Moral outrage is an emotional, cognitive, and behavioral response to moral violations, resulting in a desire to punish the transgressor. Previous research has examined moral outrage toward transgressive behaviors, but no studies have examined the potential for moral outrage to be roused by another’s beliefs alone. Do people experience moral outrage at one another’s thoughts? If so, how do they punish someone who has roused their outrage but has “done nothing wrong”? In Study 1 (n = 209), I examined moral outrage reactions at people’s unacceptable beliefs on three topics (pedophilia, sexual assault, fraud) by comparing moral outrage elicited by people holding an indefensible belief (e.g., “sexual assault is no big deal”) but doing absolutely nothing to express or further that belief, versus people acting on these beliefs to various degrees (e.g., talking about it on social media, or assaulting someone themselves). Results indicated that people can become morally outraged at outrageous beliefs alone, and to a similar degree as at actual outrageous behaviors. In Study 2 (n = 327), I investigated whether the pattern would generalize from extreme beliefs most people would find outrageous to ideologically divided issues. Specifically, I examined the consequences of experiencing moral outrage when the target’s beliefs violated participants’ own moral convictions about abortion rights. Study 2 also investigated how participants punished the transgressor in a workplace setting, which is consequential and relevant to the fraught current political climate. Participants read a hypothetical male co-worker’s controversial and outrageous Facebook post, rated their feelings of moral outrage at the co-worker, and finally indicated how likely they would be to punish the co-worker directly (e.g., confrontation), indirectly (e.g., exclusion), or by avoiding him. Transgressive beliefs not only elicited more moral outrage when compared to control conditions, but transgressive beliefs elicited moral outrage to a similar degree as transgressive behaviors. Further, moral outrage at both beliefs and actions encouraged people to be more punitive toward the transgressor in direct ways (as seen in previous research), but also in indirect ways (such as social exclusion) or just by avoiding the transgressor. Finally, across both studies, I also found that participants’ intellectual humility (i.e., the degree to which a person recognizes that their beliefs and attitudes might be incorrect) predicted the intensity of their moral outrage: the intellectually humble reported overall lower levels of moral outrage than the intellectually arrogant. Implications for these findings for workplace discrimination and the study of moral outrage are discussed.

Moral outrage is an emotional, cognitive, and behavioral response to moral violations, resulting in a desire to punish the transgressor. Previous literature on moral outrage was limited in its examination of cognitive components and in the consideration of potential sources of moral outrage beyond transgressive behaviors. Through two studies, I addressed (a) cognitions and judgements integral to moral outrage, and (b) how different sources of moral outrage impacted overall moral outrage, as well as its cognitive, emotional, and behavioral components. In Study 1, I examined a literature-derived list of 42 cognitions and judgements about the transgressor in response to a morally outrageous news story. Using EFA and SEM models, I narrowed down and supported four subscales of potential cognitions related to moral outrage: judgements that the transgressor was Villainous, Intentional, Uncaring, and Harmful. Each subscale was internally consistent, though only Villainous and Intentional subscales were found to be uniquely and consistently predictive of moral outrage. In Study 2, I manipulated the moral outrage source in several scenarios presented as fictional news article about a YouTube star and his involvement with a disturbing viral video, following a 4 (moral outrage source: action, belief, affiliation, control) X 3 (topic: physical assault, zoophilia, stealing tips) design. Results showed a complex relationship between the moral outrage source and the strength of moral outrage, as well as each of its components. Interaction effects of source x topic also impacted multiple variables, where the pattern between each source condition differed depending on which vignette topic the participant had read. Broadly speaking, there were mixed results as to whether moral outrage toward a transgressive belief was equally strong as that toward a transgressive action (as seen in my previous research), or somewhat weaker. There was also novel support for the presence of a moderate level of moral outrage toward a person for their affiliation to a transgressive entity, even if the person had no personal transgressive actions or beliefs. The patterns of emotions, cognitions, and behavioral reactions varied slightly from overall moral outrage in unique ways that encourage future study. This research has implications for political polarization, cancel culture, and recognizing the cognitive component of moral outrage, a construct thus far defined primarily through its emotional components.

In this essay, I examine the interplay between history, progress, and morality, as it is discussed explicitly or implicitly in the metaethical literature. At first sight, it is perhaps intuitive that these three are necessarily intertwined and mutually dependent, as if they were casually connected. For instance, few would deny that moral progress has occurred throughout history. The abolishment of slavery and the political emancipation of certain groups are seen as obvious signs that morality does indeed progress. Those who believe in de facto moral progress would point to such 'facts' by comparing two states of affairs according to their moral status. Moral progress thus occurs when we move from a "worse" state of affairs to a "better". However, this simple algorithm becomes increasingly untenable once we ask what it means for something to be "better". Better by what measure, better according to whom, better in what sense? Some – moral realists– will argue that as we become increasingly aware of moral truths and as these truths steadily accumulate, progress occurs. Others will argue that there are no moral truths and no moral facts, and a comparison between different states of affairs is impossible because it involves a sort of moral 'historical imperialism' in which we assert our convictions and prejudices upon a time and culture with completely different beliefs. Taken to the extreme, this view gives rise to the idea that moral progress is nothing but a mirage, a psychological necessity without justification. I conclude the essay by arguing that several positions fall short when addressing questions regarding moral progress, and that there are other ways of discussing it which might be more fruitful.