This thesis has examined the course of foreign policy of Fascist Italy from the beginning of the Second World War, September 1, 1939, to Italy's formal entry into that war, June 10, 1940. This policy was virtually the will of Benito Mussolini, the Italian Fascist dictator. Most deeply explored were Italy's relationships with Great Britain, France, and Germany. Explored to a lesser degree were Italy's relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union.This thesis sought to answer two basic questions: Why did Italy not go to war in September, 1939, as she was bound by treaty to do?, and, what finally prompted Italy to go to war, on Germany's side, when she did the following June? Accordingly, the various possible factors, political, diplomatic, economic and military, that brought pressure upon Mussolini to act as he did were also examined. These factors originated both from within Italy and without.

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