Thesis (LL.M.)--University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print.

published_or_final_version / Law / Master / Master of Laws

Thesis, Dijon, 1911 / Bibliography

The traditional approach to corporate governance in Canada has centered on shareholders. This model of governance is commonly referred to as shareholder primacy. The shareholder primacy model has recently been rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples v. Wise and BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders. This paper will be argued that directors should be required to focus exclusively on increasing shareholder value in the change of control context. It is within the change of control context that shareholders most require fiduciary protection. In addition, the shareholder primacy rule provides an enforceable standard for evaluating the actions of directors. As stakeholders have a variety of mechanisms to ensure that their interests are not disregarded, they are not in need of fiduciary protection. In contrast, shareholders face greater risks, which validate a need to be protected by an exclusive fiduciary duty in the change of control context.

The traditional approach to corporate governance in Canada has centered on shareholders. This model of governance is commonly referred to as shareholder primacy. The shareholder primacy model has recently been rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples v. Wise and BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders. This paper will be argued that directors should be required to focus exclusively on increasing shareholder value in the change of control context. It is within the change of control context that shareholders most require fiduciary protection. In addition, the shareholder primacy rule provides an enforceable standard for evaluating the actions of directors. As stakeholders have a variety of mechanisms to ensure that their interests are not disregarded, they are not in need of fiduciary protection. In contrast, shareholders face greater risks, which validate a need to be protected by an exclusive fiduciary duty in the change of control context.

Purpose: The thesis aims to explore the roles that board directors undertake and understand whether there is an impact of the external organisational environment as well as several board characteristics on these roles. Design/ Methodology Approach: Building on existing literature a model is developed to test hypothesized relationships—i.e. directors’ roles with external environment and board characteristics. Measurements are designed—withdrawing them from the literature—to collect quantitative data from directors of UK organisations. The responses were collected from 115 directors working in UK organisations. Principal component analysis is conducted to reduce the data and propose a set of directors’ roles and correlation as well as regression analyses are utilised in order to test the hypothesised relationships. Findings: The results of the principal component analysis propose a set of six distinct roles for board directors, providing a new framework for future researchers. In addition, it is found that both the external environment and the board characteristics have some impact on what directors do, extending the limited empirical evidence found in the literature. However, the theoretical framework needs further examination and research. Limitations/Future Recommendations: The current thesis is evidenced by various limitations. Firstly, additional constructs can be added as determinants of the directors’ roles. Secondly, the response rate in the survey is low, which is regarded as a limitation, although there are limited studies offering quantitative results from board members.

Thesis (S. J. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Auburn University, 2007. / Abstract. Vita. Includes bibliographic references (ℓ. 88-96)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1970. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 117-121).

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