Voters are getting information from more and more sources. Along with this proliferation of sources has come an increasing distrust of traditional mass media. This has created a challenge for voters who seek reliable information when making decisions in the voting booth; including on ballot initiatives. Because voters tend to find ballot initiatives confusing and not easily informed by traditional party cues, the Citizen's Initiative Review (CIR) and the non-partisan, fact-based recommendations they produce have now spread into multiple states. This thesis seeks to gauge whether the CIR is effective at achieving the goals of increasing voter knowledge and encouraging thoughtful voting decisions; two challenges posed by ballot initiatives. I evaluate the available literature on how voters make decisions in general and about ballot initiatives specifically and then review data from five studies conducted in states with a CIR to determine whether the CIR has met these goals. Where other reports have evaluated findings from individual studies or states, my report takes a comprehensive view of the available data and compares it to what traditional political science literature has to say about voter behavior related to ballot initiatives. On balance, I find that voters see the CIR as providing useful and informative recommendations that have legitimate positive impacts on how they deliberate and vote on ballot initiatives.

On March 23 - 26, 1898, Populists, Democrats, and Silver Republicans of Oregon held their state conventions in Portland and agreed upon a common platform and a common state ticket for the elections of June 6, 1898. None of the available works on Oregon history explains that this fusion was the culmination of a two-year effort to unite the reform forces the state. This thesis tries to fill the gap. Because of the lack of secondary works on the subject, the thesis is based mainly on two sources: newspapers on microfilm, especially The Oregonian; and the unpublished correspondence of party chairman Cooper (January, 1897 - February, 1898, in the Oregon Historical Society). It will be seen that the party was at first a local party, dealing especially with economic problems, and then broadened its scope to embrace Populist principles. The first chapter deals with the national background. It briefly reviews the currency legislation since 1834 and the economic situation, especially of farmers, in the wake of the panic of 1893. The National Silver Party is discussed, because the Union Bimetallic Party of Oregon may have been intended as a state branch of this national organization. The terms "free coinage of silver" and "bimetallism" are explained, and the demand for direct legislation, arising in the early 1890's, is alluded to with special reference to Oregon. In the second chapter the origin of the Union Bimetallic Party is traced to splits over the money question within the Republican Party of Yamhill County. After the new party had scored a complete victory in the county elections, it was expanded into other counties; the first state convention was held on July 9, 1896. The presidential election of November, 1896, and the ''hold-up''-legislature of 1897 are dealt with as far as members of the Union Bimetallic Party were involved. After months of inactivity the party was revitalized in the spring of 1897 and further expanded in the following months. Emphasis is laid upon the internal debate over union or fusion, e.g., whether the old party organizations should .be dissolved or maintained. This question was decided in January, 1898, in favor of the latter solution and the Union Bimetallic Party was thus reduced to a coordinating body and practically became superfluous. The fifth chapter deals with several forces which were detrimental to the Union cause: the return of prosperity since the spring of 1897; the chronic lack of funds; the rumors about alleged secret deals with Mitchell Republicans and Pennoyer Democrats; and the resistance of Mid-road Populists. The proceedings of the state conventions of 1898 are described. As far as the campaign is concerned, only the impact of the war with Spain is alluded to. On June 6, 1898, the Union forces suffered a severe defeat; some reasons for this defeat are given.

This research identifies variables that determined the amount of autonomy Oregon's gubernatorial leadership possessed in formulating and implementing the Regional Strategies program, centerpiece of industrial policy in Oregon during the latter half of the 1980s. The literature on state industrial policy points to instances in which the leaders of America's state governments are acting autonomously. Gubernatorial actors appear to be formulating industrial policy goals independent of powerful non-state groups and other state actors and developing the capacity to transform their policy preferences into authoritative actions. The literature is largely devoid, however, of any systematic accounting of the variables that determine the extent to which gubernatorial actors possess autonomy. Drawing upon interviews with key actors involved in formulating and implementing the Regional Strategies initiative and document research, this case study points to five principal sources of variation in gubernatorial success. These are as follows: (I) Economic crisis. The inability of longstanding industrial recruitment practices to reconcile divisions caused by Oregon's deepest recession since the Great Depression eroded support for existing state economic development arrangements, enabling Oregon's newly elected Governor Neil Goldschmidt to reform state economic development policy along industrial policy lines and accumulate discretionary authority for state economic development spending denied his predecessors. (2) The division of power between the executive and legislative branches of Oregon state government. Reacting to tensions founded in localism, regionalism, and concern with having its authority usurped, Oregon's legislature placed limitations upon Governor Goldschmidt's industrial policy mandate. Legislatively-enforced measures precluded the competitive evaluation of local economic restructuring plans, frustrating a key Administration goal, and instead made equity and political expediency the driving force behind key industrial policy decisions. Legislators also denied the Administration authority it was seeking over semi-autonomous state agencies, impeding its plan to consolidate control over state economic development policymaking. 3) State fiscal capacity. Industrial recruitment's failure led voters to establish a statewide lottery with proceeds dedicated to economic development. The lottery expanded Oregon's fiscal capacity for economic development, providing the Goldschmidt administration an instrument with which to fund industrial policy. (4) The degree to which local interests were fiscally dependent upon state revenues. Administration success in securing key industrial policy goals was a direct consequence of its ability to use the discretionary authority it possessed over lottery spending to enforce local compliance with its policy preferences. The Administration proved more successful in circumstances in which local authorities were fiscally dependent upon gubernatorial controlled state lottery revenues for funding local economic development projects than in instances in which local interests were independent of the state for revenues. (5) The character of private capital investment. Economic development is contingent upon the investment of private assets, over which Oregon's political leadership exercised little direct control. The failure of anticipated private investment to materialize frustrated Administration plans to use lottery money to leverage private investment in favored projects. Investment induced by Oregon's industrial policy initiative was likely to promote job growth in low wage sectors, frustrating the Administration's goal of using industrial policy to generate high wage jobs.

The thesis examines the role of partisanship in two sessions of the Oregon Legislature. Both the Oregon Senate and the Oregon House of Representatives were examined for the 56th (1971) and the 57th (1973) session. Indicies of partisanship, or party cohesion were developed for both parties in both houses during both sessions. Each legislator was also assigned an index of partisanship. The indicies of partisanship for the parties were the average percentage of the members of the two parties voting together on those issues which underwent "party votes." A party vote was defined as any vote on which the majority of one party was opposed by at . least the majority of the other party. The individual index of partisanship for each legislator was that percentage of time the legislator was on the same side as the majority of his or her party during party votes. These two indices, of party partisanship and individual partisanship allowed comparison of the parties themselves and various subgroups within the parties such as urban legislators, legislators under thirty years of age and women legislators. All calculation was done by means of a special program on an IBM 1130 computer.

Oregon in 1922 was the scene of significant Ku Klux Klan activity. This thesis examines the interrelationship of the Klan, the press of Oregon, the gubernatorial race of that year and the passage of the Compulsory School Act. In addition, one chapter covers the ultimate fate of the Compulsory School Act in the courts. Specific material in this thesis is derived principally from newspapers and periodicals of the time, although general sources on the Ku Klux Klan were utilized for the broader discussions of the situations. The existence of the Ku Klux Klan in Oregon in 1922 directly affected both the passage of the Compulsory School Act and the election of Walter Pierce. The roles of the state’s newspapers were mixed. Two were quite outspoken on the issues of the Klan and the Compulsory School act, while most took less forthright stands. It was in the United States Supreme Court, however, that the final decision on the compulsory School Act was made.