When do militias---whose power, riches, and legitimacy depend on the continuation of civil wars---accept negotiated settlements? An unexplored and crucial dimension of militia decision-making is the process of militia institutionalization. Militias create institutions to improve their odds of winning the war and project legitimacy internally as well as externally. / Militia institutions affect the strategic choice of decision-makers. They create financial and organizational interests that modify the preferences of the militia leadership. The modified preferences increase the win-set of militia leaders at the negotiating table. Militia institutions also change the decision-making context. Institutions unleash three dynamics that decrease a militia's ability to withstand fluctuations in the military balance of forces. Institutions can lead to factionalism, increased visibility (and hence vulnerability to attack), and strains in relations with patrons. / Using the logic of two-level games, I argue that leaders evaluate peace settlements with an eye on two boards. Externally, they evaluate their position vis-a-vis other protagonists in the conflict. Internally, leaders are concerned with their positions in power. Institutionalization results in a tension between "raison de la revolution" (ideological motivations) and "raison d'institution" (institutional preservation). Embattled leaders who increasingly find it difficult to withstand changes in the balance of forces find that their institutional interests are better preserved by peace. They agree to compromise on their ideological preferences thus opening a window of opportunity for the attainment of sustainable peace settlements. / Employing the comparative case-study method, the dissertation examines the attitudes of the Lebanese Forces and the Bosnian Serbs respectively toward conflict-resolution schemes that sought to bring the Lebanese and Bosnian civil wars to an end. / By focusing on leaders' incentives to settle, the research allows us to predict a priori which settlements are more sustainable. Theoretically, it refines the concept of "ripeness" for negotiations by specifying both its intra-communal and its extra-communal dimensions. In terms of practical policy implications, the research argues that militias are prime candidates for the role of spoilers. Thus, it is important not only to understand their incentives to settle but also to craft peace agreements that give even such radical factions a vested interest in peace.

No description available.