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This discussion aims to demonstrate how the project of identifying the nature of humanity is ongoing. The dominant models have their own flaws to contend with, and in the end we are still left uncertain of what constitutes our nature. Of the two views vying for prominence (dualism vs. materialism) neither is indubitable, nevertheless their are faithful proponents on each side. In a debate of belief vs. theory we see these seemingly disparate realms come together in a resignation to faith that their option is an adequate representation of human nature. / Religion

The Exclusion Argument for physicalism maintains that since every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, and cases of causal overdetermination (wherein a single effect has more than one sufficient cause) are rare, it follows that if minds cause physical effects as frequently as they seem to, then minds must themselves be physical in nature. I contend that the Exclusion Argument fails to justify the rejection of interactionist dualism (the view that the mind is non-physical but causes physical effects). In support of this contention, I argue that the multiple realizability of mental properties and the phenomenal and intentional features of mental events give us reason to believe that mental properties and their instances are non-physical. I also maintain (a) that depending on how overdetermination is defined, the thesis that causal overdetermination is rare is either dubious or else consistent with interactionist dualism and the claim that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, and (b) that the claim that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause is not clearly supported by current science. The premises of the Exclusion Argument are therefore too weak to justify the view that minds must be physical in order to cause physical effects as frequently as they seem to. / Philosophy

This thesis analyzes the philosophical origins of dualism in Western culture in the Classical period in order to examine dualist modes of representation in the history of Western portraiture. Dualism - or the separation of soul and body - takes the form in portraiture of the representation of the head or head and shoulders at the expense of the body, and since its emergence in Classical Greece, has been the major influence on portraiture. In this respect the modern portrait's commonplace attention to the face rests on the dualist notion that the soul, and therefore the individuality of the subject, rests in the head. Art historical literature on portraiture, however, fails to address the pictorial, cultural and theoretical complications arising from various forms of dualism and their different artistic methodologies, such as that of the physiognomy (the definition of personality through facial characteristics) in the 19th century. That is, there is a failure to identify the complexities of dualism's relationship to the traditional honorific aspects of the portrait (the fact that historians are inclined to accept at face value the fact that portraits historically have tended to honour the achievements and social status of the sitter). Indeed, scholars have a propensity to romanticise the humanist individualists inherent to this long history of the honorific, particularly in canonic portrait practices such as Rembrandt's and Picasso's.

Thesis advisor: Marilee Ogren / The suggestion of a mind-brain duality that emerges out of Descartes’ cogito argument is assessed in the context of twenty-first century neuroscience. The Cartesian texts are explored in order to qualify the extent to which the cogito necessitates such dualism and the functions that Descartes attributes to a non-corporeal soul are precisely defined. The relationship between the mind and brain is explored in the context of a number neuroscientific phenomena, including sensory perception, blindsight, amusia, phantom limb syndrome, frontal lobe lesions, and the neurodevelopmental disorder Williams syndrome, with an attempt to illuminate the physiological basis for each. Juxtaposing the two perspectives, the author concludes that Descartes hypothesis of a disembodied soul is no longer necessary and that a purely physiological understanding of the human mind is now possible, and that there is an underlying affinity between this assertion and Descartes theory of mind. / Thesis (BS) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Psychology.

abstract: Given the success of science, weak forms of mind-brain dependence are commonly treated as uncontroversial within contemporary philosophies of mind. More controversial are the different metaphysical claims inferred from this dependence, many ascribing ontological priority to the brain. Consider the following three propositions: (i) neurological events are essentially identified by their role in material systems, laws, and causes that are constitutively non-rational; (ii) at least some mental events are essentially identified in virtue of their role in the use of reason; (iii) all mental events are realized by, identical to, or composed out of, neurological events. (i) is uncontroversial. However, (iii) is strictly materialistic. (i), (ii) and (iii) taken together appear incoherent. A fruitful task for philosophy is to resolve this apparent incoherence. In his 1997 book The Last Word Thomas Nagel offers an explication of reason that conceptually transcends the nature of material substrate. In his 2010 article "Modest Dualism" Tyler Burge offers reasons to think of propositional thought as irreducible to the concepts of the material sciences. Both focus on rationality as a unique form of intentionality. Both philosophers also reject materialism (iii). On their accounts it's reasonable to take 'rational intentionality' as exhibiting a logical priority of the mind with respect to the brain in inquiries into the nature of mind. Granting this, the diminished conception of mind presupposed by prevailing contemporary theories is seen to be the result of a more general failure to recognize the logical priority and intricate nature of rationality. The robust views of rationality expressed by Nagel and Burge constitute grounds for argument against even the weakest form of materialism. I develop such an argument in this thesis, showing that the propositional attitudes exhibited in thought and speech preclude all materialistic notions of mind. Furthermore, I take the nature of propositional attitudes to suggest a perspective for exploring the fundamental nature of mind, one that focuses not on composition but on rational powers. / Dissertation/Thesis / M.A. Philosophy 2011

This thesis explores what an aesthetic judgment would be if we take existence to be non-duallyinterconnected. Interconnectedness and aesthetic judgment does not seem to be compatible becauseaesthetic judgment seems to depend on, at least, the dualism of the beautiful and the ugly and that ofsubject and object. In contrast, interconnectedness can not accept these dualisms.Zen philosopher Dōgen provides a non-dually interconnected framework that allows for aestheticjudgments in an interconnected view of existence. Zen philosophy concludes that we can both havedualism and non-dualism and that the ideas do not cancel each other out but deal with differentaspects of existence. Dualism with a centric view where existence is viewed from a standpoint andthus is restricted by a perspective, and enlightenment, where existence is perceived non-duallyinterconnected, can coexist. Because Aesthetic judgments are dependent on dualism, they must takeplace on the centric plane of existence. However, because, in enlightenment, everything is seen asBeautiful, it can not reveal much about an object’s beauty. Instead, the aesthetic judgment revealssomething about the standpoint taken in judgment. In light of this reformulation of the meaning ofaesthetic judgments, aesthetics will become phenomenological no matter if you deal with howcentric or enlightened ways of existence reveal themselves. Whether your focus is on aestheticjudgments, appreciation, or artistic practice, you will always deal with aesthetic experiences.

A particularly intriguing aspect of personal identity is the staying power of the first arguments. Many of the earliest arguments have remained influential to contemporary theories, even if they sometimes go unacknowledged. One of the most prominent of those long-lived theories comes from Descartes. In this paper I establish the intellectual background, framework, and implications of Cartesian dualism. With this theory in mind I examine Derek Parfit’s We Are Not Human Beings. Despite his denial dualism’s relevance, Parfit’s argument for personal identity contains Cartesian Dualism within it. His examples, definitions, and “intuitions” are compatible, if not more supportive of the Cartesian philosophy. To have the strongest argument that we are not human beings Parfit needs dualism - even if he will not directly acknowledge it.

There is a widespread intuition that physicalist theories of consciousness are importantly incomplete. But the psychological facts give us reason to think that the gap-intuition does not justify the belief that physical theories of consciousness always leave out some facts about consciousness. I target this belief, and aim to establish that it is not epistemically justified by the gap-intuition. I begin by making a case for thinking that a purely psychological analysis of the "explanatory gap" is not only a viable one, but is in many ways preferable to the standard modal-epistemological analysis. Then I marshal a body of empirical findings in support of the view that various sub-personal psychological processes play a key role in producing the gap-intuition. The most crucial of these processes is the agent-detector, a cognitive system specifically dedicated to detecting other conscious agents in the third-person mode. Leveraging this account, I argue that while the relevant sub-personal processes are generally accurate, in the case of the gap-intuition they are "tricked" in a manner analogous to a visual blind spot or a bias in decision-making. Thus gap-intuitions are not trustworthy and do not confer justification upon belief in a "real" gap. I conclude by situating my account within the context of existing literature on the explanatory gap. My account naturally complements various physicalist accounts of the gap, and also deserves consideration as an outright replacement for such accounts. The overall lesson is that the gap-intuition would arise whether or not physicalist theories of consciousness really do leave something out, and would persist even if we came to accept a true physicalist theory of consciousness. Thus anti-physicalist arguments that are based on the gap-intuition pose no serious threat to physicalist theories of consciousness.

This doctoral research, The Articulatory Practices of Islamism: A Focus on Space and Subjectivity, inquires into the role played by tradition, modernity and transmodernity qua symbolic reservoirs of Islamist discourses. By tackling Islamism from the theoretical and methodological perspective of discourse theory, my thesis will make a case for including within contemporary analyses of Islamism both a semiotic differentiation of Islamist articulatory practices (discourses) and a speculative assessment of their spatial representations and subjectivity formations. While the general framework of this study will be laid out in the Introduction (Chapter I), Part I of the thesis offers an examination of tradition, modernity and transmodernity in order to provide the reader with a conceptualisation of these key research categories. In addition to offering a reading of tradition and modernity crucial to a discourse-centred critique of Islamism, Chapter II will examine in detail the discourses of nationalism and pan-Islamism. Here the objective will be to uncover their deployment of two speculative paradigms in the construction of space and subjectivity; that is, dualism and universalism. Chapter III will then examine the emergence of key transmodern discourses such as globalism , universalism and virtualism tackling their relationship with globalisation. In Part II, I outline the main argument forwarded by my research. I will do so by examining the way three case studies engage with tradition, modernity and transmodernity. The discourse of three leading Islamist figures will be presented accompanied by textual examination and speculative analysis, the objective being to distinguish different discursive trajectories. I will strive to differentiate between a territorial trajectory of Islamism (Hasan al-Banna) in chapter IV; a transitional trajectory (Sayyid Qutb) in chapter V; and a transterritorial trajectory (Osama bin Laden) in chapter VI. Such an endeavour will help me to develop my main line of argument through an assessment of the role of symbolic reservoirs in the differentiation of Islamist discourses and in their construction of space and subjectivity. My conviction is that, while enlarging the space of academic debate on Islamism, such a theoretical approach could bring a new perspective to analytic inquiries into other discursive formations (liberalism, communism, anarchism etc), so helping analysts to differentiate between distinct trajectories within their respective discursive universe.