In the strive towards a highly competitive market, the European Commission has long promoted an extensive use of so-called private enforcement, where individuals claim their rights, as guaranteed by the acquis communautaire, before national courts. The incentive to litigate is, mostly, the right to receive damages for loss suffered due to another private party’s violation of the EU antitrust rules, established by the CJEU in its famous ruling in Courage, in 2001.          Lately, the Commission seems to believe that the aim of a more effective private enforcement of antitrust law justifies rather extensive intrusions into the internal legal systems of the Member States. In a White Paper of 2008, the Commission proposed several measures aimed at enhancing the possibilities for individuals to be awarded with compensation for having suffered from a breach of the antitrust rules. These measures include the harmonization of certain national procedural laws, to facilitate inter alia damages claims at a national level. One year later, in 2009, an internal document with a draft for a directive was leaked out from the Commission, which suggests that there are advanced plans for issuing a harmonizing legislation.          Extensive critique has been aimed at the Commission’s proposal, mainly on the basis that procedural rules should be left unaltered by the European Union. Procedural rules are often considered to be the result of careful considerations of specific domestic characteristics and problems, which over time have resulted in a well-balanced internal system based on legal traditions and culture. Even though national rules would still apply in purely domestic situations, it is said that the internal balance of the national procedural systems would be undermined if certain procedural rules were to be harmonized throughout the Union.          This thesis aims at analysing whether the aim of an effective private enforcement of Union competition law does justify a harmonization of procedural rules that could facilitate inter alia private damage claims before national courts. In the case of a confirmative answer, the work also aims at answering to the question of what form such a harmonization should take: should the Commission initiate a legislative process or should it be left to the CJEU to continue developing the state of law through sporadic rulings on the matter? Recourse is made throughout the work to several important general principles of Union law, such as the principles of national procedural autonomy, subsidiarity, and equality. / I sin strävan efter att åstadkomma en marknad med hög konkurrenskraft har Europeiska kommissionen länge förespråkat ett mer extensivt nyttjande av så kallad private enforcement (ung. privat genomförande) där individer åberopar sina rättigheter, som följer av acquis communataire, inför nationella domstolar. Incitamentet för att driva processer består i dessa fall mestadels av rätten att erhålla skadestånd för den skada som klaganden lidit på grund av en annan privat aktörs brott mot konkurrensreglerna, grundad av EU-domstolen (EUD) i målet Courage, 2001.          På senare tid tycks kommissionen anse att målet med en mer effektiv private enforcement rättfärdigar relativt djupa intrång i medlemsstaternas interna rättssystem. I en Vitbok från 2008 föreslog kommissionen flera medel för att förbättra möjligheterna för individer att erhålla kompensation för skada orsakad av konkurrensöverträdelser. Förslagen skulle innebära en harmonisering av vissa processuella regler för att underlätta bland annat skadeståndstalan på nationell nivå. Ett år efter Vitbokens publicering läckte ett annat dokument ut från kommissionen, innehållande ett utkast på ett direktiv som föreslår liknande regler som Vitboken. Detta tyder på att det finns långt skridna planer för att skapa en harmoniserande lagstiftning på EU-nivå.          Omfattande kritik har riktats mot kommissionens förslag, mestadels på grunden att processuella regler bör undanhållas från Europeiska Unionens inflytande. Processuella regler anses ofta vara en produkt av noggranna överväganden av nationella särdrag och problem, som under tidens gång lett till ett välbalanserat internt system baserat på gamla rättstraditioner och rättskultur. Trots att nationella regler skulle fortsätta att gälla för rent interna situationer, påstås det att den interna balansen inom de nationella processuella systemen skulle undergrävas vid en harmonisering.          Denna magisteruppsats syftar till att analysera huruvida målet med en effektiv private enforcement av Unionens konkurrensregler rättfärdigar en harmonisering av processuella regler, för att underlätta bland annat privata skadeståndstalan i nationella domstolar. Om så visar sig vara fallet skall arbetet även undersöka vilken form en sådan harmonisering borde ta: skall kommissionen initiera en lagstiftningsprocess eller skall det vara upp till EUD att fortsätta utveckla det relevanta rättsläget? Under arbetet används genomgående några viktiga generella EU-rättsliga principer som referensramar. Dessa är bland annat principen om nationell processautonomi, subsidiaritet och likabehandling.

Economic growth is a major concern for state governments. One method that states use to spur economic growth is recruiting firms to relocate or expand within their state. Headlines and press releases from high–profile recruitment cases suggest that states compete with each other to recruit firms. The primary question in this dissertation is whether states compete to recruit firms. A unique panel data set that captures a state’s firm recruitment effort now provides the opportunity to answer this question. A variety of econometric methods (2SLS, MLE, and GS2SLS–GMM) isolate the spatial interdependence effect, and the empirical results show states do compete with each other to recruit firms. Another question answered in this dissertation is whether it matters how researchers measure a state’s effort to recruit firms. The results reveal that it is important to capture only spending related to firm recruitment, as other measures provide fundamentally different results. In addition, this dissertation tests for the nature of rivalry between states and shows that states compete with other states that are economically or demographically similar. The results of competition are not only robust, but large in magnitude as well. States are very responsive to their rival’s effort to recruit firms. Can states stop spending on firm recruitment? If they do, the other states will capture their potential firms–thus the competition to recruit firms does not seem likely to end soon.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the competition structure in the market for crossing Øresund and which price setting techniques are used. The results show that the market for crossing Øresund Bridge is monopolistically competitive market. While Øresund Bridge can in some cases be seen as a monopoly. Furthermore the results show how the firms that are operating in the market offer their consumers various pricing schedules to self-select from. The results based upon the information collected found that Øresund Bridge uses price discriminatory pricing schedules such as two-part tariff, quantity discount and peak-load pricing. According to the theory of price discrimination the firm needs to have market power in order to price discriminate and it is found that Øresund Bridge have a market share of 76%. The negative consequences of price discrimination in the particular market can mostly be seen in the ferry market where the two largest firms have to start collaborating in order to sustain as a part of the market. The positive consequences is found to be that a wider range of consumer groups are able to travel over Øresund due to the extensive range of different prices offered by the market operators.

In 1970,China carry out economic reform policy, development export-oriented agriculture, because of having the advantage of low-cost labor and land resource, loosen economic control and attract foreign capital investment gradually. In 1980, Taiwan entrepreneur start to investment agriculture related industry in China, and to bring in technology improved seed. but reviews the home, because environmental consciousness, the factory moves gradually toward the Southeast Asian country and China.Comparatively speaking, our country competitive power has the drop tendency. Separately, Taiwan and China joined one after another in WTO about in 2002, affect product wish of our country farmer because possible the low price to rob the market. We discuss bilateral in international market sales situation, the export market comparison from the Taiwan ten main aquatic products, the result discovered that the Taiwan most aquatic products all substitute by China, the government must propose in accordance to the plan and achieves the industry to continue forever to manage.

In the last decades, the globalisation process has reshaped the competition dynamics in two ways: Technology and innovation have become significant components of productivity and competition / and policies taking into consideration local resources and local production systems, gains ground. In that context, clusters appear as new organisations of production. This thesis aims at assessing the innovation performance of the firms and the factors affecting their performance by comparing agglomerated and non-agglomerated firms in the TR62 (Adana, Mersin) Region. Adana Organised Industrial Zone (AOSB) and Mersin-Tarsus Organised Industrial Zone (MTOSB) are selected as agglomeration examples in the region to study the effects of spatial proximity on innovativeness. It is found that local specific policies such as the establishment of an integrated system for cooperation and competition are needed to improve the innovation and competition capacity of the region.

Univ., Diss.--Köln, 2005.

Thesis (M.B.A.)--Ohio State University, 1949. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 118-122). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.

No description available.

Darbo tikslas - išanalizavus metodinę - teorinę literatūrą ekonomikos subjekto konkurencinės aplinkos vertinimo klausimais įvertinti UAB „Vilniaus duona“ konkurencingumą pagal apibendrintą konkurencinės aplinkos vertinimo schemą. Ją pritaikius nustatyta, jog įmonė yra konkurencinga, jos konkurencinė aplinka yra palanki įmonės veiklai, plėtrai, tačiau ji neturėtų apleisti savo pozicijų rinkoje, o išlikti jos lydere, todėl privalo nuolat stebėti konkurencinę aplinką. Darbe iškelta hipotezė - suformuluotos ir apibendrintos konkurencinės aplinkos vertinimo schemos etapų, kuriuos ekonomikos subjektas gali įtakoti ir įtakoja, eiliškumas nedaro įtakos ekonomikos subjekto konkurencinės aplinkos vertinimo rezultatams - patvirtinta. / The purpose of the Thesis is to generalize a scheme of evaluation and to measure competitive ability of Private Company “Vilniaus duona” after the analysis of methodical – academic works on competitive environment. After applying the scheme, it was identified that the Company is competitive in Lithuanian market, and its competitive environment is beneficial for further activity and development of the Company. However, the Company should not neglect its positions and should remain the leader in the market; therefore it should always observe the competitive environment. The hypothesis of the Thesis - succession of competitive environment evaluation stages, which can be influenced by a company, does not influence the results of evaluation – was proved. The international trade and competition became more intensive in Lithuania after joining European Union. Therefore, if company seeks profitability or even a survival it should be competitive, and it has to give a lot of attention to the competitors and evaluation of competitive environment. The Thesis also defines the concept of competition and competitive environment, as well as evaluation of competitive environment. The result of theoretical analysis is a scheme on competitive environment evaluation. The Thesis includes the analysis on the bread market, hot issues and problems on evaluation of competitive environment in Lithuania after joining the European Union. The Thesis reviews the main participants in the bread market and... [to full text]

Chapter 1: Downstream Competition and the Effects of Buyer Power The first chapter examines the interaction between buyer power and competition intensity in the downstream market in affecting consumer and total welfare. We study a model where oligopolistic retailers compete in quantity in the downstream market and one of them is a large retailer that has its own exclusive supplier. Negotiation between this retailer and its supplier is modeled as a generalized Nash bargaining game. We demonstrate that an increase in the buyer power of the large retailer against its supplier leads to a fall in retail price and consequently an improvement in consumer surplus and this is true even in the extreme case where the downstream market is served by a monopoly. More interestingly, we find that the effects of buyer power are large when the intensity of downstream competition is low, with the effects being the largest in the case of downstream monopoly. This suggests that buyer power and downstream competition are substitutes. Chapter 2: Subsidy, Product Diversity and Buyer Power The objective of the second chapter is to analyze the effectiveness of government subsidies in promoting product diversity when the downstream firm (a retailer) has buyer power. We extend the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition and compare the effects of subsidies on equilibrium number of product varieties and social welfare in the case where products are sold directly to consumers and the case where they are sold through a monopoly retailer with buyer power. Two types of subsidies are considered, a subsidy on marginal cost and a subsidy on fixed cost. We find that while the two types of subsides have different effects on the quantity and retail price of each variety, they both raise the number of product varieties and the social welfare. Moreover, a combination of the two types of subsidies is able to achieve the social optimum. These results are true even when products are distributed through a downstream monopoly retailer who has all the bargaining power, but the mechanism through which a subsidy increases product varieties is different. In comparison with the case where products are distributed directly to consumers, retailer buyer power reduces product variety and social welfare. Furthermore subsidies become less effective in the presence of buyer power. To be more specific, retailer buyer power has both a level effect and a marginal effect on product diversity. At any given subsidy rate, the equilibrium number of varieties is smaller and a marginal increase in subsidy leads to a smaller increase in the number of varieties. Chapter 3: Subsidy on Complementary Products in a Model of Monopolistic Competition The third chapter seeks to re-examine the market provision of product diversity under monopolistic competition and the effects of an infinitesimal subsidy on product variety and social welfare in the case of complementary products. This examination builds on the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition but assumes an alternative demand linkage. The results show that, different from the case of substitutable products, demand complementarity leads to multiple equilibriums and the number of product varieties could be higher or lower than the constrained optimum depending on the level of the fixed cost of production. When the fixed costs are small, the market yields too many products and an infinitesimal subsidy exacerbates the problem leading to an over-supply of product varieties. On the other hand, when the fixed costs are large, there are too few products and in some cases the complementary goods industry becomes non-existent. A subsidy that induces a switch of equilibriums enhances product variety and improves social welfare.