The main thesis of this study is that since 1990 South Africa has conducted its nuclear diplomacy by constructing certain norms and its identity in a particular way to serve its national interests. A constructivist analysis of South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy concerning the nuclear non-proliferation export control regimes; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); the Pelindaba Treaty; and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) suggests that South Africa’s application of three typical middle power diplomatic strategies, namely confrontation, cooperation and parallelism have enabled the country to secure a niche role for itself that has provided the country with some material and non-material rewards. South Africa’s membership of some of the major nuclear export control regimes reflects its socialisation of the norms of non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. South Africa has incorporated aspects of this regime in its nuclear export trade policies and national nuclear-related institutions. Despite this, the South African government’s efforts were undermined by a series of contentious nuclear proliferation-related incidents, most notably the involvement of South Africans in the AQ Khan network. South Africa was a founder member of the IAEA in 1957. Despite this early role in norm construction, South Africa’s relations with the IAEA deteriorated as international opposition to its apartheid policies escalated. Defying international isolation, the country embarked on a nuclear weapons programme that produced six atomic devices. South Africa returned to its designated seat for Africa on the IAEA Board of Governors in 1995. A vocal opponent of the discriminatory nature of the IAEA Statute and supporter of all countries’ right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, South Africa’s influence in the Agency expanded. Despite this, the country’s candidate for the position of IAEA Director General was not elected. Africa’s position on nuclear non-proliferation originated in the 1960s. Once South Africa’s domestic policies became known and suspicions of its nuclear weapons programme grew, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) turned its focus to condemnation of South Africa. As a result of the political transition in South Africa; its ratification of the NPT; and the IAEA’s verification process, South Africa joined Africa to establish the African nuclear weapons free zone in terms of the Pelindaba Treaty. As a result the country was elected to chair and host the AFCONE. Despite its historical opposition to the NPT, the country ratified the Treaty in 1991 and has constructed its niche role in the NPT regime through its problem-solving and bridge building roles at various NPT conferences. Therefore, this study concludes that South Africa’s post-1990 nuclear diplomacy has maintained a normative foundation; employed various diplomatic strategies; and was conducted in compliance with the set objectives of the country’s foreign policy. In this, the analysis of the nuclear diplomacy of a state such as South Africa, which discontinued its nuclear weapons programme, provided insights into nuclear diplomacy in general and the nuclear diplomacy of states similar to the South African situation. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Political Sciences / unrestricted

Yes / This paper develops a novel approach to understanding North Korea's nuclear policy on the basis of conflict transformation theory. By conceptualizing the situation on the Korean peninsula as a protracted conflict (either between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea or North Korea and the United States), new insights into the nature of the protracted cycle of engagement and conflict with North Korea can be developed. In this context, the role and trajectory of the nuclear program can be analyzed and both the failure of and the need for arms control negotiations understood. The paper shows that the use of conflict transformation theory provides an analytically coherent explanation of North Korean security policy and foreign policy behavior that fits the empirical evidence more closely than alternative approaches. The paper assesses the current policy of "strategic patience" vis-à-vis North Korea and demonstrates how it is based on false assumptions and involves risks that need to be addressed by the United States and the international community. This paper presents a novel approach to analyzing the puzzle of North Korean foreign policy behavior with important implications for understanding the nature of the conflict and possible conditions for its resolution. / This article was originally published in North Korean Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2017), by McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers.

Dès janvier 1957, après la crise de Suez, Macmillan donna toute priorité à la refondation de la « relation spéciale » anglo-américaine ; en juin 1958, de Gaulle revint au pouvoir, avec l’ambition de pratiquer une politique étrangère fondée sur l’indépendance nationale vis-à-vis des Etats-Unis. La volonté gaullienne de faire émerger une autonomie européenne entra en opposition avec la politique de la Grande-Bretagne, visant à maximiser son influence globale au sein de l’Alliance atlantique. Le heurt entre ces deux orientations fondamentales, d’abord latent, déboucha sur un schisme politico-stratégique entre Paris et Londres, que de Gaulle choisit de proclamer publiquement le 14 janvier 1963 en refusant l’entrée de la Grande-Bretagne dans la Communauté Economique Européenne et l’offre anglo-américaine de partenariat nucléaire. A la lumière des archives diplomatiques françaises et britanniques, cette thèse se concentre sur une question essentielle, mais jusqu’ici insuffisamment étudiée : le rôle qu’aura joué la relation franco-britannique et en particulier sa dimension politico-stratégique à une époque cruciale pour la constitution de l’architecture de sécurité euro-atlantique dans un monde dominé par la guerre froide. En croisant les perspectives européenne et transatlantique, cette étude montre le lien entre la construction politico-stratégique de l’Europe et les évolutions de l’OTAN et permet ainsi de mieux comprendre certaines tendances fondamentales de la politique étrangère de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne dans la longue durée, ces deux pays représentant depuis lors des positions extrêmes dans le débat opposant atlantistes et partisans de l’« Europe européenne ». / From January 1957 onwards, following the Suez crisis, Macmillan prioritised the rebuilding of the Anglo-American “Special Relationship”; in June 1958, de Gaulle returned to power, with the ambition to deliver a foreign policy grounded in the principle of French national independence from the United States. De Gaulle’s desire to promote a strategic European autonomy came into conflict with a British foreign policy designed to maximise British influence within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. The fundamental clash between these two directions of travel, latent at first, resulted in a politico-strategic schism between Paris and London, which de Gaulle chose to expose publicly on January 14, 1963, by vetoing the British entry into the European Economic Community and turning down the Anglo-American offer of a nuclear partnership.Drawing on the French and British diplomatic archives, this thesis will examine a crucial question which, until now, has been insufficiently analysed: the role that Anglo-French relations played, especially their politico-strategic dimension, during a period which proved crucial for building the architecture of Euro-Atlantic security, in a world dominated by the Cold War. By bringing together European and transatlantic perspectives, this study demonstrates the links between the politico-strategic dimension of the European project and the development of NATO, and thus improves our understanding of fundamental long-term trends in British and French foreign policies, namely how, from that point on, Britain and France came to represent two antagonistic positions within the debate between Atlanticists and supporters of “European Europe”.

Masters of Commerce / Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is one of the most dangerous materials in the world, because it is a key ingredient in making a nuclear bomb. If a terrorist organisation can get HEU, it would be close to making a nuclear bomb. After South Africa disarmed its nuclear weapons, it kept HEU that was extracted from the nuclear bombs. The US tried to persuade South Africa to blend down its HEU into low enriched uranium (LEU) or give it up for safekeeping. However, South Africa refused to give it up. After a breach at Pelindaba, a national key point facility where South Africa stores its HEU, the US intensified its efforts to pressure South Africa to give its HEU up. It even promised incentives to South Africa should they agree to give it up, but South Africa refused. The US used the nuclear terrorism narrative to justify its initiative to eliminate vulnerable materials in the world. However, South Africa is yet to be swayed. This is odd since South Africa's refusal can negatively affect its credentials as a nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament champion and its image as a norm entrepreneur. The objective of the study was to understand the role played by HEU in South Africa's nuclear diplomacy. It was to explore HEU as a factor in the state's nuclear diplomacy and to understand the power of having HEU in nuclear negotiations, as well as what SA intends to do with its HEU. The study is framed theoretically by drawing on foreign policy theory, namely middle-power theory, and revisionism. It juxtaposed middle power, reformist, and revisionist positions with status quo foreign policy to analyse the role of HEU in South Africa's nuclear diplomacy. As a middle power with a moral high ground, South Africa hoped that it can affect change in the nuclear regime. However, when this did not occur its foreign policy shifted to a revisionist character that is discontent with the status quo in the nuclear regime. SA is dissatisfied with the current nuclear order and wants it revised towards liberal values such as equality and non-discrimination. It views the current nuclear order as nuclear apartheid. Therefore, South Africa uses HEU as leverage against nuclear weapon states in nuclear diplomacy. It is using HEU as an act of defiance against nuclear weapon states (such as the US) that are yet to disarm their nuclear weapons.