The years 1951 to 1953 are among the most important and controversial in Iranian history. The period is significant not only for the domestic dynamics of popular nationalism under Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, but also for the role that United States policy played in an interaction with the conflict between a lingering British economic presence and the Iranian move to nationalize its oil industry. An examination of United States national security policy of that time reveals that policy toward Iran was consistent with the overall post-war policy of the United States, dominated as it was by the central theme of preventing the spread of communism. The task for the men who were charged with the application of U.S. policy in Iran during those years was to accommodate two factors which complicated the search for an order which would ensure post-war national security for the United States: Iranian nationalism as epitomized by Mossadegh; and the economic and diplomatic interests of Great Britain. The United States sought to resolve the conflict so that instability in Iran would not invite communist influence or takeover. United States policymakers were influenced by several factors which combined to eventually decide the outcome. The centrality of the perceived world communist expansion threat, McCarthyism in the United States, the role of several key figures with experience in U.S.-Soviet diplomacy, and the change from a Democratic to a Republican administration at the time Mossadegh was experiencing a deterioration of his own domestic political situation; all worked toward the still-controversial outcome of U.S. policy: the overthrow of Mossadegh. The primacy of containment of communism in United States policy did not preclude variations in its application, nor did this emphasis ignore the forces of Iranian nationalism and self-determination. Nonetheless, given the men involved in the policy decisions, the information available to them and the context of the post-World War II international order, the outcome was predictable and entirely consistent at the time with creating an international order conducive to the national security interests of the United States.

President Jimmy Carter's foreign policy changed significantly and progressively over the course of his four year term. What began as a liberal-internationalist approach to foreign policy ended in a traditional Cold War stalemate with the Soviet Union. There are many causes for this shift: changes in the international environment, shifting public opinion, and other domestic-political pressures. One of the most consistently undervalued causes for Carter's overall foreign policy shift was the personal influence of his National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Through a variety of advocacy pressures and framing tactics, Brzezinski was able to utilize the changes in the international system, and especially, changes within domestic-political environment to convince Carter of an extensive reformation of his foreign policy perspective and priorities. / by Kevin S. Embrick. / Vita. / Subtitle on abstract page incorrectly spells the name Zbigneiw [sic] Brzezinski. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2008. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

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This study investigates Canada's border security policy, practices and technologies and the discourses in which they function, to better understand the U.S-Canadian "Smart Border" and the post-9/11 geographies of the nation-state. With the erasure of economic and military borders and the erection of new security-oriented police borders, Canada's "Smart Border" is no longer at the edges of territory but is a series of spaces reproduced in and outside of Canada through technologies such as the passport, immigration and anti-terrorism legislation, security agencies, monuments, and maps. The "Smart Border" perpetuates colonial distinctions and projects as a site of tension between the national construction of Canadian identities, policing technologies and the enforcement of a global apartheid that restricts access to political and economic resources by enforcing a regime of differential access to mobility. As a site of resistance, the "Smart Border" is also a space from which to displace colonial-national genealogies.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Alberta (Canada), 2006. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1996. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 538-567). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis--School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 2004. / Title from title screen (viewed Sept. 17, 2004). "June 2004."

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2008. / Title from PDF title page; viewed on Dec. 10, 2008. "30 May 2008." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 78-83).

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 128-138).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, 2006. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 290-305).