This thesis investigates the economic and military policies hegemons pursue while experiencing relative decline. Based upon the rising costs of leadership associated with hegemony, this thesis establishes that both systemic and domestic environments equally influence the hegemon's policy-making. Furthermore, the paper contends that hegemons do practice strategic planning during relative decline, in an effort to adjust its commitments and resources to the environment. Relative success or failure in maintaining the international system and thus adjusting for decline depends on how decision-makers compensate for two prevailing variables: threat of challengers and availability of allies. This study offers a predictive theoretical model for interpreting the dynamics of grand strategy formulation, compensating for the influences of the domestic environment three historical case studies, the Dutch Republic, Britain and the United States, test the accuracy and validity of the model. This thesis finds that periods of strong leadership, void of threat, while augmented by external balancing best support a hegemon's relative decline.

No description available.