This study examines whether auditor industry expertise in private clients influences audit quality of public client engagements in the United States. Private companies are significant to the U.S. economy as well as audit firms. I hand-collect auditors' private client information and construct a national, city, and joint national/city specialist designation and document a 17.9 to 47.3 (12.9 to 25.8) percent decrease in a public client's likelihood to misstate their financial statements (net income earnings management) when an auditor is a private client industry specialist. I then construct and test a city specialist measure using both private and public client data and find that it is economically stronger and more robust than the public only measure commonly employed by audit researchers. This study provides evidence of the importance of private companies to an audit firm's industry expertise as well as to researchers' use of city specialist measure in audit studies. / Doctor of Philosophy / This study examines whether auditor industry expertise in private clients influences audit quality of public client engagements in the United States. Private companies are significant to the U.S. economy as well as audit firms. I hand-collect auditors' private client information and construct a national, city, and joint national/city specialist designation and find that audit quality is higher for the audit firm's public clients in the same industry. Next, I construct and test a city industry specialist measure using both private and public client data and find that it is economically stronger and more robust than the public only measure commonly employed by audit researchers. This study provides evidence of the importance of private companies to an audit firm's industry expertise as well as to researchers' use of city specialist measure in audit studies.

This paper examines the occurrence and outcome of auditor litigation related to financial statement misstatements and the effect of auditor misstatement-based litigation on subsequent auditor behavior. The study is motivated by recent calls to limit auditor legal liability and the need to examine the ability of litigation to deter non-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) financial reporting. I find that misstatement severity is the primary driver of auditor litigation. Specifically, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a regulatory investigation, a larger stock price decline, and/or a greater number of accounting application [i.e., Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)/GAAP) failures. In addition, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur when the misstatement is associated with engagement fees that consist of a greater magnitude or a greater proportion of non-audit service fees. Further, I find that misstatement severity and the size of the plaintiffs? claims are the primary drivers of auditor settlements resulting from misstatement-based litigation. Specifically, I find that an auditor settlement resulting from misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a greater amount of alleged income or equity inflation over the class action time period, and/or a larger alleged percentage drop in share price over the class action time period. With respect to subsequent auditor behavior, I find evidence that auditor litigation results in more conservative subsequent auditor behavior across a litigated auditor?s office-wide client portfolio (that excludes the litigated client). Specifically, in the year following auditor litigation, I find evidence that litigation results in increased auditor constraint of client-reported positive and signed discretionary accruals, as well as longer audit report lags.

This paper examines the occurrence and outcome of auditor litigation related to financial statement misstatements and the effect of auditor misstatement-based litigation on subsequent auditor behavior. The study is motivated by recent calls to limit auditor legal liability and the need to examine the ability of litigation to deter non-Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) financial reporting. I find that misstatement severity is the primary driver of auditor litigation. Specifically, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a regulatory investigation, a larger stock price decline, and/or a greater number of accounting application [i.e., Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)/GAAP) failures. In addition, I find that auditor misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur when the misstatement is associated with engagement fees that consist of a greater magnitude or a greater proportion of non-audit service fees. Further, I find that misstatement severity and the size of the plaintiffs? claims are the primary drivers of auditor settlements resulting from misstatement-based litigation. Specifically, I find that an auditor settlement resulting from misstatement-based litigation is more likely to occur when the misstatement is associated with fraud, a greater amount of alleged income or equity inflation over the class action time period, and/or a larger alleged percentage drop in share price over the class action time period. With respect to subsequent auditor behavior, I find evidence that auditor litigation results in more conservative subsequent auditor behavior across a litigated auditor?s office-wide client portfolio (that excludes the litigated client). Specifically, in the year following auditor litigation, I find evidence that litigation results in increased auditor constraint of client-reported positive and signed discretionary accruals, as well as longer audit report lags.

The present study examines and finds that internal auditors, particularly Chief Audit Executives, recognize financial accounting expertise as a significant base of audit committee (AC) power in the financial reporting process. However, such an AC expertise (i.e., financial accounting expertise) does not "counterbalance" internal auditors' perceived dependency on management or influence their decisions to monitor financial reporting quality. Instead, the cost-benefit analysis affects their decisions: (1) benefits of staying resolute to monitor financial reporting quality (i.e., "psychological empowerment"), and (2) costs of potential adverse reactions of management who exerts power over the internal audit. In addition, this study examines and finds that the financial reporting location (recognition vs. disclosure) has significant impacts on both internal audit reporting decisions and decisions to correct misstatements. Specifically, internal auditors' tolerances for disclosed misstatements reveal that they also feed the "vicious circle" of reliability expectations as external auditors do in a prior study (Libby, Nelson and Hunton, 2006).

The main aim diploma thesis was the evaluation possibilities of detection accounting fraud and misstatements in financial reports for the managing business corporations. Diploma thesis is divided into two main chapters on literature search and practical. Part of this work was the analysis of techniques and models of of detection performed on a case study of a selected accounting unit. For of individual models calculations were used accounting data from financial statements that were provided by AB, s. r. o. An entity shall compile both financial statements comprehensibly, to give a true and fair view of accounting and financial situation. Risk analysis for of detection manipulation of financial statements, I chose Beneish model, model CFEBT and Jones Nondiscretionary Accruals.