This dissertation consists of three chapters. First two chapters examines how nonprofit organizations (NPOs) react to the state level minimum wage increases, and the third chapter studies the effect of board interlock on the diffusion of innovation.In the first chapter, I investigate the impact of minimum wage increases on employment. I extend the literature by hypothesizing and showing a differential impact of state-level minimum wage increases on nonprofit organizations relative to for-profit organizations. While I find that increases in minimum wages reduce employment growth in both types of organizations, this decrease is substantially larger for nonprofit organizations. I also find that investment in automation, i.e., information technology, rises in nonprofits post minimum wage increase, consistent with the substitution of capital for labor. Minimum wage increases also increase the likelihood of nonprofit exit. In the second chapter, I investigate how CEO pay in nonprofit organizations responds to an exogeneous increase in labor cost resulting from state-level minimum wage hikes. I find that these increases in labor cost, which constrain budgets, are followed by declines in the total pay of NPO CEOs. In contrast, I do not find an impact on CEO pay in for-profit companies. I attribute the differential response between NPO and for-profit organizations to NPO CEOs acting as stewards of the NPO, whereby they are willing to take less to ensure the continued existence of the enterprise, as well as fulfillment of its mission. This phenomenon has previously been observed in the nonprofit sector and termed labor donation, whereby individuals who work for NPOs are intrinsically motivated and consequently, are willing to work for less money. Cross-sectionally I find the declines in compensation are larger in NPOs headquartered in smaller counties, in counties with higher levels of religiosity, and in counties with greater levels of social capital, and in NPOs that are run by their founders. In the last chapter, I propose that board interlocks can act as a channel of information transmission and social learning, hence enhancing the diffusion of innovation among firms. I find that a firm’s patents are more likely to be cited by patents from firms that have common directors (i.e., interlocked firm). The result is robust under a difference-in-differences setting, where the death or retirement of interlocking directors is used as an exogeneous shock to board interlock. The effect is more pronounced for interlocking directors who have longer experience in R&D-intensive industries, have a larger network, and have a higher compensation delta. While I find that board interlock enhances the diffusion of innovation across industries, it has no effect on within-industry knowledge diffusion. Finally, I document that board interlock enhances firms’ overall innovation output, measured by patent counts and citation counts per patent. The paper sheds light on an important role played by board of directors in promoting knowledge spillover and innovation. / Business Administration/Finance