The main objective of this study is to search, using both theoretical analysis and empirical evidence for the European case, for the strategy to be followed for the creation of a monetary union among a group of countries, and to derive the conditions which have to be fulfilled in order to make such a strategy viable. The theoretical foundations for the creation of a monetary union are set out. The European realities suggest gradualistic approaches. Theoretical analysis of the strategy of economic policy coordination takes place in terms of all of the above considerations. Analysis then follows on the extent to which this strategy, implemented in Europe since the early seventies, has been successful. Finally, in the light of this analysis and analysis of other proposals, a conclusion is reached on which should be the preferred strategy, and how it should be established successfully. The move towards exchange rate fixity has implications for members' objectives and policies. The European arrangements were inadequate and did not pay sufficient attention to important issues which remained unsolved. Economic discipline was not forced and members' objectives diverged considerably. Policies did not depict any coordination pattern. As a result the 1972 intra-European exchange rate arrangements failed. Other undesirable implications also followed. Policy coordination still seems to be the preferable approach provided that important changes take place, and measures to eventually develop centralisation are taken. The decision to create a European monetary system is judged in view of these conclusions. Major weaknesses remain and the system's ability to guarantee long-run stability is questioned. Important changes are necessary for the Community to embark on the path to a monetary union. Indications are not encouraging, while important obstacles to the changes remain.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago. / "The pages included in this dissertation have been reprinted as chapters I-V of A history of the Latin monetary union ... issued as no. V of the Economic studies of the University of Chicago."

Master of Arts / Department of Economics / Steven P. Cassou / In this report, I investigate the possibility of a monetary unification among the Arab States. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states that include Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait and Oman are coming together on the basis of common ethnicity, religion, culture, traditions, and monetary issues. This research will discuss different factors upon which the monetary unification and the birth of a new currency depend. For comparison to the Euro, I closely examined different factors such as inflation rates, exchange rates, trade, etc. over the past decade. As stated, this examination was done to see how these factors compare with those of the Euro region to determine if a similar monetary unification among the GCC states is possible. The target date for launching the new GCC currency was January 1, 2010; however that date has long passed. Although the above mentioned factors are favorable to currency unification of the GCC states, ample time is necessary to achieve such a herculean feat. After all, the Europeans did not achieve the unification of the Euro in one night. One hurdle to unification is that the GCC states still need to control the inflation rates in their own economies. Other economic factors, such as trade, have been favorable for all the GCC states, and all the states have been doing well in terms of the U.S. dollar (USD). Although unification may not have met the January 1, 2010 goal, the GCC will still be observing the economic factors and considering other possible scenarios. All the GCC countries vow to achieve this unification.

Author: Nadzeya Laurentsyeva Title: Monetary Union of Belarus and Russia - Analysis of Possible Costs for the Belarusian Economy Abstract The thesis analyses alignment of the Belarusian and Russian economies with the aim to infer on costs of the possible monetary union for Belarus. Having estimated a structural vector autoregression model with long-run restrictions, we conclude that the economies have shared common supply and external demand shocks, but other temporary fluctuations have been, in large, asymmetric. Structural discrepancies (as proven by the qualitative analysis) and differences in the monetary policy foci and transmission (as illustrated by the estimation results of Taylor rules and a monetary vector autoregression model) could account for increasing misalignment since 2010. In terms of the welfare costs for Belarus (evaluated with a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model), the monetary union can be considered preferable to the current monetary policy of the National bank of the Republic of Belarus, while being inferior to the hypothetical inflation targeting regime. The welfare gap between the two arrangements reduces, if stronger domestic price flexibility and higher synchronization of productivity shocks can be assumed.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--York University, 2000. Graduate Programme in Political Science. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 733-757). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?1492753.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Anthropology, March 2003. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

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The research looks at the design of fiscal and monetary policy in EMU. The characteristics of the "economic constitution" established in the Maastricht treaty are analysed to test their robustness to different hypothesis about fiscal sustainability and fiscal and monetary policy interaction. Chapter two illustrates how the possibility of default of public debt in one large member country creates interdependence among fiscal positions of all member countries. Chapter three and four show that a similar kind of interdependence between national fiscal position could be determined by the effect that un-funded fiscal expansions have on the level of prices. The theoretical argument, borrowed from the so called Fiscal Theory of Price Determination, is developed both in a closed economy, to illustrate the basic mechanism and its interpretation, and in a two country monetary union model. Chapter five analyses, in a game theoretical framework, how the interdependence between policy instruments should be recognised in full, in order for any policy to be effective. In a situation in which a possible conflict of objectives or preferences between policy makers is present, any institutional arrangements which does not deal with it positively is intrinsically inefficient and can result in the policies cancelling each other out. The last chapter develops an example on how the conflict between policy institutions can be endogenous to an institutional structure chosen to reduce the influence of policy uncertainty on the economy. It is therefore a note of caution about the common belief that is possible with simple institutional solutions to overcome differences in preferences or objectives that are characteristic of the European environment. The analysis suggests that both greater fiscal policies cooperation and decentralisation of policy institutions from national to regional are developments necessary to achieve the policy goals of the Monetary Union.

This thesis examined the extent to which there is convergence in inflation rates, interest rates and incomes in the Common Monetary Area (CMA). It also investigated if countries in the area exhibit asymmetric adjustments to aggregate shocks. Based on optimum currency area theory, lack of convergence and the presence of asymmetric adjustments to shocks is likely to pose serious challenges that need to be addressed as the CMA moves towards a fully-fledged monetary union. I formulated and estimated a macroeconomic model to capture the transmission of shocks in the CMA. The model consists of four equations namely; Phillips curve, IS curve, exchange rate and monetary policy rule. The model links the CMA countries via the aggregate demand, inflation and interest rate equations. I simulated the model to assess the economic performance of the smaller countries when subjected to either a single monetary policy rule or country specific monetary policy rules. Such an analysis is used to gauge if a move towards a fully-fledged monetary union will result in higher benefits for the smaller countries. Furthermore, I estimated a structural VAR model based on the theoretical model. The identification restrictions in the VAR are also derived from the model. The analysis confirms monetary convergence, which is supported by the strong evidence of co-movement in interest rates and inflation rates in the CMA. Monetary convergence is an indicator of strong financial sector integration in the area. There is also evidence that inflation in the smaller countries is driven by that of South Africa. This result is mainly attributable to the strong trade links in the area as well as the existing parity between currencies in the area. The results also show that countries in the area are likely to face asymmetric shocks based on their composition of exports as well as the low correlation of growth rates. However, this asymmetry does not mean that countries cannot move towards iii creation of a fully-fledged monetary union, but rather that the existing asymmetries should be considered seriously by ensuring that other adjustment mechanisms are put in place. Extending the analysis to the SADC region shows that this region exhibits weak monetary convergence even though the poor countries show some form of real convergence with South Africa. Simulations from the VAR model show a price puzzle for Swaziland and South Africa but it is not prolonged. Based on the analysis the study concludes that a monetary union is possible in the CMA and is likely to be less costly. However, the evident asymmetries call for gradual step by step phasing in of the monetary union.