This thesis examines the consequences of an increased institutional involvement in the recently emerging lending business known as peer-to-peer lending (P2PL). Since the P2PL business itself is a type of originate-to-distribute (OTD) lending model – in which the originator never carries the risk for the loans – this thesis investigates the effects it can have on the quality of the screening of potential borrowers, and if it could create a misalignment of interests between different stakeholders in the P2PL market. It also examines how the information asymmetry in the screening process is affecting moral hazard behavior and adverse selection problems. From the empirical research – which was gathered from interviews with significant participants in the Swedish P2PL market and the financial market as a whole – the authors find that an increased institutional involvement seems to come hand-in-hand with an increased loan volume, which creates incentives for the P2PL companies to ease their screening of borrowers and thus decreasing the average quality of the loans they originate. Furthermore, it shows evidence of great similarities between the current P2PL market and the sub-prime mortgage market that was the cause of the financial crisis in 2008. By comparing different geographic P2PL markets the thesis is providing the reader with four development phases that the P2PL markets seem to follow.