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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
201

Roadside safety improvements

Estes, Carol Sue January 2010 (has links)
Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries
202

Multiplexing high speed quantum key distribution with conventional data on a single optical fibre

Patel, Ketaki Animesh January 2015 (has links)
No description available.
203

An innovative algebraic approach for IP traceback.

January 2004 (has links)
Chen Zhaole. / Thesis submitted in: Aug 2003. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 54-56). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract / Acknowledgement / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1. --- Motivation --- p.2 / Chapter 1.2. --- The Problem --- p.2 / Chapter 1.3. --- Project Introduction --- p.3 / Chapter 1.4. --- Thesis Outline --- p.4 / Chapter 2 --- Denial-of-Service Attacks --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Denial-of-Service Attacks --- p.7 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Direct DoS Attacks --- p.7 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Reflector DoS Attacks --- p.11 / Chapter 3 --- Related Work --- p.14 / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.15 / Chapter 3.2 --- Link Testing --- p.15 / Chapter 3.3 --- Probabilistic Marking Scheme --- p.16 / Chapter 3.4 --- ICMP Traceback --- p.17 / Chapter 3.5 --- Algebraic Marking Scheme --- p.18 / Chapter 3.6 --- Advanced and Authenticated Marking Scheme --- p.19 / Chapter 4 --- An Innovative Algebraic Approach for IP Traceback --- p.21 / Chapter 4.1 --- Introduction --- p.22 / Chapter 4.2 --- Background --- p.23 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Definitions --- p.23 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Assumptions --- p.24 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Basic Principles --- p.25 / Chapter 4.3 --- Marking Schemes for Tracing DoS Attacks --- p.26 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Simplified Algebraic Marking Scheme --- p.26 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Reflective Algebraic Marking Scheme --- p.31 / Chapter 5 --- Feasibility and Performance Analysis --- p.35 / Chapter 5.1 --- Backward Compatibility --- p.36 / Chapter 5.2 --- Number of False Positives --- p.37 / Chapter 5.3 --- Minimum Number of Packets for Reconstruction --- p.38 / Chapter 5.4 --- Multiple Attacks --- p.38 / Chapter 5.5 --- Reconstruction Time --- p.39 / Chapter 5.6 --- Router Performance --- p.39 / Chapter 6 --- Experiment Results --- p.40 / Chapter 6.1 --- Experiments of Simplified Marking Scheme --- p.41 / Chapter 6.2 --- Experiments of Reflective Marking Scheme --- p.44 / Chapter 7 --- Conclusions and future work --- p.47 / Chapter 7.1 --- Conclusions --- p.47 / Chapter 7.2 --- Future Work --- p.48 / Bibliography --- p.50
204

Towards IP traceback based defense against DDoS attacks.

January 2004 (has links)
Lau Nga Sin. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 101-110). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Research Motivation --- p.2 / Chapter 1.2 --- Problem Statement --- p.3 / Chapter 1.3 --- Research Objectives --- p.4 / Chapter 1.4 --- Structure of the Thesis --- p.6 / Chapter 2 --- Background Study on DDoS Attacks --- p.8 / Chapter 2.1 --- Distributed Denial of Service Attacks --- p.8 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- DDoS Attack Architecture --- p.9 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- DDoS Attack Taxonomy --- p.11 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- DDoS Tools --- p.19 / Chapter 2.1.4 --- DDoS Detection --- p.21 / Chapter 2.2 --- DDoS Countermeasure: Attack Source Traceback --- p.23 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Link Testing --- p.23 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Logging --- p.24 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- ICMP-based traceback --- p.26 / Chapter 2.2.4 --- Packet marking --- p.28 / Chapter 2.2.5 --- Comparison of various IP Traceback Schemes --- p.31 / Chapter 2.3 --- DDoS Countermeasure: Packet Filtering --- p.33 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Ingress Filtering --- p.33 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Egress Filtering --- p.34 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Route-based Packet Filtering --- p.35 / Chapter 2.3.4 --- IP Traceback-based Packet Filtering --- p.36 / Chapter 2.3.5 --- Router-based Pushback --- p.37 / Chapter 3 --- Domain-based IP Traceback Scheme --- p.40 / Chapter 3.1 --- Overview of our IP Traceback Scheme --- p.41 / Chapter 3.2 --- Assumptions --- p.44 / Chapter 3.3 --- Proposed Packet Marking Scheme --- p.45 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- IP Markings with Edge Sampling --- p.46 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Domain-based Design Motivation --- p.48 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- Mathematical Principle --- p.49 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- Marking Mechanism --- p.51 / Chapter 3.3.5 --- Storage Space of the Marking Fields --- p.56 / Chapter 3.3.6 --- Packet Marking Integrity --- p.57 / Chapter 3.3.7 --- Path Reconstruction --- p.58 / Chapter 4 --- Route-based Packet Filtering Scheme --- p.62 / Chapter 4.1 --- Placement of Filters --- p.63 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- At Sources' Networks --- p.64 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- At Victim's Network --- p.64 / Chapter 4.2 --- Proposed Packet Filtering Scheme --- p.65 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Classification of Packets --- p.66 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Filtering Mechanism --- p.67 / Chapter 5 --- Performance Evaluation --- p.70 / Chapter 5.1 --- Simulation Setup --- p.70 / Chapter 5.2 --- Experiments on IP Traceback Scheme --- p.72 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Performance Metrics --- p.72 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Choice of Marking Probabilities --- p.73 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Experimental Results --- p.75 / Chapter 5.3 --- Experiments on Packet Filtering Scheme --- p.82 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- Performance Metrics --- p.82 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Choices of Filtering Probabilities --- p.84 / Chapter 5.3.3 --- Experimental Results --- p.85 / Chapter 5.4 --- Deployment Issues --- p.91 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- Backward Compatibility --- p.91 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- Processing Overheads to the Routers and Network --- p.93 / Chapter 5.5 --- Evaluations --- p.95 / Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.96 / Chapter 6.1 --- Contributions --- p.96 / Chapter 6.2 --- Discussions and future work --- p.99 / Bibliography --- p.110
205

Digital video watermarking techniques for secure multimedia creation and delivery.

January 2004 (has links)
Chan Pik-Wah. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 111-130). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Background --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Research Objective --- p.3 / Chapter 1.3 --- Contributions --- p.4 / Chapter 1.4 --- The Structure of this Thesis --- p.6 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1 --- Security in Multimedia Communications --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2 --- Cryptography --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3 --- Digital Watermarking --- p.14 / Chapter 2.4 --- Essential Ingredients for Video Watermarking --- p.16 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Fidelity --- p.16 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Robustness --- p.17 / Chapter 2.4.3 --- Use of Keys --- p.19 / Chapter 2.4.4 --- Blind Detection --- p.20 / Chapter 2.4.5 --- Capacity and Speed --- p.20 / Chapter 2.4.6 --- Statistical Imperceptibility --- p.21 / Chapter 2.4.7 --- Low Error Probability --- p.21 / Chapter 2.4.8 --- Real-time Detector Complexity --- p.21 / Chapter 2.5 --- Review on Video Watermarking Techniques --- p.22 / Chapter 2.5.1 --- Video Watermarking --- p.25 / Chapter 2.5.2 --- Spatial Domain Watermarks --- p.26 / Chapter 2.5.3 --- Frequency Domain Watermarks --- p.30 / Chapter 2.5.4 --- Watermarks Based on MPEG Coding Struc- tures --- p.35 / Chapter 2.6 --- Comparison between Different Watermarking Schemes --- p.38 / Chapter 3 --- Novel Watermarking Schemes --- p.42 / Chapter 3.1 --- A Scene-based Video Watermarking Scheme --- p.42 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Watermark Preprocess --- p.44 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Video Preprocess --- p.46 / Chapter 3.1.3 --- Watermark Embedding --- p.48 / Chapter 3.1.4 --- Watermark Detection --- p.50 / Chapter 3.2 --- Theoretical Analysis --- p.52 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Performance --- p.52 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Capacity --- p.56 / Chapter 3.3 --- A Hybrid Watermarking Scheme --- p.60 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Visual-audio Hybrid Watermarking --- p.61 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Hybrid Approach with Different Water- marking Schemes --- p.69 / Chapter 3.4 --- A Genetic Algorithm-based Video Watermarking Scheme --- p.73 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Watermarking Scheme --- p.75 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- Problem Modelling --- p.76 / Chapter 3.4.3 --- Chromosome Encoding --- p.79 / Chapter 3.4.4 --- Genetic Operators --- p.80 / Chapter 4 --- Experimental Results --- p.85 / Chapter 4.1 --- Test on Robustness --- p.85 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Experiment with Frame Dropping --- p.87 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Experiment with Frame Averaging and Sta- tistical Analysis --- p.89 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- Experiment with Lossy Compression --- p.90 / Chapter 4.1.4 --- Test of Robustness with StirMark 4.0 --- p.92 / Chapter 4.1.5 --- Overall Comparison --- p.98 / Chapter 4.2 --- Test on Fidelity --- p.100 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Parameter(s) Setting --- p.101 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Evaluate with PSNR --- p.101 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Evaluate with MAD --- p.102 / Chapter 4.3 --- Other Features of the Scheme --- p.105 / Chapter 4.4 --- Conclusion --- p.106 / Chapter 5 --- Conclusion --- p.108 / Bibliography --- p.110
206

Wireless LAN security.

January 2005 (has links)
Chan Pak To Patrick. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 82-86). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iii / Contents --- p.iv / List of Figures --- p.vii / List of Tables --- p.viii / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Motivation --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- The Problems --- p.3 / Chapter 1.3 --- My Contribution --- p.4 / Chapter 1.4 --- Thesis Organization --- p.5 / Chapter 2 --- Wireless LAN Security Model --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- Preliminary Definitions on WLAN --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Security Model --- p.7 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Security Attributes --- p.7 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Security Threats in WLAN --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Attacks on Authentication Scheme --- p.10 / Chapter 2.2.4 --- Attacks on Keys --- p.10 / Chapter 2.3 --- Desired Properties of WLAN Authentication --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Security Requirements of WLAN Authentication --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Security Requirements of Session Keys --- p.12 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Other Desired Properties of WLAN Authentication --- p.12 / Chapter 3 --- Cryptography --- p.14 / Chapter 3.1 --- Overview on Cryptography --- p.14 / Chapter 3.2 --- Symmetric-key Encryption --- p.15 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Data Encryption Standard (DES) --- p.15 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) --- p.15 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- RC4 --- p.16 / Chapter 3.3 --- Public-key Cryptography --- p.16 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- RSA Problem and Related Encryption Schemes --- p.17 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Discrete Logarithm Problem and Related Encryption Schemes --- p.18 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems --- p.19 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- Digital Signature --- p.19 / Chapter 3.4 --- Public Key Infrastructure --- p.20 / Chapter 3.5 --- Hash Functions and Message Authentication Code --- p.21 / Chapter 3.5.1 --- SHA-256 --- p.22 / Chapter 3.5.2 --- Message Authentication Code --- p.22 / Chapter 3.6 --- Entity Authentication --- p.23 / Chapter 3.6.1 --- ISO/IEC 9798-4 Three-pass Mutual --- p.23 / Chapter 3.6.2 --- ISO/IEC 9798-4 One-pass Unilateral --- p.24 / Chapter 3.7 --- Key Establishment --- p.24 / Chapter 3.7.1 --- Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange --- p.24 / Chapter 3.7.2 --- Station-to-Station Protocol --- p.25 / Chapter 3.8 --- Identity-Based Cryptography --- p.25 / Chapter 3.8.1 --- The Boneh-Franklin Encryption Scheme --- p.26 / Chapter 3.8.2 --- Au and Wei's Identification Scheme and Signature Scheme --- p.27 / Chapter 4 --- Basics of WLAN Security and WEP --- p.29 / Chapter 4.1 --- Basics of WLAN Security --- p.29 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- "Overview on ""Old"" WLAN Security" --- p.29 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Some Basic Security Measures --- p.29 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- Virtual Private Network (VPN) --- p.30 / Chapter 4.2 --- WEP --- p.31 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Overview on Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) --- p.31 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Security Analysis on WEP --- p.33 / Chapter 5 --- IEEE 802.11i --- p.38 / Chapter 5.1 --- Overview on IEEE 802.11i and RSN --- p.38 / Chapter 5.2 --- IEEE 802.1X Access Control in IEEE 802.11i --- p.39 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Participants --- p.39 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Port-based Access Control --- p.40 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- EAP and EAPOL --- p.40 / Chapter 5.2.4 --- RADIUS --- p.41 / Chapter 5.2.5 --- Authentication Message Exchange --- p.41 / Chapter 5.2.6 --- Security Analysis --- p.41 / Chapter 5.3 --- RSN Key Management --- p.43 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- RSN Pairwise Key Hierarchy --- p.43 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- RSN Group Key Hierarchy --- p.43 / Chapter 5.3.3 --- Four-way Handshake and Group Key Handshake --- p.44 / Chapter 5.4 --- RSN Encryption and Data Integrity --- p.45 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- TKIP --- p.45 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- CCMP --- p.46 / Chapter 5.5 --- Upper Layer Authentication Protocols --- p.47 / Chapter 5.5.1 --- Overview on the Upper Layer Authentication --- p.47 / Chapter 5.5.2 --- EAP-TLS --- p.48 / Chapter 5.5.3 --- Other Popular ULA Protocols --- p.50 / Chapter 6 --- Proposed IEEE 802.11i Authentication Scheme --- p.52 / Chapter 6.1 --- Proposed Protocol --- p.52 / Chapter 6.1.1 --- Overview --- p.52 / Chapter 6.1.2 --- The AUTHENTICATE Protocol --- p.56 / Chapter 6.1.3 --- The RECONNECT Protocol --- p.59 / Chapter 6.1.4 --- Packet Format --- p.61 / Chapter 6.1.5 --- Ciphersuites Negotiation --- p.64 / Chapter 6.1.6 --- Delegation --- p.64 / Chapter 6.1.7 --- Identity Privacy --- p.68 / Chapter 6.2 --- Security Considerations --- p.68 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- Security of the AUTHENTICATE protocol --- p.68 / Chapter 6.2.2 --- Security of the RECONNECT protocol --- p.69 / Chapter 6.2.3 --- Security of Key Derivation --- p.70 / Chapter 6.2.4 --- EAP Security Claims and EAP Methods Requirements --- p.72 / Chapter 6.3 --- Efficiency Analysis --- p.76 / Chapter 6.3.1 --- Overview --- p.76 / Chapter 6.3.2 --- Bandwidth Performance --- p.76 / Chapter 6.3.3 --- Computation Speed --- p.76 / Chapter 7 --- Conclusion --- p.79 / Chapter 7.1 --- Summary --- p.79 / Chapter 7.2 --- Future Work --- p.80 / Bibliography --- p.82
207

Hausdorff dimension of the Brownian frontier and stochastic Loewner evolution.

January 2012 (has links)
令B{U+209C}表示一個平面布朗運動。我們把C \B[0, 1] 的無界連通分支的邊界稱爲B[0; 1] 的外邊界。在本文中,我們將討論如何計算B[0,1] 的外邊界的Hausdorff 維數。 / 我們將在第二章討論Lawler早期的工作[7]。他定義了一個常數ζ(所謂的不聯通指數) 。利用能量的方法, 他證明了 B[0,1]的外邊界的Hausdorff維數是2(1 - ζ)概率大於零, 然後0-1律可以明這個概率就是1。但是用他的方法我們不能算出ζ的準確值。 / Lawler, Schramm and Werner 在一系列文章[10],[11] 和[13] 中研究了SLE{U+2096}和excursion 測度。利用SLE6 和excursion 測度的共形不變性,他們可以計算出了布朗運動的相交指數ξ (j; λ )。因此ζ = ξ (2; 0)/2 = 1/3,由此可以知道B[0, 1] 的外邊界的Hausdorff 維數就是4/3。從而可以說完全證明了著名的Mandelbrot 猜想。 / Let B{U+209C} be a Brownian motion on the complex plane. The frontier of B[0; 1] is defined to be the boundary of the unbounded connected component of C\B[0; 1].In this thesis, we will review the calculation of the Hausdorff dimension of the frontier of B[0; 1]. / We first dissuss the earlier work of Lawler [7] in Chapter 2. He defined a constant ζ (so called the dimension of disconnection exponent). By using the energy method, he proved that with positive probability the Hausdorff dimension of the frontier of B[0; 1] is 2(1 -ζ ), then zero-one law show that the probability is one. But we can not calculate the exact value of ζ in this way. / In the series of papers by Lawler, Schramm and Werner [10], [11] and [13], they studied the SLE{U+2096} and excursion measure. By using the conformal invariance of SLE₆ and excursion measure, they can calculate the exact value of the Brownian intersection exponents ξ(j, λ). Consequently, ζ = ξ(2, 0)/2 = 1/3, and the Hausdorff dimension of the frontier of B [0,1] is 4/3 almost surely. This answers the well known conjecture by Mandelbrot positively. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Zhang, Pengfei. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-55). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.6 / Chapter 2 --- Hausdorff dimension of the frontier of Brownian motion --- p.11 / Chapter 2.1 --- Preliminaries --- p.11 / Chapter 2.2 --- Hausdorff dimension of Brownian frontier --- p.13 / Chapter 3 --- Stochastic Loewner Evolution --- p.24 / Chapter 3.1 --- Definitions --- p.24 / Chapter 3.2 --- Continuity and Transience --- p.26 / Chapter 3.3 --- Locality property of SLE₆ --- p.30 / Chapter 3.4 --- Crossing exponent for SLE₆ --- p.32 / Chapter 4 --- Brownian intersection exponents --- p.37 / Chapter 4.1 --- Half-plane exponent --- p.37 / Chapter 4.2 --- Whole-plane exponent --- p.41 / Chapter 4.3 --- Proof of Theorem 4.6 and Theorem 4.7 --- p.44 / Chapter 4.4 --- Proof of Theorem 1.2 --- p.47 / Chapter A --- Excursion measure --- p.48 / Chapter A.1 --- Metric space of curves --- p.48 / Chapter A.2 --- Measures on metric space --- p.49 / Chapter A.3 --- Excursion measure on K --- p.49 / Bibliography --- p.53
208

Dimension of graphs of Weierstrass-like functions.

January 2011 (has links)
Chan, Ying Ying. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 66-69). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.6 / Chapter 1.1 --- Weierstrass function --- p.7 / Chapter 1.2 --- Rademacher series --- p.10 / Chapter 2 --- Preliminaries --- p.12 / Chapter 2.1 --- Hausdorff dimension and box dimension .. --- p.12 / Chapter 2.2 --- Properties of Hausdorff dimension and box dimension --- p.15 / Chapter 2.3 --- Basic techniques in computing dimensions . --- p.16 / Chapter 2.4 --- Graphs of functions --- p.18 / Chapter 3 --- Weierstrass Function --- p.20 / Chapter 3.1 --- Weierstrass-like functions and their box dimension --- p.20 / Chapter 3.2 --- Hausdorff dimension of Weierstrass-like graphs --- p.23 / Chapter 3.3 --- Weierstrass function with a random phase angle --- p.31 / Chapter 4 --- Rademacher series --- p.37 / Chapter 4.1 --- Basic properties --- p.38 / Chapter 4.2 --- Box dimension for Rademacher series with generalization --- p.39 / Chapter 4.3 --- Some remainders on the infinite Bernoulli convolution --- p.46 / Chapter 5 --- Rademacher series with Pisot reciprocal as parameter --- p.48 / Chapter 5.1 --- Pisot number --- p.48 / Chapter 5.2 --- Hausdorff dimension --- p.49 / Chapter 5.3 --- Matrix representation --- p.54 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- Set-up --- p.54 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Case of golden ratio --- p.61
209

DeRef: a privacy-preserving defense mechanism against request forgery attacks.

January 2011 (has links)
Fung, Siu Yuen. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 58-63). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Background and Related Work --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1 --- Request Forgery Attacks --- p.7 / Chapter 2.2 --- Current Defense Approaches --- p.10 / Chapter 2.3 --- Lessons Learned --- p.13 / Chapter 3 --- Design of DeRef --- p.15 / Chapter 3.1 --- Threat Model --- p.16 / Chapter 3.2 --- Fine-Grained Access Control --- p.18 / Chapter 3.3 --- Two-Phase Privacy-Preserving Checking --- p.24 / Chapter 3.4 --- Putting It All Together --- p.29 / Chapter 3.5 --- Implementation --- p.33 / Chapter 4 --- Deployment Case Studies --- p.36 / Chapter 4.1 --- WordPress --- p.37 / Chapter 4.2 --- Joomla! and Drupal --- p.42 / Chapter 5 --- Evaluation --- p.44 / Chapter 5.1 --- Performance Overhead of DeRef in Real Deployment --- p.45 / Chapter 5.2 --- Performance Overhead of DeRef with Various Configurations --- p.50 / Chapter 6 --- Conclusions --- p.56 / Bibliography --- p.58
210

An effective methodology to traceback DDoS attackers.

January 2003 (has links)
Lam, Kwok Tai. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 64-66). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction to Network Security via Efficient IP Traceback --- p.10 / Chapter 1.1 --- Motivation --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2 --- DDoS Attacker Traceback Problem --- p.11 / Chapter 1.3 --- Document Roadmap --- p.13 / Chapter 2 --- Background --- p.14 / Chapter 2.1 --- Probabilistic Edge Marking Algorithm --- p.14 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Probabilistic Edge Marking Procedure --- p.15 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Attack Graph Construction Procedure --- p.17 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Advantages and Disadvantages of Algorithm --- p.19 / Chapter 3 --- Attacker Traceback: Linear Topology --- p.22 / Chapter 3.1 --- Determination of Local Traffic Rates --- p.23 / Chapter 3.2 --- Determination of Minimum Stable Time tmin --- p.25 / Chapter 3.3 --- Elimination of Attackers --- p.26 / Chapter 4 --- Attacker Traceback: General Topology --- p.30 / Chapter 4.1 --- Determination of Local Traffic Rates --- p.30 / Chapter 4.2 --- Determination of Minimum Stable Time tmin --- p.33 / Chapter 5 --- Simulations --- p.36 / Chapter 5.1 --- Simulation 1 - Correctness and robustness of estimating the min- imum stable time tmin --- p.37 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Simulation l.A - Influence on tmin by different packet arrival processes --- p.37 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- Simulation l.B - Influence on tmin by different packet arrival processes under MMPP --- p.38 / Chapter 5.1.3 --- Simulation l.C - Influence on tmin and variance of traffic rate estimation by different pthreshold --- p.39 / Chapter 5.2 --- Simulation 2 - Factors which influence the minimum stable time tmin --- p.40 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Simulation 2.A - Influence on tmin by different length of the attack path --- p.41 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Simulation 2.B - Influence on tmin by the relative posi- tions of the attackers --- p.42 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Simulation 2.C - Influence on tmin by different ATR and different length of the attack path --- p.43 / Chapter 5.3 --- Simulation 3 - Extension to General Network Topology --- p.45 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- Simulation 3.A - Influence on tmin by different ATR and different diameter of the network topology --- p.45 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Simulation 3.B - Influence on tmin by different number of attackers --- p.46 / Chapter 5.4 --- Simulation 4 - Extension to Internet Topology --- p.47 / Chapter 5.4.1 --- Simulation 4.A - Influence on tminby different diameter of the network topology --- p.49 / Chapter 5.4.2 --- Simulation 4.B - Influence on tmin by different number of attackers --- p.50 / Chapter 6 --- Experiments --- p.51 / Chapter 6.1 --- Experiment 1: Simple DoS Attack --- p.53 / Chapter 6.1.1 --- Experiment l.A - Influence on tmin by different types of DDoS attack --- p.54 / Chapter 6.1.2 --- Experiment l.B - Influence on tmin by different length of the attack path --- p.55 / Chapter 6.2 --- Experiment 2: Coordinated DoS Attack --- p.55 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- Experiment 2.A - Influence on tmin by the relative posi- tions of the attackers --- p.56 / Chapter 6.2.2 --- Experiment 2.B - Influence on tmin by different number of attackers --- p.58 / Chapter 7 --- Related Work --- p.59 / Chapter 8 --- Conclusion --- p.62 / Bibliography --- p.64

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