One of the most critical tasks facing the world in the post-cold war era is to eliminate nuclear proliferation. With the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the subject of nuclear proliferation has returned to the forefront of international politics. Taking issue with the complacent belief that only a few states unnecessarily jeopardize international peace by acquiring nuclear weapons, I argue that many states in territorial protracted conflict are generally proliferants because of their specific security concerns. Demonstrating how individual and domestic level motivations are not the key determinants of the nuclear choices of the South Asian and Middle Eastern states, I emphasize the role of systemic level motivation, particularly security, in their nuclear decisions. Through a close examination of these states' nuclear weapons choices, I develop a new appraisal of the territorial protracted conflict states' potential to proliferate. While high war-probability has provoked virtually all of these protracted conflict states to seek nuclear deterrent capability and become proliferants, the variations in the type of conflict, regional power structure and geographical proximity have brought about variations in the pace of proliferation among these states. Finally, I expand the implications of this study for IR theory, especially with regard to Realist theory, nuclear deterrence, post-cold war world order, and nuclear arms control treaties. I conclude that the resolution of the roots of regional conflicts will most effectively ensure that more states do not embark on a nuclear weapons program. It is, however, naive to expect the new nuclear states to roll back their weapons programs.

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