This paper explains how the Islamic State grew rapidly, answering a question of "what is" the Islamic State? A review of existing literature on simulation modeling of insurgencies identifies several gaps, as existing theories of non-state actors and insurgencies are inadequate to explain ISIS's performance. Additionally, there are few mathematical simulation models of insurgent behavior that can reproduce ISIS results. Finally, what models exist are not detailed enough either to conduct detailed experiments testing proposed explanations of ISIS, or evaluate policy responses aimed at containing or mitigating ISIS. The paper offers several contributions. First it proposes a dynamic hypothesis that the Islamic State (ISIS) is an emerging-state actor, a new form of actor that differs from traditional non- state actors and insurgencies. Propositions are constructed and presented as an overall theory of emerging-state actor behavior. These propositions are then simulated as experiments within a detailed model parameterized with conditions very similar to what ISIS faced in Iraq and Syria 2013. The model is then run from 2013-2020, and experiment results confirm evidence of emerging- state actor behavior and allow refinement of model boundary assumptions. Second, an initial set of intervention policies are tested in a variety of conditions: best case, operationally constrained, isolated, combined, and at different timing intervals. Analysis of the results yields key dynamic insights. These insights aid policy makers in understanding the challenges posed by emerging state actors. Finally, the detailed simulation model used to test the propositions and policy analysis, including a novel approach to combat simulation with endogenous geospatial feedback, is provided in full detail in two Appendices. Appendix A provides a sector-by-sector view of model structure and equations. Appendix B provides more discussion, analysis and sources used to develop model structure, establish parameter values and determine equations for the simulation. Due to length and other considerations, Appendix B is available only upon request. The detailed simulation model can be used to refine non-state actor theories (configured for insurgencies, emerging-state actors, or other scenarios). The model can be loaded with other scenarios to simulate other actors in other geospatial terrain: ISIS in Libya, Boko Haram in Nigeria, the returning Taliban in Afghanistan, etc. Keywords: ISIS, ISIL, DAESH, insurgency, conflict, security, stability, non-state actor, emerging- state actor, combat simulator, geospatial, national security.

This paper explains how the Islamic State grew rapidly, answering a question of "what is" the Islamic State? A review of existing literature on simulation modeling of insurgencies identifies several gaps, as existing theories of non-state actors and insurgencies are inadequate to explain ISIS's performance. Additionally, there are few mathematical simulation models of insurgent behavior that can reproduce ISIS results. Finally, what models exist are not detailed enough either to conduct detailed experiments testing proposed explanations of ISIS, or evaluate policy responses aimed at containing or mitigating ISIS. The paper offers several contributions. First it proposes a dynamic hypothesis that the Islamic State (ISIS) is an emerging-state actor, a new form of actor that differs from traditional non- state actors and insurgencies. Propositions are constructed and presented as an overall theory of emerging-state actor behavior. These propositions are then simulated as experiments within a detailed model parameterized with conditions very similar to what ISIS faced in Iraq and Syria 2013. The model is then run from 2013-2020, and experiment results confirm evidence of emerging- state actor behavior and allow refinement of model boundary assumptions. Second, an initial set of intervention policies are tested in a variety of conditions: best case, operationally constrained, isolated, combined, and at different timing intervals. Analysis of the results yields key dynamic insights. These insights aid policy makers in understanding the challenges posed by emerging state actors. Finally, the detailed simulation model used to test the propositions and policy analysis, including a novel approach to combat simulation with endogenous geospatial feedback, is provided in full detail in two Appendices. Appendix A provides a sector-by-sector view of model structure and equations. Appendix B provides more discussion, analysis and sources used to develop model structure, establish parameter values and determine equations for the simulation. Due to length and other considerations, Appendix B is available only upon request. The detailed simulation model can be used to refine non-state actor theories (configured for insurgencies, emerging-state actors, or other scenarios). The model can be loaded with other scenarios to simulate other actors in other geospatial terrain: ISIS in Libya, Boko Haram in Nigeria, the returning Taliban in Afghanistan, etc. Keywords: ISIS, ISIL, DAESH, insurgency, conflict, security, stability, non-state actor, emerging- state actor, combat simulator, geospatial, national security.

Although all Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) interact with non-state actors (NSAs) in some capacity, the extent to which NSAs are granted participatory roles in the governance of IGOs varies substantially. Why do some intergovernmental organizations - intergovernmental clubs of sovereign states - extend access, participatory opportunity or even participatory rights, to non-state actors? The goal of this project is to address the question of variation. I investigate the interests of the actors with power to determine the rules regarding engagement with NSAs - member states and IGO secretariats - and identify specific incentives for each actor to establish rules or practice of engagement with NSAs in each type of engagement. I find that the member states and secretariats that determine these engagement practices benefit from the inclusion or participation of NSAs in specific and predictable ways. By identifying the interests and incentives of the relevant actors, it is possible to predict the creation of particular sorts of engagement and explain variation in those engagement mechanisms across different intergovernmental organizations. I test the proposed relationship between IGO interests and participatory rules through examination of the United Nations system and three UN organizations: The UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). I find that the historical evidence supports an interest-based theory for the granting of participation rights to NSAs within IGOS. Secretariats frequently support selective partnerships with NSAs for the purpose of advancing their mission, and assemblies generally prefer to establish informal consultation mechanisms rather than formal rights of participation for NSAs. Formal participation rights linked to the member-state venue of an IGO assembly are advanced only when in the shadow of strong support from states, or where the assembly recognizes that NSA participation provides benefits that cannot be gained through informal consultation alone. / Political Science

This diploma thesis is focusing on the problem of violent non-state actors and their relationship with a state. Firstly, a non-state actor is seen with the optics of the theories of international relations. Non state actors are classified in line with existing theoretical research about their behavior. Secondly, they are viewed from the perspective of international law. Furthermore, the thesis deals with a state and the options the state has for a combat against those violent non-state actors. Afterwards, four case studies are presented. They illustrate the behavior of state and non-state actors, each example represents one of the categories determined in the theoretical part of the thesis. The aim of the case studies is to categorize the instruments which might be used by the state against non-state actors and to systematize the violent non-state actor's classification as the theoretical research on this field is still being overlooked and is lacking coherence.

The thesis applies the neomedieval theoretical framework on the contemporary political map of the world. The thesis argues, that the contemporary international politics cannot be understood by an application of the unified geopolitical setting and that the key divergencies in the geopolitical environment play a crucial role for the actors operating in different regions. As an outcome of the theoretical works dealing with the selected theory, a three-world model is being presented dividing the political map among these settings - Durable Disorder (defined by networking and privatization), Westphalian System (defined by a dominant position of strong centralized state), and Chaotic Anarchy (lacking stable political power and control over means of violence). This model is consequently applied on the global political map with the consequent analysis of the strategies of different actors located inside specific environments and mutual interactions of these three worlds.

This thesis wants to make clear the theoretical concept in the form of a testable hypothesis on the relationship between the political control of the territory by a Violent Non-State Actor (VNSA) and the effectiveness of realization of its political objective (policies). Since in the literature there is no explicit theory or theorization that would reflect the varying degree of effectiveness with regard to the varying degree of territorial penetration, and there are no explicit parametric indicators and values that may be necessary for effective achievement of the political objective in relation to the territory, the purpose of the research will be to answer the question whether, how and to what extent the intensity of the physical penetration of the territory is related to the ability to more easily and efficiently achieve the goals for which the VNSA has been established and has strived. A general definition of threshold values of the penetration can also provide partial piece of knowledge for practical policies and approaches to territorial VNSA on the part of states (counterinsurgency actors). Although there is no explicit use of any of the theories of international relations in the research, the used theoretical framework is inspired by a) approaches to political geography and outlines of...

Informal settlements are a relatively new phenomenon in Yemen, first documented in the 1980s (El-Shorbagi, 2008; 2007). They have since grown at a very rapid rate. Sana'a City, the nation's capital, alone has an estimated 35 informal settlements that together contain 20.5 percent of that urban center's population (El-Shorbagi, 2008; 2007). To date, the Yemeni government has paid limited attention to informal settlements. The government has not developed any specific planning policies to address their needs, partly due to meager resources and professional capacities, and partly as a consequence of conflicting (and higher priority) needs (World Bank, 2010a). The unchecked growth of informal settlements has alarmed local and national authorities as well as international organizations and recently caused officials in these entities to begin to consider seriously how to address this new community reality. This dissertation explores the engagement of state and non-state actors in informal settlement governance in Sana'a. The analysis offered here employs Mahwa Aser, the largest and most controversial informal settlement in Sana'a, as an exemplar for a broader set of concerns for all of Sana'a\s informal communities. The dissertation provides a nuanced portrait of Yemeni government capacities, policies, and practices related to Sana'a's informal settlements generally and to Mahwa Aser particularly via the perspectives and activities of multiple stakeholders, including, importantly, the community's residents. It explores the active governance roles of non-governmental and international organizations seeking to provide services in these communities as well. It also explores ways to build informal community residents' capacities to work with government and with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and international governmental organizations (IGOs) to address their many basic needs. The analysis draws on personal interviews with key stakeholders, including long-time residents of Mahwa Aser, responsible government officials, and relevant leaders of NGOs, INGOs, and IGOs in Yemen, U.S.A., and Egypt. The author also examined government and international organization reports and documents to gain insight into the governance challenges linked to continued growth of informal communities in Yemen. The study identifies a number of factors that have led to worsening living conditions in Mahwa Aser and other informal settlements in Sana'a. Taken together they suggest the Yemeni government and its partners may need to work far more self-consciously with informal community residents to establish shared goals and clear expectations. Those entities engaged collectively in governing these communities in Sana'a and in Yemen more generally will need to develop reliable policies and coherent programs within a transparent governance framework if the very difficult living conditions in such communities are to be improved. In particular, governance actors will need to devise ways and means to develop government capacities and resources even as they work to address community infrastructure and service needs in a sometimes daunting socio-cultural and economic context. / Ph. D.

In the last three decades, civil conflicts have become more complex and intractable than in the past. One reason for this development is the proliferation of rebel groups within the armed oppositions involved in these conflicts. Today, armed oppositions are more likely to be movements composed of loosely connected or competing rebel groups rather than unitary blocs. Yet, despite their centrality to the dynamics of conflict, different structural characteristics of and competitive and power relations within armed oppositions have not been taken in adequate account as possible predictors of civil conflict outcomes. To further our knowledge and cover this gap in the scholarship, the dissertation investigates how and to what extent the fragmentation, internal competition, and internal power distribution of armed oppositions affect civil conflict termination. The dissertation develops a theory that sees the fragmentation of, a moderate and severe competition, and a dispersed distribution of power within armed oppositions as having an impact on the fighting effectiveness of the rebels, the countereffort of the government, bargaining problems, and the intensity of the conflict. This impact shapes, in turn, how civil conflicts end. This theory is tested with a nested analysis consisting of a large-N and a small-N analysis. Through the large-N analysis, the dissertation demonstrates that, at a general level, these characteristics of armed oppositions indeed affect how civil conflicts end. Through the small-N analysis, the dissertation further illustrates the causal mechanisms linking these characteristics to specific civil conflict outcomes. With these findings, the dissertation makes two important contributions. First, it provides generalisable conclusions that remedy the limited generalisability of the scholarship on the phenomena under study. Second, it provides indications on how to resolve conflicts in which the involved oppositions are fragmented and bedevilled by internal competition, thus helping disentangle the proverbial complexity of multi-party civil conflicts.

The thesis is devoted to a special actor of international relations - the Holy See, Roman Catholic Church representation. It analyzes its behaviour mainly in the issue of recognition of the new state with the majority use of an official discourse of its diplomatic delegates. Specifically, Holy See's position towards criteria for recognition of the new state, which are recommended for state actors, is observed through its rhetoric. Similarities and differences with the state actor are also scrutinized through comparison with a typical behaviour of small states in foreign policy. Case study of the analysis focuses on the question of Palestine and its worldwide recognition as a state, as this topic has possessed a significant role in foreign policy for long time.

Violent non-state actors have represented a significant challenge for both national and international security in recent decades. One of the many countries that have experienced extensive violence perpetrated by these entities is also Kenya. Particularly armed group called Mungiki managed to become influential security, political, criminal and religious actor. Considering frequent transformations of the group making it difficult to determine what type of violent non-state actor Mungiki is, the group still represents a challenging case for researchers to fully comprehend. To contribute to the understanding of this entity and extend contemporary knowledge of violent non-state actors, this study aims to conceptualize individual phases of Mungiki development and discover mechanisms behind its recurrent metamorphoses from one type of violent actor to another. Based on the review of existing literature focused on violent non-state actors, their conceptualization, emergence, and transformations, the thesis uses a case-centric process- tracing method aimed at explaining particular outcomes of individual transformations. The study consists of an in-depth analysis of Mungiki development in the context of Kenyan security and political environment. The results indicate that Mungiki represented different types...