The discussion examines the idea that because of its relatively unique nature, commercial law has the distinct ability to evolve and function in the absence of a central coercive authority. While law of a non-commercial nature generally requires the backing of a state through which to derive its efficacy, a great deal of commercial law as it exists today evolves often in the absence of a single coercive authority, shaped largely by market forces outside the purview of any one state power. To this end, we look primarily at transnational commercial law, specifically at what is commonly understood as the new law merchant. It is the central contention of this paper that commercial law stands apart from other forms of law in that it is uniquely equipped to generate norms in situations where a single legislative power is notably not present, as it is largely impacted by the choices and behaviour of individual economic actors. We examine the notion that the manner of interaction implied by commercial intercourse involves a higher degree of overall engagement. This we term ‘high engagement’, which we divide into two elements: repetition and game creation, which with reciprocity, works in tandem to produce identifiable legal norms and the subsequent compliance with them. In Part I, after presenting a brief overview of the idea of reciprocity and spontaneous law theory, a more detailed explanation of the notion of engagement is offered. In Part II, we set out exactly how high engagement facilitates the development of and compliance with legal norms. Finally, the conclusion this paper reaches is that this element of high engagement, a salient characteristic of commercial interaction, plays a decisive role in the ability of commercial law to evolve and function in the vacuum of a central legislative authority.

The discussion examines the idea that because of its relatively unique nature, commercial law has the distinct ability to evolve and function in the absence of a central coercive authority. While law of a non-commercial nature generally requires the backing of a state through which to derive its efficacy, a great deal of commercial law as it exists today evolves often in the absence of a single coercive authority, shaped largely by market forces outside the purview of any one state power. To this end, we look primarily at transnational commercial law, specifically at what is commonly understood as the new law merchant. It is the central contention of this paper that commercial law stands apart from other forms of law in that it is uniquely equipped to generate norms in situations where a single legislative power is notably not present, as it is largely impacted by the choices and behaviour of individual economic actors. We examine the notion that the manner of interaction implied by commercial intercourse involves a higher degree of overall engagement. This we term ‘high engagement’, which we divide into two elements: repetition and game creation, which with reciprocity, works in tandem to produce identifiable legal norms and the subsequent compliance with them. In Part I, after presenting a brief overview of the idea of reciprocity and spontaneous law theory, a more detailed explanation of the notion of engagement is offered. In Part II, we set out exactly how high engagement facilitates the development of and compliance with legal norms. Finally, the conclusion this paper reaches is that this element of high engagement, a salient characteristic of commercial interaction, plays a decisive role in the ability of commercial law to evolve and function in the vacuum of a central legislative authority.

The discussion examines the idea that because of its relatively unique nature, commercial law has the distinct ability to evolve and function in the absence of a central coercive authority. While law of a non-commercial nature generally requires the backing of a state through which to derive its efficacy, a great deal of commercial law as it exists today evolves often in the absence of a single coercive authority, shaped largely by market forces outside the purview of any one state power. To this end, we look primarily at transnational commercial law, specifically at what is commonly understood as the new law merchant. It is the central contention of this paper that commercial law stands apart from other forms of law in that it is uniquely equipped to generate norms in situations where a single legislative power is notably not present, as it is largely impacted by the choices and behaviour of individual economic actors. We examine the notion that the manner of interaction implied by commercial intercourse involves a higher degree of overall engagement. This we term ‘high engagement’, which we divide into two elements: repetition and game creation, which with reciprocity, works in tandem to produce identifiable legal norms and the subsequent compliance with them. In Part I, after presenting a brief overview of the idea of reciprocity and spontaneous law theory, a more detailed explanation of the notion of engagement is offered. In Part II, we set out exactly how high engagement facilitates the development of and compliance with legal norms. Finally, the conclusion this paper reaches is that this element of high engagement, a salient characteristic of commercial interaction, plays a decisive role in the ability of commercial law to evolve and function in the vacuum of a central legislative authority. / Law, Faculty of / Graduate

This essay conducts a Plausibility Probe Case Study focused on how the UN and the wider international community have approached the civil war in Ethiopia. Because the Ethiopian Government has been unable to protect its population, Ethiopia can be considered a typical case for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P was introduced in response to the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica and builds upon the idea of the international community having a responsibility to assist states to protect their populations. R2P’s normative status remains debated, however, due to criticism directed against R2P’s third pillar which prescribes the international community a responsibility to act when a state is unwilling or unable to protect its population. Therefore, scholars have started to analyse R2P’s status by the use of Finnemore & Sikkink’s Norm Life Cycle Theory, disagreeing about R2P’s normative strength and whether R2P will ever be able to enter the third stage of the Norm Life Cycle (NLC). This essay applies the same theory to the empirical findings from the Ethiopian case with the primary aim to contribute to the debate about R2P’s normative status. Findings show how R2P seems to be positioned at the second stage of the NLC. This does not necessarily mean that R2P should be considered a weak norm as the UN and the international community have indirectly complied with R2P when approaching the Ethiopian conflict. Yet, the fact that none of the relevant actors under study has mentioned R2P explicitly indicates how R2P still remains a controversial norm within international politics.