Non-compete covenants are clauses in employment contracts that forbid employees from competing with their former employers during a given time period. Recent literature has identified non-compete covenants as a new type of entry barrier to entrepreneurship within high-tech industries, impeding regional innovation, growth and employment. In Europe, the legal regime is highly heterogeneous, suggesting that certain regions might gain a competitive advantage in innovation. This study uses Fixed Effects regression and Poisson Fixed Effects regression models to investigate the ways in which non-compete covenants effect how venture capital investments stimulate regional innovation and entrepreneurship. The data set was constructed using data from The European Patent Office, the Eurostat, the World Bank and the OECD Economic Outlook. Ius Laboris overview was used to assess the enforceability of non-compete covenants in sample countries. The results show that increased supply of venture capital increases innovative activity in all regions. Relative to countries that enforce non-compete covenants, countries that restrict the use of these contracts experience higher rates of patenting activity. The level of enforceability was not found to have significant effects on new firm formation. The results suggest that financial intermediates and the legal regime have an important role in promoting regional innovation.