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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

Some problems related to the Karp-Sipser algorithm on random graphs

Kreacic, Eleonora January 2017 (has links)
We study certain questions related to the performance of the Karp-Sipser algorithm on the sparse Erdös-Rényi random graph. The Karp-Sipser algorithm, introduced by Karp and Sipser [34] is a greedy algorithm which aims to obtain a near-maximum matching on a given graph. The algorithm evolves through a sequence of steps. In each step, it picks an edge according to a certain rule, adds it to the matching and removes it from the remaining graph. The algorithm stops when the remining graph is empty. In [34], the performance of the Karp-Sipser algorithm on the Erdös-Rényi random graphs G(n,M = [<sup>cn</sup>/<sub>2</sub>]) and G(n, p = <sup>c</sup>/<sub>n</sub>), c &GT; 0 is studied. It is proved there that the algorithm behaves near-optimally, in the sense that the difference between the size of a matching obtained by the algorithm and a maximum matching is at most o(n), with high probability as n → ∞. The main result of [34] is a law of large numbers for the size of a maximum matching in G(n,M = <sup>cn</sup>/<sub>2</sub>) and G(n, p = <sup>c</sup>/<sub>n</sub>), c &GT; 0. Aronson, Frieze and Pittel [2] further refine these results. In particular, they prove that for c &LT; e, the Karp-Sipser algorithm obtains a maximum matching, with high probability as n → ∞; for c &GT; e, the difference between the size of a matching obtained by the algorithm and the size of a maximum matching of G(n,M = <sup>cn</sup>/<sub>2</sub>) is of order Θ<sub>log n</sub>(n<sup>1/5</sup>), with high probability as n → ∞. They further conjecture a central limit theorem for the size of a maximum matching of G(n,M = <sup>cn</sup>/<sub>2</sub>) and G(n, p = <sup>c</sup>/<sub>n</sub>) for all c &GT; 0. As noted in [2], the central limit theorem for c &LT; 1 is a consequence of the result of Pittel [45]. In this thesis, we prove a central limit theorem for the size of a maximum matching of both G(n,M = <sup>cn</sup>/<sub>2</sub>) and G(n, p = <sup>c</sup>/<sub>n</sub>) for c &GT; e. (We do not analyse the case 1 ≤ c ≤ e). Our approach is based on the further analysis of the Karp-Sipser algorithm. We use the results from [2] and refine them. For c &GT; e, the difference between the size of a matching obtained by the algorithm and the size of a maximum matching is of order Θ<sub>log n</sub>(n<sup>1/5</sup>), with high probability as n → ∞, and the study [2] suggests that this difference is accumulated at the very end of the process. The question how the Karp-Sipser algorithm evolves in its final stages for c > e, motivated us to consider the following problem in this thesis. We study a model for the destruction of a random network by fire. Let us assume that we have a multigraph with minimum degree at least 2 with real-valued edge-lengths. We first choose a uniform random point from along the length and set it alight. The edges burn at speed 1. If the fire reaches a node of degree 2, it is passed on to the neighbouring edge. On the other hand, a node of degree at least 3 passes the fire either to all its neighbours or none, each with probability 1/2. If the fire extinguishes before the graph is burnt, we again pick a uniform point and set it alight. We study this model in the setting of a random multigraph with N nodes of degree 3 and α(N) nodes of degree 4, where α(N)/N → 0 as N → ∞. We assume the edges to have i.i.d. standard exponential lengths. We are interested in the asymptotic behaviour of the number of fires we must set alight in order to burn the whole graph, and the number of points which are burnt from two different directions. Depending on whether α(N) » √N or not, we prove that after the suitable rescaling these quantities converge jointly in distribution to either a pair of constants or to (complicated) functionals of Brownian motion. Our analysis supports the conjecture that the difference between the size of a matching obtained by the Karp-Sipser algorithm and the size of a maximum matching of the Erdös-Rényi random graph G(n,M = <sup>cn</sup>/<sub>2</sub>) for c > e, rescaled by n<sup>1/5</sup>, converges in distribution.
2

Weak core solution for the non-transferable utility kidney exchange game

Collette, Raphaël 08 1900 (has links)
Plusieurs pays possèdent des programmes de don croisé de rein (PDCR). Le but de ces programmes est d’aider les patients ayant un donneur incompatible à obtenir une greffe, en échangeant les donneurs incompatibles entre les patients. Pour pouvoir obtenir des bassins de paires incompatibles de plus grande taille, il est possible d’élargir les PDCR pour y inclure plusieurs pays ou hôpitaux. Par contre, on doit s’attendre à ce que ces derniers agissent de façon stratégique pour maximiser le nombre de leurs patients obtenant une greffe. Avec ce cadre, on peut définir le problème de don croisé de rein à plusieurs agents. Dans ce mémoire, nous modélisons ce problème comme un jeu coopératif à utilité non- transférable et nous présentons le noyau faible comme solution à ce jeu. Nous étudions empiriquement notre solution sur des exemples basés sur des données réelles et montrons qu’elle est atteignable en pratique. Nous comparons aussi le noyau faible à une autre solution présente dans la littérature: les couplages résistants aux rejets. / In various countries, kidney paired donation programs (KPDs) are implemented. These programs aim to help patients with an incompatible donor to obtain a transplant by swapping the donors between the patients. In order to increase the size of the pool of incompatible patient-donor pairs and potentially enhance patient benefits, KPDs can be extended to include multiple countries or hospitals. However, unlike existing nationwide KPDs, strategic behaviour from these entities (agents) is to be expected. This gives rise to the multi-agent kidney exchange problem. In this work, we model for the first time this problem as a non-transferable utility game. We also propose and argue in favour of the use of the weak core as a solution concept for the game. Using integer programming tools, we empirically study our solution concept on instances from the literature, which are derived from real-world data, and show that it is attainable in practice. We also compare the weak core to another recently presented solution concept from the literature, the rejection-proof matching.

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