This dissertation develops a theory of democracy based on the premises that a) there is no democracy in the 21st century without democratic control of technology, and b) democracy must be judged along three axes: 1) Democracy—Monarchy: how is political power divided? 2) Democracy—Oligarchy: how easily is money translated into political power? 3) Politics—Society: does democracy encompass the decisive processes of society? To satisfy these criteria, this dissertation proposes a democratic federalism grounded in the commons, which are not only integrated within larger governments, but constitute distinct and independent polities with an equal say in all matters concerning the physical organization of their territories. It integrates lottocratic selection within a system of direct (rather than representative) government, in which participation at higher levels of government is made possible by breaking open governing functions into their constituent parts, particularly in the legislature. Democratic federalism institutionalizes the tension between the center and the periphery, the collective and the community, the abstract benefits and concrete costs of modern technology through the dual relationship between the commons and all larger polities of which it is a part.