's incentive to inflate may also increase the costs to inflation, and therefore do not necessarily result in a worsened inflation bias. In particular, the model shows that discretionary inflation in the economy is nonmonotonically related to the distortion. The model also indicates that changes in the real interest rate affect the monetary authority's incentives and hence the discretionary rate of inflation. An increase in the labor share raises the discretionary rate. Lastly, lack of commitment, costs to inflation, and the presence of a distortion are crucial for discretionary inflation to be biased above the Friedman (1969) rule. The second essay builds on the first, extending the model to an open economy environment. The extended model indicates several channels through which openness affects the monetary authority's incentives. Most significantly, the model cannot replicate the Romer (1993) and Lane (1995) result that openness reduces the discretionary rate of inflation. Again, the model relates the underlying features of the economy on the discretionary rate, and an economy's foreign asset position. Strategic incentives are also important for determining whether an open economy's rate of inflation is less than that of a comparable closed economy. The last essay analyzes empirically the relationship between the overall degree of competition among firms, as measured by the markup, and the average rate of inflation for the OECD group of countries. In line with the time-consistency argument, results indicate a positive relationship between markups and inflation. This finding is robust to the inclusion of several explanatory variables, such as terms of trade effects, and central bank independence. The evidence is weak, however, in the presence of per capita GDP.