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From a logical point of view, it is obvious that a large military build-up must have occurred in the Soviet Union during some period preceding World War II. The purpose of this dissertation is to analyse the military objectives of the Soviet leadership, to examine how such objectives were formulated in public statements and internal decisions, to determine whether they were supplemented or competed with industrialisation, and to see to what extent they were accomplished. This study formulates a new analytical approach to Soviet rearmament as a process. The purpose in this regard is limited to establishing a framework for further empirical studies. This analytical model will be tested on a few selected branches, rather than to give an exhaustive description of the whole Soviet defence industry. Given the archival access, the primary purpose is to determine exactly what kind of plans were designed by the military. Such an approach raises several questions: Was there a specific pattern of planning in the defence sector? Did the defence industry apply methods that differed from economic planning in general? Did the combination of military goals with those of the industrialisation in general form a specific Soviet model of planning? In other words, will the new knowledge concerning the military targets in planning change, or even require revisions of our views on the planning system as such? To elaborate on this analytical approach, the scope of the study has been limited in time and space; to the years 1926-1937, to the defence industry in a narrow sense and to the highest decision-making circles in the Party, State, military and planning organisations. The central actor in this study is Mikhail Tukhachevskii, acting as Chief of Staff at the time when this study commences, and as a Deputy Defence Commissar and Chief of Armaments in the mid-1930s. Tukhachevskii’s flamboyant career during the Russian Civil War and the Soviet-Polish war in 1920 had already made him a famous personality in the mid-1920s. The implications of Tukhachevskii’s elaboration of new warfare doctrine for the industrialisation of the Soviet Russia are taken up. The two basic questions for this study are: Which were his strivings with regard to the new weapon producers? What was the result of his involvement in industrial management and mobilisation. The study covers the development of Soviet defence industry planning from 1926 to 1937. The starting-point of 1926 was chosen because it was then that defence matters, for the first time since the Russian Civil War, were again high on the political agenda. The choice of 1937 as the final year of this study is motivated by both historical factors and the available sources. By then, a clear pattern of defence planning system had emerged. Several reforms designed to synchronise the military and planning organs had been implemented. In other words, a fixed structure for defence industrial planning had taken shape. Thereafter, in the "Geat Terror" of 1936-38, a whole generation of cadres from the Party, state and industrial authorities was wiped out, while the Red Army literally was beheaded. A subsequent study would be required to analyse whether or not the organisation was sufficiently solid to make it possible for the newly-promoted successors to continue the preparations of the country for war. This study is limited in space so as to highlight the specific decisions and plans for the defence industry. When it had become accepted that a future armed conflict would require the resources of the whole economy, and that a new kind of warfare – including long-range aviation and chemical weapons – would inflict damage far behind the front-lines, war preparations came to include most sectors of the economy, the administration, and the educational and transport systems. When the Soviet leaders foresaw a total war, their war-preparedness naturally came to include most sectors of society. The scope of this study is limited, however, to the drafting of and implementations of plans for the armaments manufacturers and, to a certain extent, also for the principle suppliers to the defence industry. The dissertation is cronologically divided into three parts: Part I: Contours of the future war, threat assessments and their implications. Part II: The role of the defence in the first five-year plan – Some reconsiderations. Part III: The military and the defense industry in the second five year-plan, 1933-1937. Each part is structured basically in the following manner. The first chapter in each part deals with military threat perception, its doctrines and its main proposals for the transformation of the armed forces. The organisational network that linked the military, the planners and the high political decision-making bodies forms the following element of each part. In these chapters the author scrutinises both the formal processing of various plans and defence issues through the highest military, planning and Party organs, on the one hand, and the personal in-fighting that went on among outstanding military leaders, on the other hand. These two elements provide the background for the war plans. The war plans are analysed not in their operational, but in their material dimension. The material requirements of the military, expressed in the long-term mobilisation requests and the annual military armaments order were the centrepiece of the investment and production plans of the defence industry and its suppliers. Thereafter, the author analyses the military components in the first, respectively the second, Five-year plans and evaluate the military results of each of these plans. The results deal both with actual armaments productiom during these years, and so far as the indirect estimations allow, with the eventual mobilisation preparedness of the industry. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 1996

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Europe and Eurasia))--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010. / Thesis Advisor(s): Abenheim, Donald ; Yost, David S. "June 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on July 14, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: European Union, comprehensive security, strategic planning, European security and defense policy, ESDP, common security and defense policy, CSDP, military operations, crisis management, EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, EUNAVFOR Somalia Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-98). Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 271-291).

No description available.

This thesis examines a largely unexplored area of deterrence theory: unconventional deterrence. Unconventional deterrence is defined herein as "persuading the opponent not to attack, via threats of unconventional warfare, such as guerrilla resistance and terrorism." It treats terrorism as a punishment strategy, through which the one deterring threatens to punish the aggressor's population. Guerrilla warfare is a denial strategy, through which the one deterring threatens to protract a war and deny the aggressor his political objectives. This study questions the underlying hypothesis of deterrence theory which says that the balance of the opponents' military capabilities is the basic determinant of successful deterrence. Rather, the hypothesis here is that the deterrer may deter the aggressor from attacking by adopting a strategy that makes the aggressor's military superiority irrelevant. The present thesis focuses primarily on relatively weak states. Unconventional deterrence is explored as a means for a weaker state to deter a considerably stronger opponent. This thesis discusses the requirements for successful deterrence, and the peculiarities of unconventional deterrence. As well, the dynamics of small wars are explored in order to unfold a paradoxical phenomenon: the possibility of an underdog's victory in war. Two case studies: (1) the Vietnam War of 1964-73 and (2) the Afghanistan War of 1979-89 are explored as examples of the weak denying the strong their objectives.

Throughout American history, policymakers have struggled with the use of American military power. The Limited War argument holds that the use of force needs to remain an option to support American diplomacy. The Never Again argument, meanwhile, holds that the use of American military power should be undertaken only in the face of threats against vital national interests. The most influential Never Again argument has been the 1984 Weinberger Doctrine, later expanded to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which sought to limit the use of American military power. After the Vietnam War and the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine was ascendant over Limited War arguments like Secretary of State George Schultz's case in favor of the limited use of American military force against targets of less than vital interest. Between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2002 Invasion of Iraq, however, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine lost much of its influence with American policymakers. This thesis will establish a link between the loss of influence by the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and the rise in the utility of force based on improvements in military technology and doctrines, leading to a broadening of policy objectives that would not have been possible during the Cold War. / US Army (USA) author.

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Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Europe and Eurasia))--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Yost, David S. Second Reader: Moran, Daniel. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 28, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Britain, United Kingdom, France, Germany, ESDP, ESVP, European Security and Defense Policy, European Security and Defence Policy, European Union, Foreign policy, St. Malo, National interest, Priorities. Includes bibliographical references (p. 89-94). Also available in print.

This thesis is an examination of the Conscription movement in Britain between 1899-1914. / The introduction briefly examines British efforts at home defence before 1899 and the existing historiography on the Edwardian Conscription movement. / Chapter One studies the impact of that conflict's manpower problems. In particular, it looks at the ad hoc wartime efforts to expand the Army and the subsequent rise of the National Service League. / Chapter Two studies the non-military goals of the Conscription movement. It considers the attraction of conscription as the foundation of both greater physical efficiency and social reform, especially before 1906. / The final chapter studies the use of sensationalist invasion scares and calls for home defence to further the cause of the Conscription movement. Particular attention is given to the invasion scare of 1908-09 and the rise of the Territorial Force after 1906.