Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University. / Vita. Published also as Studies in history, economics and public law, v. 12, no. 3. Bibliography: p. 134-135.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, 1921. / Biography. Bibliography: p. 87.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, 1921. / Biography. Bibliography: p. 87.

Thesis (LL. M.)--Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army, 1959. / Title from LLMC on-line catalog. Typescript. Includes bibliographical references. Also issued in microfiche.

Thesis (LL. M.)--Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army, 2001. / "April 2001." Computer-produced typeface. Includes bibliographical references. Also issued in microfiche.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, 1921. / Imprint from p. [4] cover. A study of the "Military and Naval Insurance Act of October 6, 1917, an amendment to the War Risk Insurance Act of September 2, 1914."--P. 7-8. Reproduction of original from Connecticut State Library. Bibliography: p. 87.

Bonuses serve as a valuable tool in attracting and retaining Naval officers. This thesis analyzes the way officer bonuses are currently distributed in the Navy and provides recommended changes based on analysis of scholarly publications. Combining the information gained from current policies and research already conducted in the academic arena, the author proposes a workable bonus structure to meet the recruitment and retention goals while providing the Navy flexibility, quality personnel, and cost effectiveness. Combining auction theory and signaling theory into a new program has great potential to provide flexibility to the Navy, maintain the appropriate quantity and quality of officers, and provide cost savings to the Navy, while providing continued servicemember satisfaction. By offering bonus programs of different rates and time commitments, effectiveness and personnel quality can be increased by allowing officers to signal their intentions to the Navy. Auctions can be used to determine the appropriate monetary values to offer under each contract. By implementing an auction for bonus amounts, the Navy helps to ensure that bonuses will be competitive with the overall job market. This approach provides the Navy with a flexible, effective officer bonus program that is responsive to existing job market conditions. / US Navy (USN) author.

Thesis (M.S.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Shu S. Liao, John E. Mutty. Includes bibliographical references (p. 131-132). Also available online.

The United States government began paying pensions to disabled Union veterans before the Civil War ended in April 1865. By 1890 its pension programs included any Union veteran who had fought in the Civil War, regardless of his financial means, as well as surviving family members, including mothers, fathers, brothers, and sisters. Union veterans did not hesitate to "wave the bloody shirt" in their attempts to liberalize pension laws. Pension programs for Confederate veterans were much slower to develop. Lacking any higher organization, each southern state assumed the responsibility of caring for disabled and/or indigent Confederate veterans and widows. Texas began paying Confederate pensions in 1899, Georgia in 1888 and Virginia in 1889. Unlike Texas, Georgia and Virginia provided artificial limbs for their veterans long before they started paying pensions. At the time of his enlistment in the 1860s, the typical future pensioner was twenty-five years of age, and fewer than half were married heads of households. Very few could be considered wealthy and most were employed in agriculture. The pensioners of Georgia, Texas, and Virginia were remarkably similar, although there were some differences in nativity and marital status. They were all elderly and needy by the time they asked for assistance from their governments. The Confederate pension programs emerged about the same time the Lost Cause began to gain popularity. This movement probably had more influence in Georgia and Virginia than in Texas. Texas tended more to look to the future rather than the past, and although Confederate veterans dominated its legislature for years, its pension program could not be called generous. The Civil War pension programs died out with the veterans and widows they were designed to care for and did not evolve directly into any other programs. Because they helped to remove the stigma of receiving government aid (state or federal), The pension programs served as precedents for future social programs.

Typescript, etc. / Digitized by Kansas State University Libraries