Thesis (M.S. in Information Systems and Operations)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): Dan Boger, Bill Kemple. Includes bibliographical references (p. 35). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2003. / Cover title. "March 2003." AD-A414 654. Includes bibliographical references. Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.S. in Systems Technology)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Bill Kemple. Includes bibliographical references (p. 131-132). Also available online.

Thesis: M.S., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 1976 / Bibliography: leaves 161-162. / M.S. / M.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science

CHDS State/Local / Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Since 11 September 2001, a number of authorities have provided definitions for both Homeland Security (HS) and Homeland Defense (HD), however, as the definitions develop, they provide less functional detail. The most often asked question posed to professionals in the field is "what is the distinction between the Homeland Security mission and the Homeland Defense mission." What they are really asking is, in a particular scenario, "who's in charge of the operation?" "When is it law enforcement, or non-military, and when is it a military operation"? Many have argued that the command structure between the two Services needs to be changed to ensure the seam between HS and HD is minimized. This is a natural approach because command and control is possibly the most important of all operational functions. The objective of this thesis is to argue that the Navy and Coast Guard should not establish a joint interagency command structure for the missions of Homeland Security and Homeland Defense. They should continue to coordinate and support one another, when required, but they should not combine the two Services together into a permanent single organization. / Commander, United States Navy

When we open the history book of Human Sea Power, there is always an entangled relationship between the scale of navy force and the state of economy within a country. Since 1978, three decades reforming on its economic policy, China has . Eye-witting the First Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the September 11th terrorist attack on America territory, the Second Gulf War, and, most recently, the piracy in Gulf of Aden, China authority is now reconsidering its role on both international and regional security and then amending its navy strategy based on evaluations. Although the ultimate goal is to protect its own profit, yet aggressively expanding its navy force might generate instability status and will break the Strait balance and its peace progress in Asia Pacific. No doubt, due to the modernized strategic of China Navy which has created tension in its neighborhood area, and, particularly, it is obvious that the force gap between China and Taiwan has yawned by steadily economy boom in China. By the end of Taiwan President Election in 2008, the stalemate prevailed under Chen era is now melting and quickly treading toward peace, yet national security couldn¡¦t merely rely on jubilant atmosphere of diplomacy but on staid force. Facing problems between the Strait, China has adopted both peace and war strategies simultaneously and never give up its intention to invade Taiwan. Frankly, it is undoubtedly best to solve political conundrum under peaceful diplomatic progress, but facing the threat of China¡¦s invasion, we still need to grasp the status of its development of navy, to forecast the pattern of its navy expanding, and to mull best way to defiance, to ensure the national security of Taiwan.

Thesis (M.S. in Modeling, Virtual Environments, and Simulation (MOVES))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): John Hiles. Includes bibliographical references (p. 55-58) Also available online.

Thesis (M.S. in Modeling, Virtual Environments, and Simulation (MOVES))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): John Hiles. Includes bibliographical references (p. 55-58) Also available online.

Thesis (M. of Strategic Studies)--U.S. Army War College, 2006. / Cover title. "15 MAR 2006"--Tech. report doc. page. Includes bibliographical references (p. 15-17). Full text document available on public STINET.

This dissertation conducts a genealogy of freedom of the seas discourse in United States foreign policy in order to problematize the contemporary representation lying at the heart of American political-military strategy in the Western Pacific. This project aims to accomplish two goals. First, this project aims to show that freedom of the seas is not an enduring historical principle consistently championed by the United States, as is often claimed in contemporary governmental publications. Rather, it shows that the current understanding is a recent phenomenon that emerged after the Second World War. By highlighting the contingency of the contemporary understanding of freedom of the seas, this work seeks to show that such discourse is not a necessary foundation on which to place American political-military strategy. The second objective of this genealogical analysis is to show that the contemporary freedom of the seas discourse in U.S. foreign policy is not an altruistic principle championed on behalf of the global community, but rather facilitates American control over the global ocean space. By showing that freedom of the seas is a mechanism of sea control, this work aims to show that in an era of maritime great power competition, strategies predicated upon the discourse are more dangerous than would otherwise appear. Together, this genealogical analysis, and the two goals that are made possible by it, will make a substantive contribution to the critical strategic studies literature, in conjunction with the wider critical security studies literature, by showing that American political-military strategy in the South China Sea can and should be reconceptualized. / Doctor of Philosophy / Currently, the United States is locked in a fierce competition with China in the South China Sea. The United States believes that Chinese actions in the region, such as claiming large swaths of maritime territory, constructing militarized artificial islands, and deploying weaponry designed to endanger American forces operating in the region, violates the principle of freedom of the seas. The United States asserts that it has consistently championed the principle freedom of the seas because it is the essential foundation of international peace and prosperity. Due to this, the U.S. claims that it will continue to defend the principle of freedom of the seas against Chinese depredations. However, this dissertation argues that the United States' political-military strategy in the Western Pacific is misrepresenting the concept of freedom of the seas and therefore failing to see the dangers at stake in the regional confrontation. To show this, this work writes a history of how the concept of freedom of the seas has been used in U.S. foreign policy over the course of American history. Such a history shows that the concept of freedom of the seas has not been consistently championed by the United States and is not an altruistic principle defended on behalf of international peace and prosperity. Instead, this project shows that the concept of freedom of the seas is used by the United States to facilitate control over the world's oceans on behalf of U.S. interests. It is problematic to portray the pursuit of American national interests as a universal altruistic good because it does not leave room open for compromise. In a time where China is rapidly developing their military forces to control sea themselves, basing American political-military strategy on the concept of freedom of the seas is increasingly dangerous.