Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs and Civil-Military Relations)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2002. / AD-A411 244. Includes bibliographical references (p. 89-93). Also available online.

The theories supporting Network Centric Warfare (NCW) continue to mold the tactical use of U.S. forces throughout the global warfare environment. This thesis research will correlate the four tenets of NCW to the tactical employment of the Naval Postgraduate School's LRV. The four tenets of NCW are: 1. A robustly networked force improves information sharing. 2. Information sharing and collaboration enhance the quality of information and shared situational awareness. 3. Shared situational awareness enables self-synchronization. 4. These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness. The faculty and students at NPS are dedicated to researching methods to leverage science and technology in order to maximize the combat effectiveness of U.S. and allied forces. In teaming with our primary sponsor, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), NPS has developed the Tactical Network Topology (TNT) series of experiments aimed at providing the warfighter information solutions for the battle space. The NPS LRV was derived from an operational requirement to have a mobile C4I/ISR platform that provides enhanced real-time information sharing to tactically employed units. Total force combat effectiveness is growing more reliant on agile means of information sharing. Wireless communications and collaborative technologies are essential to ensuring dynamic, forward-deployed forces have the ability to transmit and receive critical information when and where it is needed. Through past TNT experimentation, the LRV has not demonstrated itself as a stable platform providing a high-bandwidth information sharing capability. This research advanced the LRV concept by bridging the multiple wireless technologies and providing a reliable high-bandwidth communications link.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / The NPS Tactical Horizon Extension Project objective is to define and demonstrate a concept by which task force-level commanders and below can obtain a persistent, over-the-horizon surveillance capability for the purpose of target development and other missions without tasking national or theater-level assets. Our goal is to increase the ISR capacity of units who normally would not rate the priority to task a Predator, Global Hawk, or U-2. There are two guiding tenets in developing this concept. First, the equipment and its control should be organic to the SOF unit or task force. Second, utilizing this capability should not require the soldier to carry any additional equipment into the field. Initial research led us to the idea of using networked unmanned aerial systems (UAS's) to generate an over-the-horizon surveillance capability for SOF. We demonstrated the concept by forming a network comprised of a forward ground team, an inexpensive, test-bed UAS equipped with an off-the-shelf video camera, a manned aircraft, and a tactical operations center (TOC). We attained connectivity through an ITT Mesh structure at 2.4 GHz, amplified to 1W. Researchers were from the Defense Analysis, Mechanical and Astronautical Engineering, and Information Sciences Departments. We conducted successful experiments through the USSOCOM-NPS Cooperative Field Experimentation Program. / Outstanding Thesis

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision Making and Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Dahl, Erik. Second Reader: Roberts, Nancy. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 28, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Persistent surveillance. Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-66). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S. in Systems Technology)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): Dan Boger, Bernard Ulozas. Includes bibliographical references (p. 79-81). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S.)--School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. / "June 2008." Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 64-67). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (M.S. in Information Systems and Operations)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Michael T. McMaster. Includes bibliographical references (p. 59-62) Also available online.

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2006. / "31 May 2006." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-77).

Thesis (M.A.)--Florida State University, 2004. / Advisor: Dr. Michael Creswell, Florida State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Dept. of History. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Jan. 12, 2005). Includes bibliographical references.

Peruvian civilian and military authorities were trapped on a dead-end road in the counterinsurgency struggle against the terrorist movement Shining Path until the capture of the organization's top leader on September 12, 1992. The episode led to the eventual demise of the terrorist organization. This thesis argues that the successful operation was a consequence of the particular organization and working processes of the intelligence unit assigned to this sensitive case, and describes the extent to which the capture contributed to the defeat of the insurgency. Given the characteristics of the Shining Path terrorist organization, it was necessary to design a Special Intelligence Group with specific characteristics that made the group strong enough to overcome the obstacles of the reality it faced in Peru. Several other units with the same mission were unsuccessful in the twelve years of open struggle against the Shining Path. During its 22 years of activity, the Shining Path had built a solidly impenetrable organization, which allowed the police and military to hit the organizations' military apparatus, but not the political one. In Maoist organizations like the Shining Path, the political apparatus controls the organization. A study of the tactics, techniques and procedures developed by the Special Intelligence Group and the exchange between the intelligence and the operations components, as well as the decision making process within the group itself, demonstrates the organizational necessity of secrecy, isolation, motivation and delegation of authority for this type of mission.