Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. / A U.S.-led naval operation in October 2003 interdicted a shipment of uranium-enrichment components on-board a German cargo ship traveling from Dubai to Libya. In December 2003, Libya announced it would halt its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and eliminate its existing stockpiles under international verification and supervision. The George W. Bush Administration proclaimed the interdiction a triumph for the newly created Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an activity which was announced five months earlier to interdict, through the threat or actual use of force, land, sea, and air trafficking of WMD at the earliest possible point. Despite increasing international support, numerous joint exercises, and the successful Libyan intercept, the PSI faces serious legal, intelligence, and operational challenges to sustained effectiveness. This thesis takes a close look at these challenges and considers how they can be overcome. I conclude that overcoming these challenges will require a multilateral trusted information network to augment secretive bilateral intelligence sharing, a PSI-specific legal umbrella to replace current reliance on only partially applicable international laws and resolutions, and an interoperable, team approach to operations that takes advantage of industry's technological improvements in detection technology and is conscious of air-intercept restrictions. / Major, United States Air Force

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited / Throughout twenty-five years of strained relations, U.S. policy efforts have delayed but not thwarted Iran's clandestine nuclear weapons program, largely because Washington has failed to influence Iran's motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons. There are three main motivations behind Iran's nuclear program. First, at the systemic level, external threats drive Iran's perceived need for a nuclear deterrent. Second, at the individual level, well placed governmental elites propel the nuclear security myth to spur nationalistic support for nuclear weapons. Third, at the state level, institutional bureaucracies, created to build Iran's nuclear infrastructure, now compete against other organizations for their own self interests, which are closely associated with the continued development of nuclear weapons. The thesis recommends three policy tracks, addressing causal factors at each level. First, the United States should try to create a new Gulf Security organization, including Iran and the new Iraqi government, to build a collective security environment without nuclear weapons. Second, Washington should build a multilateral coalition to contain Iranian proliferation activities while offering economic incentives for Iranian disarmament. Third, the United States should work to discredit Iran's nuclear security myth by fostering a public debate within Iran on the costs of nuclear weapons, using U.S.-run media. / Major, United States Air Force

Do Russia and the United States share the same views of nuclear proliferation? This thesis seeks to answer this question by considering the case of Iran. Both nations are concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons, yet have taken opposing stances on Iran's nuclear program. The United States contends that Iran is using its civilian nuclear program to build an atomic weapon. Russia, on the other hand, does not publicly acknowledge such a view. The conclusions of this thesis are that threat perceptions have shaped U.S. and Russian views of nuclear proliferation. Both countries have supported Iran's nuclear program, but their timing coincided with major shifts in Iran's diplomatic orientation. When the Cold War ended, they were left with contrasting threat perceptions of Iran / Russia viewed Iran as a geo-strategic trading partner, while the United States viewed it as a sponsor of international terrorism. More importantly, this thesis highlights how vital it is for members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to remain united in their effort to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. If IAEA members cannot agree on the risks of proliferation, then the very foundation upon which the nonproliferation regime rests is in danger of obsolescence.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies(Homeland Security and Defense))--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Yost, David S. ; Wirtz, James J. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 27, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, nuclear weapons. Includes bibliographical references (p. 53-58). Also available in print.

An indirect crisis, the terrorist attacks of September 1 1 , is used as a catalyst to review the tasks of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime. However, it is insufficient to initiate a comprehensive change to the regime to incorporate the challenge from non-state nuclear terrorism. There will not be a change of regime, understood in terms of principles and norms. Yet, potential for change within the regime exists, with regard to rules and procedures. This is demonstrated by analysing the organisational and state levels of the regime through a synthesis of rationalist and weak-cognitivist assumptions. The organisational level is more adaptable in light of new information and more susceptible to change. Two factors limit this change. Member states will handle issues arising from the crisis outside the venue of the regime. Also, consensual knowledge among actors remains key for significant change to occur. An indirect crisis lacks the force to cultivate an epistemic community able to promote such knowledge among decision-makers.

Thesis (M.A.). / Written for the Dept. of Political Science. Title from title page of PDF (viewed 2008/07/28). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision-Making and Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, Sept. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Peter Lavoy, Jeff Knopf. Includes bibliographical references (p. 87-92). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Mikhail Tsypkin. Includes bibliographical references (p. 85-93). Also available online.

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Stanford University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 241-300).