Este trabalho se propõe a remontar a dissolução ocorrida no tempo em que a Economia Política buscava limitar seu campo de estudo, particularmente no que se refere a percepção sobre a conduta humana e a assunção de que os homens são intrinsecamente egoístas. Para tanto, é desenvolvida a visão do homem moralmente condicionado em Adam Smith e também as modificações subsequentes originadas nas diferentes concepções dos autores da escola clássica e da neoclássica. Sendo que estas mudanças enfatizam o egoísmo do agente econômico. Neste intento, é retraçado o caminho da consolidação do postulado do egoísmo, assim como os percalços, controvérsias e conflitos desta caracterização. São explorados os elementos que auxiliaram na transformação do homem smithiano em homo economicus, tais como a leitura descontextualizada de Smith, o individualismo, o utilitarismo, o individualismo metodológico, o positivismo e a própria necessidade de abstração teórica. Adicionalmente, é verificado que a confusão de conceitos presente nesta construção metodológica traz a referência de que a ciência econômica faz apologia ao egoísmo. Esta percepção é um subproduto do desenlace da economia com as questões morais. / This research is proposed to reassemble the dissolution occurred when the Political Economy sought to limit their field of study, particularly in the perception of humann behavior and the assumption that men are inherently selfish. To do that, it is developed the perception of Adam Smith about human behavior, and the subsequent changes resulting from different conceptions of classical and the neoclassical authors. These changes emphasize the selfishness of the economic agent. In this attempt, is showed the way of the consolidating of self-interest premise, the mishaps and controversies of this path. It explores the the elements that collaborated in the transformation of Smithian man in homo economicus, such as decontextualized reading of Smith, individualism, utilitarianism, methodological individualism, positivism and the very necessity of theoretical abstraction. Additionally, it is observed that the confusion of concepts present in this methodological construction suggests that economics salutes the egoism. This is a result of the distinction between moral and economic aspects.

Este trabalho se propõe a remontar a dissolução ocorrida no tempo em que a Economia Política buscava limitar seu campo de estudo, particularmente no que se refere a percepção sobre a conduta humana e a assunção de que os homens são intrinsecamente egoístas. Para tanto, é desenvolvida a visão do homem moralmente condicionado em Adam Smith e também as modificações subsequentes originadas nas diferentes concepções dos autores da escola clássica e da neoclássica. Sendo que estas mudanças enfatizam o egoísmo do agente econômico. Neste intento, é retraçado o caminho da consolidação do postulado do egoísmo, assim como os percalços, controvérsias e conflitos desta caracterização. São explorados os elementos que auxiliaram na transformação do homem smithiano em homo economicus, tais como a leitura descontextualizada de Smith, o individualismo, o utilitarismo, o individualismo metodológico, o positivismo e a própria necessidade de abstração teórica. Adicionalmente, é verificado que a confusão de conceitos presente nesta construção metodológica traz a referência de que a ciência econômica faz apologia ao egoísmo. Esta percepção é um subproduto do desenlace da economia com as questões morais. / This research is proposed to reassemble the dissolution occurred when the Political Economy sought to limit their field of study, particularly in the perception of humann behavior and the assumption that men are inherently selfish. To do that, it is developed the perception of Adam Smith about human behavior, and the subsequent changes resulting from different conceptions of classical and the neoclassical authors. These changes emphasize the selfishness of the economic agent. In this attempt, is showed the way of the consolidating of self-interest premise, the mishaps and controversies of this path. It explores the the elements that collaborated in the transformation of Smithian man in homo economicus, such as decontextualized reading of Smith, individualism, utilitarianism, methodological individualism, positivism and the very necessity of theoretical abstraction. Additionally, it is observed that the confusion of concepts present in this methodological construction suggests that economics salutes the egoism. This is a result of the distinction between moral and economic aspects.

Este trabalho se propõe a remontar a dissolução ocorrida no tempo em que a Economia Política buscava limitar seu campo de estudo, particularmente no que se refere a percepção sobre a conduta humana e a assunção de que os homens são intrinsecamente egoístas. Para tanto, é desenvolvida a visão do homem moralmente condicionado em Adam Smith e também as modificações subsequentes originadas nas diferentes concepções dos autores da escola clássica e da neoclássica. Sendo que estas mudanças enfatizam o egoísmo do agente econômico. Neste intento, é retraçado o caminho da consolidação do postulado do egoísmo, assim como os percalços, controvérsias e conflitos desta caracterização. São explorados os elementos que auxiliaram na transformação do homem smithiano em homo economicus, tais como a leitura descontextualizada de Smith, o individualismo, o utilitarismo, o individualismo metodológico, o positivismo e a própria necessidade de abstração teórica. Adicionalmente, é verificado que a confusão de conceitos presente nesta construção metodológica traz a referência de que a ciência econômica faz apologia ao egoísmo. Esta percepção é um subproduto do desenlace da economia com as questões morais. / This research is proposed to reassemble the dissolution occurred when the Political Economy sought to limit their field of study, particularly in the perception of humann behavior and the assumption that men are inherently selfish. To do that, it is developed the perception of Adam Smith about human behavior, and the subsequent changes resulting from different conceptions of classical and the neoclassical authors. These changes emphasize the selfishness of the economic agent. In this attempt, is showed the way of the consolidating of self-interest premise, the mishaps and controversies of this path. It explores the the elements that collaborated in the transformation of Smithian man in homo economicus, such as decontextualized reading of Smith, individualism, utilitarianism, methodological individualism, positivism and the very necessity of theoretical abstraction. Additionally, it is observed that the confusion of concepts present in this methodological construction suggests that economics salutes the egoism. This is a result of the distinction between moral and economic aspects.

Hayek's interpretation of Smith's invisible hand as a metaphor for the theory of spontaneous order still holds as the only authentic interpretation of that famous phrase, despite all criticism. Although not many authors noticed it, Hegel was a theorist of spontaneous order, namely also a theorist of the spontaneous order of market economy. There is evidence that Hegel followed here Adam Smith's teachings about the invisible hand. The invisible hand is present in Hegel's writings as an element, from what sprang his theory of spirit. That means that his theory of spirit is a general theory of spontaneous order, although written in metaphysical manner. However, being a theorist of spontaneous order didn't prevent him from being an interventionist. He was led to interventionism by his synoptic fallacy of mind. He never tried to apply this fallacy on the studies of the market economy. Marxists did that. Some of recent scholars (Sciabarra, Johnson, and Cristi) identified Hegel's theory of spontaneous order, but their interpretation wasn't perfectly in accordance with Hegel's texts. How these authors denied Popper's and Hayek's incorrect opinion that Hegel was a totalitarian, thus it is needed to enrich studies of mentioned current scholars. Here it is taken into account only what Hegel wrote, not later authors about him. This thesis is also an attempt to evaluate the history of economic thought from the standpoint of Smith's and Hegel's methodology.

This thesis presents a positive answer to the question: "Is theory of value an unjustly overlooked subject of economics?" The positive answer is arrived at by analysis of logical and historical genesis of the concept of value itself and consequences of its nature to both concept of value and its applicability, as well as for economics proper and some of its subject matters (choice theory, theory of money and welfare theory).

This thesis has two main objectives. First, it accomplishes a detailed critical reading of Michel Foucault’s writings on the archaeology of knowledge, focusing on the emergence of political economy. Second, it explores some possibilities opened up by his work for a rethinking of the historiography and methodology of economics. The first results from the fact that there have been very few assessments of his archaeology of economics, not only in economics itself, but also in the fields of philosophy and history of thought in general. Although it may be possible to find some applications in economics of notions and concepts introduced by him, this has mostly been done without a detailed critical analysis of his writings. Thus, it is considered here that it is first necessary to go back to his writings and to develop a very careful reading of them in order to be able to explore them in a second stage. As for the second, the main argument is that his archaeology has important contributions that are still missing by economists. The study is developed in two parts. The first part is dedicated to a meticulous reading of the The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Order of Things, ending up with an assessment. Part II develops an analysis of his contributions in three areas of research in economics: methodology of economics, historiography of economic thought, and studies on Adam Smith’s context. This analysis is considered itself an important contribution of this thesis. Chapter 3 situates Foucault’s perspective and system among other current interests in economic methodology, comprising basically three parts. First, it identifies one common fundamental question underlying some of these interests, that is, whether there is an underlying configuration in knowledge that permits us to think what we think in economics in a certain moment in time and space. It is argued that Foucault’s archaeology makes important contributions to this strand. Second, it compares his approach to the current interest in rhetorical studies in economics. Third, it gives special attention to the historiography of economic thought through the investigation of the interplay between the notion of the ‘episteme’ and the Kuhnian concept of ‘paradigm’. Chapter 4 explores and assesses his archaeology of political economy in The Order of Things and briefly indicates some of the important ideas provided by him in his lectures at the Collège de France in 1978-79, which give some hints for the possibility of investigating the current epistemic context underlying economics. The last chapter concentrates on Smith’s writings on language and rhetoric, the methodological conception underlying his writings, and the notion of invisible hand, according to Foucault’s system. This latter essentially shows the potentiality for his system to improve the level of consciousness of our past and emphasizes that it opens up a series of possibilities of further and interesting inquiries. The thesis concludes with an appraisal of Foucault’s contribution and additional issues for further enquiry.

This thesis deals with current discourse whether methods of neuroscience generate useful tools for standard economics to understand, predict and ideally guide behavior of humans, social groups and the whole economies. An initial methodological analysis concluded that the usefulness of neuroeconomics is still only potential, since this approach is not able to answer substantial questions of economics in better way than tools existing. Following sections of thesis summarized representative research in the field of decision neuroscience in the areas of intertemporal decisions, decision-making under risk and uncertainty and the strategic interactions, and social preferences respectively. It has been demonstrated that many findings of decision neuroscience offer a partial confirmation of specific economic models already or provide inspiration for creating new ones.

The thesis deals with significant moments in the relationship between methodology of economics and implications of the financial crisis culminating in 2008 and 2009. Its key insight rests upon the claim that some theoretical concepts developed within mainstream economics do not tackle the reality adequately and contributed in a significant way to the sequence of events leading to the financial crisis. Most of those concepts were introduced in the second half of the 20th century, during a "high tide" of positivistic ideas in the domain of methodology of mainstream economics. Though the same ideas had been already discredited to a large extent by the philosophy of science at the time, mainstream economists did not reflect it satisfactorily. Aside from a historical expose the thesis consists also of an outline of a possible future development of the prevailing form of economic theory; four scenarios of future potential development are presented. In the final parts of the thesis, which are focused more specifically, the author appraises negatively options of the Austrian School as well as post-Keynesianism to influence in a more significant manner the mainstream economics during the post-crisis era.