This thesis deals with the political, military and social aspects of the volunteer movement in Great Britain during the wars against revolutionary and Napoleonic France. It explores the nature and purpose of the volunteer infantry, yeomanry cavalry, and armed associations: their organisation, administration, membership, and political adherences. Several questions concerning the political nature of volunteering are addressed, and it is shown that both the volunteers' motivation and the government's reasons for raising a voluntary force were more closely related to military than to political considerations. The occupational structure and political allegiances of several corps are analysed, revealing a broad range of political allegiance. The conclusion is drawn that the volunteers were more a 'constitutional' force than a partisan one. This thesis also investigates the ways in which the volunteer movement posed a challenge to the established social and political order, particularly in its autonomy and 'democratic' organisation. The central government and local authorities were, however, well aware of the potential threat, and precautions were taken against its development. The workings of the volunteer 'system' are explored in order to judge the validity of contemporary criticism of volunteer autonomy, and it is concluded that fears of apparently democratic organisation were exaggerated. The question of volunteer loyalty is investigated by examining the means of selection, individuals' motives, and the response of corps to peace-keeping duties. Finally, an assessment of the position of the movement in contemporary society shows it to have been closely related to the ambivalent concept of the 'citizen-soldier'. Extensive use is made of manuscript sources, particularly the papers of the Home and War Offices held in the Public Record Office, and official and private correspondence in the British Library and several county record offices.

This thesis examines the role of national defence in British parliamentary politics between 1794 and 1812. It suggests that previous analyses of the late eighteenth-century political milieu insufficiently explore the impact of war on the structure of the state. Work by J.E. Cookson, Linda Colley, J.C.D. Clark, and Paul Langford depicts a decentralised state that had little direct involvement in developing a popular “British” patriotism. Here I argue that the threat of a potential French invasion during the wars against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France provoked a drive for centralisation. Nearly all the defence measures enacted during the period gave the government a much greater degree of control over British manpower and resources. The readiness of successive governments to involve large sections of the nation in the war effort through military service, financial contributions, and appeals to the British “spirit”, resulted in a much more inclusive sense of citizenship in which questions of national participation and political franchise were unlinked. National identity was also affected, and the focus on military defence of the British Isles influenced political attitudes towards the regular army. By 1810, however, the nation was disillusioned by the lengthy struggle with France. The result of lingering political weakness was that attention shifted from national defence onto domestic corruption and venality. The aftermath of the Irish Act of Union, too, demonstrated the limits of attempts to centralise the policy of the whole United Kingdom. Significantly, however, the debates over the relationship between the centre and the localities in the 1830s and 1840s, and the response to a new French invasion threat in the 1850s and 1860s, revived themes addressed during the 1790s and 1800s. The political reaction to the invasion threats between 1794 and 1812 ultimately had more in common with a Victorian state bureaucracy than an eighteenth-century ancien régime.